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This thesis critically re-examines the finance-growth nexus. It takes a pluralist approach to 
draw upon the theoretical limitations of the literature and analyse the empirical revisionism 
that has emerged. The narrowness of the literature is seen in the disaggregation of the nexus 
through forms and channels for which finance is alleged to affect growth, neglecting other 
potential causal factors for both or their relationship. The limitations of the threshold analysis 
is taken as a point of departure, teasing out the implications for developing countries, and to 
broaden empirical investigation of the nexus. 
A critical analysis of the nexus in development literature is shown to reveal the gaps in 
understanding of the context and the limitations of measures through which the impact of 
finance on African countries has been analysed. Financial development in Nigeria is critically 
considered to better understand the nature of expanding finance in developing countries. 
With the objective of expanding the empirical literature of the nexus to include the debate on 
the productiveness or not, of the financial sector, an investigation is made into the political 
economy of the treatment of financial services in the System of National Accounts (SNA). The 
narrative on the productiveness of finance is arguably understood as giving potency to the 
nexus. We therefore exclude value added of financial services from GDP and re-estimate the 
threshold analysis of the finance-growth nexus using cross-sectional and panel data estimations 
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CHAPTER 1.0 - INTRODUCTION 
 
"The modern banking system manufactures money out of nothing. The process is 
perhaps the most astounding piece of sleight of hand that was ever invented. Banking 
was conceived in iniquity and born in sin. Bankers own the Earth. Take it away from 
them, but leave them the power to create money, and with the flick of the pen they will 
create enough money to buy it back again...Take this great power away from them and 
all great fortunes like mine will disappear, and they ought to disappear, for then this 
would be a better and happier world to live in. But if you want to continue to be slaves 
of the banks and pay the cost of your own slavery, then let bankers continue to create 
money and control credit". - Josiah Stamp, former member of the board of the Bank of 
England during the 1920's 
 
1.1 Background of Study 
The discussion on the relationship between finance and economic development dates back to 
the 19th Century (Schumpeter, 1911). Despite the deluge of research around this subject, it is 
unlikely that any consensus has been reached regarding the issues around this relationship that 
have been debated over the years. Notable works which point to a positive relationship in the 
nexus include those of Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), Greenwood and 
Jovanovich (1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Pagano (1993), King and Levine (1993), 
Levine and Zervos (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck et al. (2000), Khan et al. (2001) 
and Levine (2005). On the other hand, the works of Gerschenkron (1952), Robinson (1952), 
Minsky (1974), Stiglitz (1989; 2000), Rousseau and Wachtel (2002), and FitzGerald (2006) all 
conclude that the relationship between finance and growth is at best, weak or negative. In fact, 
Lucas (1988) dismisses finance as an over-emphasised determinant of growth. 
The issues being debated in the nexus literature range from the functions of finance through 
causality in the finance-growth nexus, attempts at differentiating productive and unproductive 
forms of finance, mechanism for efficient allocation of finance, the impact of finance across 
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geography and income groups, to the recent attempt at identifying thresholds for the shift from 
positive to negative impact of finance on economic growth and development. Yet, one major 
ideological pillar has stood out amidst these debates: what is now the standard neoclassical 
assumption that a more or less free market system, underpinned by a liberalised financial 
market, is prerequisite for economic growth. Therefore, a strong belief in a putative link 
between finance and growth was formed, despite compelling evidence to the contrary. 
The question often asked is whether or not financial development leads to growth. Much of the 
nexus literature sets outright the objective of dealing with this subject while others dealt with 
it by implication. The general positioning being that, arguments that are inclined to a significant 
positive finance-growth relationship and draw similar conclusions of financial development 
leading to growth tend to imply causality from finance to growth. On the contrary, arguments 
that present a weak or insignificant relationship between finance and growth imply financial 
development is not positively linked to growth and, as such not necessary causal for growth. 
Quite apart from the latter taking the position of no positive causality between finance and 
growth, it can be said that they take the position that finance should not be allowed to grow on 
its own and disproportionately, but used to foster productivity in the real economy. As 
Robinson (1952) succinctly puts it, “where enterprise leads, finance follows”. 
A purported consensus or near-consensus in the finance-growth nexus arguments as reflecting 
a positive and significant relationship position between finance and growth has been alleged 
(Levine 2005; Arcand, et al. 2012), and in the context of African countries, (Murinde, 2012; 
Ikhide, 2015). But this consensus has not been shared by all economists. Dissenters continue 
to debate the issues surrounding the nexus using theory and prevailing evidence to question a 
positive relationship (Arestis and Sawyer, 2005; Philippon, 2008; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 
2015). New evidence, especially in light of the recent financial crisis, has further strengthened 
the argument for the destabilising effect of finance on growth, as such, a negative relationship. 
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Schumpeter’s work laid the early arguments for the process through which finance impacts on 
growth. He asserted that banks can spur innovation just by funding the most productive areas 
of investment. In 1952, Gerschenkron argued in a series of seminal essays that banks evolve in 
the process of industrialisation to take advantage of a set of structural incentives as the economy 
grows, and then channel scarce resources into industrial investment. Therefore, his argument 
centred on a facilitating role of financial development, through the re-allocation of resources 
or the facilitation of information flow in the case of weak entrepreneurship. Following these, 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) analysed the relationship between financial markets and 
economic growth, establishing a strong correlation in the nexus. This empirical work became 
the foundation upon which modern finance-growth nexus has been based. It has however, been 
criticised for lack of a strong theoretical background1. 
Despite the criticisms, economists are generally thought to agree on the functions of financial 
development necessary for economic growth as delineated by McKinnon and Shaw, which are: 
(i) the mobilisation of savings (ii) the allocation of investment to the most productive areas (iii) 
the facilitation of transactions and management of risk and (iv) the exertion of corporate control 
(Barajas et al., 2012). Therefore, financial development was generally understood to mean the 
establishment and expansion of financial capital, financial and non-financial institutions, 
instruments, markets and processes in the flow of savings to investments. The processes depend 
upon, and are facilitated by, financial institutions such as banks, insurance companies, pension 
houses, with all kinds of financial instruments and innovations transacting in the money and 
capital markets. It may include non-financial instruments and foreign liquidity flows as well, 
which serve to expand the market and reflect the extent of financial development (FitzGerald, 
2006). 
                                                          
1 See criticism in Chapter 2 as relates to the use of interest rates in McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). 
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Given the shortcoming of finance in achieving the above objective, some economists now draw 
on a regulatory view for measuring financial development. This can be seen in the definition 
put forward by Arcand et al. (2015, p. 108) in which “financial development relates to the 
financial system’s overall ability to reduce the information, transaction, and enforcement cost 
associated with the intertemporal nature of financial contracts”. If this definition is anything to 
go by, then financial development measures in the nexus literature are misplaced, since proxies 
for regulation are almost always a second measure (in some cases an afterthought), not to 
mention the inability for any regulatory framework to adequately capture the above 
characteristics. Arestis and Sawyer (2005) make a differentiation between financial 
development which is mainly growth in finance and intermediation, and financial liberalisation 
which is the removal of central bank controls over interest rate, especially in developing 
countries. Also, Mazzucato and Shipman (2014) shed light on financial deepening. It is 
understood as the expansion of financial sector’s share of GDP and ratio of money supply to 
GDP. This is achieved through a combination of factors, namely the allocation of more savings 
to investment, lowering interest rates by creating more liquid markets, lowering transaction 
costs through competition, reducing risk by creating futures and options markets and credit 
default swap markets, and liberalised exchange rates. For Demetriades and Rousseau (2011), 
the emphasis for financial development is placed on its quality, as a necessity for growth. 
The differences around terminologies describing developments in finance are by no means 
intransigent but logical and contextual. In this thesis, they will be used interchangeably, and 
with financial institutions, in reference to finance in general. Financial institutions are in 
themselves not restricted, but include central and commercial banks, investment banks and 
non-financial institutions whose primary focus may not necessarily be dealing in financial 
instruments but aid the circulation of finance. Another term which may need clarification in 
scope is growth. It generally refers to increase in (national) output over time. In this thesis, it 
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is used interchangeably with the word development, which is distinguishable in context but not 
necessary to draw on the difference within the scope of the thesis. 
With different positions taken in the literature on the relationship between finance and growth, 
evidence and counter-evidence were provided to justify each position. But of much concern is 
the mixed and contradictory results that research later laid out in this area of economics in 
analysing this relationship. In particular there was intensified use of empirical methods to 
validate the finance-growth nexus theory. Not only were the evidence and results that sought 
to advance the positive finance-growth nexus contradictory, but the capricious measures used 
to capture financial development in such studies were unnervingly incongruent for different 
studies. For example, it is easy to achieve different results for different countries or regions in 
similar studies by sheer manipulation of either data or methodology. As such, similar empirical 
methodologies, most of which had no consideration for the limitations of the use of quantitative 
methods, resulted in contradictory conclusions of the nexus in different studies. Such 
differences are then explained away by exhuming some exogenous factors which are argued to 
be responsible for such. Therefore, results mainly depended on who was investigating the nexus 
rather than on objective enquiry into the real relationship of finance and growth. Qin et al. 
(2016) show the conceptual confusion with many standard econometric techniques. 
This profligacy of the use of both data and methods was dominated by the proponents of a 
significant positive relationship in the finance-growth nexus by employing mainly a one-sided 
empirical approach to the argument. These all go to show a sort of desperate attempt to 
vigorously fabricate a positive relationship in the nexus without any coherent evidence. 
Although the objective to force a merger of finance and growth was met by counter-arguments 
and research that proved otherwise by their results, opposing studies later became subdued by 
the prevailing economic ideology which advanced the pro-nexus arguments. Therefore, what 
looked like a resolution of a long-standing economic debate was rather a seizure by the more 
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popular and politically acceptable position of the role of finance in economic growth, as was 
the case in other areas of economic theory in which the market was alleged to be efficient. In 
this thesis, the broad developments around the expansion of finance, institutions and the far-
reaching scholarship for this advancement are not seen to be unrelated. They are agued to be 
consistent with an ideological pursuit of (private) finance within an increasingly expanding 
capitalist environment. 
Nevertheless, there remains questions regarding the net contribution of finance to output. Tobin 
(1984) put forward that financial development may lead to suboptimal allocation of human 
resources and the social returns of financial development may be lower than its private return. 
This is because as the financial sector grows bigger, talents will migrate from the productive 
sectors of the economy to the financial. Similar concerns have been raised about finance’ net 
contribution to the economy, especially in light of crises in which “the sector requires market 
subvention, system guarantee and corporate bail out” (See Christophers, 2011, p. 113). Also, 
Rajan (2010) demonstrated that through bank bailouts and remuneration structure of bank 
managers, financial development can contribute to inefficiency between social and private 
returns. Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) provide evidence for this view. 
Following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, there has been some reaction against the 
idea that financial markets work more or less perfectly and functionally, and that financial 
development is positively correlated with, let alone causal for development by whatever index. 
Understandably, the renewed scepticism around financial markets is due in part, to the 
devastating impact of the crisis which saw the global stock market shed approximately $25 
trillion, more than a third of its total value at the time, causing bank failures and a reduction in 
domestic lending, export earnings and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to developing countries 
amidst deficit spending. In addition, the Department for International Development (DFID) 
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reported that about ninety million people were pulled back into poverty as a result of the crisis 
(Naude, 2009, p. 14), a figure which may be conservative. 
Also remarkable was the acute reversal of the alleged growth in many developing countries in 
the wake of the crisis, through financial flows and trade (Gurtner, 2010). As such, low income 
countries were as badly-hit as high-income countries with worsening impact on economic 
growth and welfare as they generally lacked sufficient safety nets against any form of 
macroeconomic instability. This was against the backdrop of the argument put forward by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to developing countries by advocates of 
the positive finance-growth nexus that these countries were immune despite aggressive capital 
inflow into them and costly accumulation of currency reserves. Their risk appetite was also 
alleged to be low, as such thought to be ‘crises-resilient’ (Soederberg, 2013, p. 606). Although 
this so-called immunity of developing countries to crises has been contested for some time 
(Diaz-Alejandro, 1985; Eichengreen, 1991; Palma 1998), including directly related to the 2008 
financial crisis (Ghosh, 2008). 
Given the colossal impact of the 2008 financial crisis for both advanced and developing 
countries, it is observed that the weight in the finance-growth nexus argument has shifted, since 
global developments in finance have gone from mainly functional to dysfunctional outcomes 
in nature and form, both at micro and macro levels. It is now evident that the market-efficiency 
theory of finance in relation to economic growth promoted excessive credit taking under the 
guise of capital for investment. Embedded in this is a kind of systemic abuse and high level of 
financial debauchery that causes instability in financial markets and culminates in crises. Given 
this reality, the balance understandably shifts in the direction of the dissenters of the finance-
growth nexus. As such, many economists continue to question the role of finance in 
development (Rodrik, 2008; Wolf, 2009). 
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As observed, this shift in the literature which, although continues to evolve, has moved to a 
threshold analysis, to a non-absolute or minimising role of finance in economic growth. Thus, 
the hitherto generally emphasised role of finance in economic growth is now being revisited 
(Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009; Obstfeld, 2009; Yilmazkuday, 2011; Arcand et al., 2012; 
Barajas et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2012) as finance cannot be conclusively argued to have an 
absolutely positive relationship with growth. More economists, than ever before, now dare to 
question whether there is a level beyond which financial development does not contribute to 
growth and from which it assumes a negative relationship (Arcand et al., 2012). Therefore, it 
becomes difficult to defend financial development in all ramifications and forms in which it is 
presented, ranging from market instruments of all kinds, capital flows, financial integration, 
market liberalisation and financial development in general. Needless to add that this difficulty 
in presenting finance as non-detrimental to development is due to the fact that its flaws may 
outweigh its benefits, a position strongly contested before now but which evidence from the 
2008 financial crisis coincidentally goes to prove (Wolf, 2010). 
Interestingly, the angle from which the shift is being initiated bears evidence that the positive 
nexus side again concede a point in this debate. It is also remarkable that a lot of these changing 
positions are driven by research emanating from the IMF, a reversal of its previously promoted 
ideology of the unequivocally positive role of finance in growth. This position assumed by the 
IMF and World Bank is evident in the proposition of global financial liberalisation leading up 
to the crisis (Fine, 2010). As such, slightly more surprising is that the IMF should have taken 
a lead in much of this revisionist literature, reversing or modifying its previous nostrums. This 
will be discussed in terms of the shifting and complex relationship between scholarship, 
ideology and policy in practice of the IMF and World Bank. 
It is important to recall that the IMF and World Bank arguments for a more liberalised market 
economy to aid developing countries was usually justified on the rationale that an open 
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economy attracts foreign investment, fosters competition and promotes growth. Developing 
countries were, therefore, encouraged to abandon their development banking approach (in 
which credit was directed at certain sectors of the economy by their governments). State-
controlled banking was branded as repressive and growth-reducing, in line with the efficient 
market ideology. This saw the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in 
the 1980s in many developing countries which later on gave rise to high inflation, currency 
depreciations and market instability. A review of the SAPs continues to raise questions (with 
no agreed answers) about the intentions and impacts of IMF and World Bank policies for 
developing countries. 
Despite the shifting position, there are many unanswered questions around the nexus. The 
threshold analysis seems to carry with it ineffective socio-economic implications for low 
income countries, as it continues to insist on financial expansion. The experience of financial 
development in general and particularly in developing countries reveals that growth from 
finance could also be associated with other factors that further compound the problems of 
development. For developing countries, the impact of finance on growth cannot be separated 
from its impact on issues relating to development such as income and inequality, employment 
and environmental sustainability. The impact of financial development is also emphasised 
separately from the much-needed industrialisation and infrastructure development for these 
countries. These show how misplaced finance is in economic development. Surely, one must 
admit that financial expansion has an inherent potential for dysfunction by ignoring the welfare 
effects of a country. It is on the backdrop of these issues that the threshold analysis of the nexus 
needs to be critically examined, together with the implications of its conclusions. 
In as much as finance as it relates to the lessons from the 2008 financial crisis, seems to be 
receiving the needed attention in the revised nexus literature, it is necessary to critically 
examine whether previous issues around finance have been resolved. The literature shows that 
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financial development, contingent upon different forms of development, is still largely 
inadequate for economic growth. Therefore, such literature is not a reversal of what has gone 
before. It simply reflects three elements: (a) some acknowledgement of the increasing 
complexity, diversity and unevenness of financial markets themselves as well as their equally 
diverse interaction with the real economy, especially in the context of the crisis. (b) A dialogue 
between perfect and imperfect market economics and its implications for development. (c) A 
corresponding continuing influence of the neo-liberal notion of a positive finance-growth 
nexus. 
As such, revisionism has only caused a partial turning upside down of the belief in financial 
markets, without correcting the mechanism that underpins crises, or set as objective the need 
to better understand finance. It is necessary to address these gaps. Given the above, one 
implication is that if finance-growth nexus is elusive, in part because finance itself can be 
dysfunctional, then empirical analyses in the literature need to be revisited, whatever their other 
deficiencies, because finance (which has been growing disproportionately) obviously does not 
seem to have an absolute positive relationship with growth. For this reason, this research seeks 
to investigate the nature of the finance-growth nexus using the threshold analysis as a critical 
point of departure. This will be done by first critically analysing the method used in the 
threshold literature, drawing on the deficiencies of this and putting forward modifications for 
the empirical analyses of the nexus. 
 
1.2 Motivation, Objectives and Contribution 
The motivation for this thesis comes from my experience in the finance sector, coupled with 
academic interest in finance. I had a stint at a microfinance bank in Nigeria and worked at 
Barclays Bank in the UK before embarking on this research. While at the microfinance bank, 
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I witnessed first-hand the processes and impact of advancing financial development in a small 
open economy. In particular, the Nigerian government’s plan to target the poor, including 
small- and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) with financial development, in a bid to eradicate 
poverty and achieve development, was derailed by the activities of bankers and financial elites. 
This plunged the country into crises and the poor further into debt and persistent poverty. 
At Barclays, the activities of global financial institutions in expanding finance through their 
subsidiaries across the global economy and capital flows, both within the advanced capitalist 
nations and to emerging markets in the pursuit of profit, came to the fore. The rise in global 
credit and all manner of credit instruments saw me working on the complaints of customers 
who felt excess interest and other charges had been extracted from their credit cards, overdrafts, 
loans and mortgages by the bank. Thus, the process of financial expansion is seen to be 
characterised by increasing shift towards expansion of credit and profit accumulation by banks. 
This experience together with the reality of the GFC made me question the role of finance and 
financial markets in economic development, as in the quotation above by Josiah Stamp. 
As a result, the narrower question of the relationship between finance and growth became of 
interest. In practice, at advanced levels of financial development, finance has a tendency to 
cause crises and macroeconomic instabilities, as evident in the GFC. This point is very well 
admitted in the literature (Haldane et al., 2010; Turner, 2010). The other point less 
acknowledge by the proponents of financial development is that even at low levels of 
development, finance is seen to cause an increase in inequality, as benefit accrues to certain 
elite groups who control finance and its institutions. In general, there is no positive relationship 
between finance and growth, despite the suggestion of such a conclusion in the nexus literature. 
Finance is seen to expand in advanced and developing economies disproportionately from 
growth. This is the reason why the nexus debate is stimulating, given that the conclusion drawn 
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continues to be in contrast with evidence. But the literature is seen to approach the relationship 
between finance and growth in a narrow way that excludes the processes by and for which 
finance expands disproportionately from growth and the reluctance to draw from a wider 
approach to understanding this relationship. As such, this thesis broadens the conversation on 
the impact of finance on growth. It does so by, first, arguing that a neoliberal market ideology 
that seeks to advance private capital lies behind the expansion of finance and the attendant 
scholarship used to promote financial development. It also seeks to link the finance-growth 
nexus debate to the emergent discussion on financialisation, with a view to expand empirical 
analyses in the literature.  
Therefore, the objective in this thesis is to critically examine the literature on the relationship 
between finance and growth, by tracing the historical evolution of the literature, identifying the 
limitations of the dominant approach used for establishing the relationship, including 
implications of the conclusions drawn in the threshold analysis. The literature (in chapter 2) is 
organised in a way that shows how the nexus has been disaggregated through forms of finance 
and channels of impact on growth, and illustrates how it excludes other fundamental factors 
that (may) affect the relationship, in the dominant econometric approach to analysing the nexus. 
Such analysis of the nexus, located around what may have been ignored in the attempt to 
establish causality and channels of impact is original to this thesis, as no such framework has 
been applied to the nexus literature, to the best of our understanding. 
This narrowness of the literature is made more evident when analysed for developing countries 
and the processes for advancing financial development with its impact on economic 
development. In this case, a positive nexus dominates analyses of the nexus in African 
countries with little or no consideration for their broader development goals. Therefore, the 
implications of continuous advancement of financial development for low income countries at 
all cost, is used as the critical point of departure for the threshold analysis of the literature. 
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Drawing on these implications of the threshold literature of the nexus for African countries (or 
developing countries in general) is original to this thesis, given that this most recent 
development in the nexus literature is yet to be analysed in this manner. The abstracted nature 
of the threshold analysis of the finance-growth nexus literature from the context of 
development, in that it demands more finance without consideration of whether development 
needs are achieved in these countries, is used to further emphasise the shortcomings of the 
nexus literature. 
Instead of a threshold relationship between finance as growth, I present an overarching picture 
of the impact of finance in Africa in chapter 4, unravelling the finance for development 
literature, both in terms of the main institutional promoters and concepts used for advancing 
finance in development and in analysing the manifest impact of increasing finance on 
development. To further understand the impact of finance in development, I argue that it is 
necessary to locate analysis of the relationship between finance and growth in Africa on the 
financialisation literature, to better understand the broader positive and negative impact of 
finance in development. 
The drive for financial development, supported by the financial inclusion and access narratives 
to address poverty in Africa, is further argued in this thesis to result in what is referred to as 
the financialisation of development, in which development is undermined, rather than attained, 
as finance expands in these countries. This analysis is applied to the case of Nigeria considering 
its experience of financial expansion, and the reliance on such to achieve its development goals. 
On the one hand, this aims to broaden the literature on financialisation and particularly on the 




Given experience of financial development and the limitations of revisionism in the nexus as 
critical points of departure, I offer an alternative for expanding the scope of the nexus, to better 
understand the impact of finance on growth. This is achieved through linking the mainstream 
nexus argument to the heterodox debate on the productiveness or not of the financial sector in 
chapter 5. I argue that, since finance cannot be said to have an absolute positive relationship 
with growth, then it ought to be excluded from contributing to growth and the empirical 
analysis of the threshold re-estimated to ascertain the nature of the nexus. 
I extend this focus on econometric techniques for establishing a positive relationship, by 
unpacking what constitutes growth in the System of National Accounts (SNA) and, in 
particular, the productiveness of finance embedded in growth as used in econometric 
estimations. This unpacking of the composition of growth is intended to address one aspect of 
the failings of the nexus literature, the question of what constitutes growth, which may 
fundamentally affect the relationship between finance and growth. It is also underpinned by 
the idea that what constitutes growth and finance as used in the econometric estimations would 
shape the kind of results obtained, and for understanding the nature of the nexus. This is 
emphasised in chapter 2 as a major shortcoming of the nexus literature. 
In this thesis, I make three major original contributions. First, I analyse the literature on the 
finance-growth nexus in a unique way that shows how it has been disaggregated around forms 
of finance and channels of impact, and point out the limitations in the literature in terms of 
what it ignores in its analyses. This is further expanded upon by teasing out the implications of 
the threshold analysis of the nexus for African economies. The discussion on developing 
countries and financial development is the basis of my second contribution, which is an 
expansion in the understanding of the process of financialisation in development. A critical 
investigation into financial development in Africa further reveals the narrowness of the 
narrative for advancing financial development and how this may undermine development. This 
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argument is supported by the experience of financial development in Nigeria, in which I show 
how banking credit is disproportionately allocated between the real sector and services. Third, 
having argued for a linkage of the literature on the productiveness of finance and the nexus, I 
advance the empirical studies of the relationship between finance and growth by separating 
financial services value added from GDP before re-estimating the nexus. 
Therefore, the contributions made in this thesis are both analytical and empirical, with wide 
ranging implications for policy. The analytical contribution made in this thesis, not least in 
teasing out what existing studies ignore and what constitutes growth is necessary for deepening 
existing understanding around the nexus. An empirically re-estimation of the nexus is aimed at 
observing the relationship when a new growth variable that excludes (non-productive) finance 
from GDP, is used for estimating the nexus. This has implications for shaping policy, by way 
of financial sector regulation in the face of increasing prominence of finance.   
 
1.3 Research Questions 
The questions around financial development remain. Levine (2005, p. 868) notes that “we are 
far from definitive answers to the questions: Does finance cause growth, and if it does, how?” 
So, quite apart from whether finance is causal for growth, the question asked in this thesis is 
whether the revised literature satisfactorily addresses the problems of finance which it has itself 
identified. Second, given the continuous push for financial development in the literature, this 
thesis enquires into the manifestations of finance in sub-Saharan African countries and 
questions the narratives used for this advancement. It asks more specifically if financial 
deepening has delivered the required development in Africa, and if not, why? Third is to 
challenge the conclusions of the threshold literature that is now simplistically contingent upon 
levels of national development. The question then asked is whether the impact of finance on 
25 
 
growth is only dependent on the level of development, irrespective of other factors. Fourth is 
to understand what the nature of the relationship between finance and growth is, by excluding 
finance as a contribution to growth and re-estimating the empirical regressions of the threshold 
literature. The results here will be compared with results in the nexus literature for an enhanced 
understanding. 
 
1.4 A Brief Discussion on Methodology 
It is necessary to contextualise the methodology of investigation in this thesis and connect the 
different elements drawn upon. Methodology may be understood as “a combination of 
techniques, the practices we conform to when we apply them, and our interpretation of what 
we are doing when we do so” (Olsen and Morgan, 2005, p. 257). While there is a decline in 
discussion around methodology in the economics discipline, in part because of the dominance 
of empirical methods, there is some inquiry into whether certain methods (i.e. systematised 
techniques or procedures) require certain methodological assumptions (see Lawson, 2003). 
Methodological assumptions are more or less inductive. But more importantly, they allow the 
researcher to draw from experience and observation or a combination of methods in order to 
understand phenomena. Therefore, the different lines of enquiry taken in analysing the 
relationship between finance and growth in this thesis demonstrates that pluralism is the 
methodological approach. This is in line with the growing call for pluralism in economics. 
Fullbrook (2017, p. 9) makes the point that “full appreciation … requires viewing [a 
phenomenon] from more than one perspective, so knowledge accumulation often depends upon 
investigating empirical domains through more than one narrative”. 
The approach in this thesis allows a combination of critical political economy and empirical 
analysis in investigating the impact of finance on growth. This is based on the recognition that 
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there is not one particular method for investigating social phenomenon. Instead, a combination 
of methods is necessary for understanding inherently dynamic social phenomena, as opposed 
to a simplistic positivist approach in which social relations must be analysed from a linear 
causal perspective, as obtains in the nexus. Critical political economy, in line with the open 
systems approach, seeks to understand complex social phenomenon, not through positivist 
causal relationships between variables, but through a combination of deductive, inductive and 
dialectical discourse (Carlson, 2000). This may include broader post-positivist approaches such 
as meanings, subjective reality, human intentions and case studies. Such combination of 
methods has been demonstrated by Jefferson et al. (2014, p. 291) to help explain “socially and 
institutionally embedded” phenomenon. 
As such, in advancing the arguments in this thesis, time-series analysis is used in line with 
existing nexus literature to test the validity of existing results and the statistical relationships 
between finance and growth. Advances in the use of panel data analyses attempt to factor into 
these regressions a certain level of heterogeneity in consideration of time, form and space of 
the variables used. However, these techniques are still limited as unable to capture the socio-
political dimensions of the nexus. Thus, the reason for combining methods. Empirical methods 
in this thesis are only used to emulate other methods with an awareness of their limitations. As 
such, results from the regression analyses in this thesis are cautiously interpreted and located 
within the observed manifestations of financial development and its social implications on the 
wider scope of development. Empirical investigations here are not used to determine causality 
in a supposed equilibrium relationship as pertain in the literature but to understand correlations 
and how decomposition of productivity of finance may affect changes in the relationships 
between finance and growth. The case of financial development in Nigeria reinforces the post-




1.4.1 Theories of Finance 
Finance existed before the capitalist mode of production and has evolved over time through 
multiple forms dictated by the latter. It has been located in initial forms of credit (Graeber, 
2011) between merchants in the circuit of capital, and accumulation by capitalist producers, 
with banks emerging to allocate idle interest-bearing capital among capitalist producers 
(Lapavitsas, 2009a). This process underpinned the long-standing debate on the productiveness 
of finance with proponents (Walras, 1954[1874]; Arrow and Debreu, 1954; Fama, 1980) and 
dissidents pointing to the role of finance in capital accumulation (Marx, 2004[1867]; 
Schumpeter, 1912; Keynes, 1930; Sayers, 1960). These different positions on the role of 
finance in the economy may derive from the variety of understandings of what finance is, its 
origins, and the processes involved in financial transactions. 
The approach to finance in this thesis will be located within Marx’s theory of finance, which 
Fine (2007b) notes is embedded in his theory of accumulation and expansion of capital. Finance 
is therefore understood from Marx’s categorisation of the functions of capital, which he divided 
broadly into merchant bearing capital and interest bearing capital. First, merchant capital is a 
form of capital dedicated to the continuity of the economic activity of production through 
facilitating exchange and realising (surplus) value in particular. In Marx’s view, merchanting 
covers the exchange of goods and the credit relations that accompany these processes. 
Merchant capital, although not producing (surplus) value, is subject to competition (tendency 
to equalise profitability within the sector and with productive capital). 
On the other hand, interest bearing capital involves the buying and selling of money capital, 
the borrowing and lending of money in anticipation of interest from surplus value to be 
produced. Although Fine notes that these divisions between merchant and interest bearing 
capital are logical and clear as such, he clarifies that these forms of capital in exchange differ 
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from one another in two distinct ways. These are that one realises surplus value at the normal 
rate of profit while the other appropriates interest out of this surplus value. From what is left 
from the latter is derived ‘profit of enterprise’, distributed across other capitals and subject to 
the tendency for rate of profit equalisation. It is thus differentiated from the interest accruing 
from interest-bearing capital. Fine, drawing on Marx, adds a third form of capital, resembling 
merchant capital - money-dealing capital. It is a specialised capital for facilitation of trade in 
money assets.  
Given the objective of this thesis, which is to link the finance-growth nexus argument to the 
productiveness of finance, it is indispensable to return to Marx. As appropriately noted by 
Christophers (2011, p. 114), a “return to classical political economy in general, and Marx in 
particular […] would allow us directly to contest the representation of banks, and financial 
service providers more broadly, as economically productive. Such services, Marx held, entail 
the circulation of value but not its production, and thus these activities, and the wage-labour 
embodied in them, are categorically unproductive”. 
In addition, Marx’s view of the different phases of capitalism and its contradictory nature is 
seen here as offering a good theoretical and analytical framework for understanding the crises 
attendant on finance. This is despite the position taken by some, such as Sardoni (2015, p. 144) 
who argues that “the structure and organisation of production as well as markets in 
contemporary capitalism are significantly different from those considered by Marx”, in that 
“the structural transformations [free-competitive capitalism to monopolistic competition] 
undergone by capitalist economies imply, in particular, that crises no longer take the form 
described by Marx”. As such, Marx’s political economy is deemed by some analysts to be 
unable to provide a developed explanation for the prolongation of the crises. Nevertheless, 
applying Marx’s method of historical materialism may offer an explanation which links 
historical and material specificities to explain economic phenomenon, including financial 
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expropriation and crises. It also allows for theorising based on common features historically 
associated with finance and manifestation of crises in the capitalist mode of production. 
 
1.4.2 Financialisation 
The consequence of the expansion of dysfunctional finance is discussed widely, not least in 
reference to the term financialisation, a conceptualisation considered necessary in analysing 
the political economy of contemporary financial development, drawing from a combination of 
approaches but most prominently located (especially theoretically) in the Marxist tradition and 
theory of finance discussed above. This is however, not taken too far in this thesis. 
Nevertheless, there is the need to draw on the discussion on financialisation, because it allows 
for the relationship between finance and growth to be taken beyond narrow econometric 
estimations, and located within the broader implications of increasing financial deepening on 
development, including processes from which such implications are derived. More specifically, 
it allows for the (potential) negative manifestations of finance on development to be teased out 
empirically at micro and macro levels. This cannot be achieved in a strictly econometric 
estimation. 
A starting point is Epstein’s (2005, p. 3) most prominent and encompassing definition of 
financialisation, in which it is seen as “the increasing importance of markets, financial motives, 
financial institutions, and financial elites in the operation of the economy and its governing 
institutions, both at the national and international levels”. This is simply to see financialisation 
as all manifestations of finance and its influences. Following this definition, the literature on 
financialisation flourished almost akin to how finance was manifest in all areas of the economy 
(and daily life). 
30 
 
Three schools of economic thought have been at the vanguard in this discussion – 
Regulationists, post-Keynesians and Marxists. Bonizzi (2016) points to the different emphases 
across these schools of thought. For the regulationists, it is placed on the set of policies and 
institutions that make a regime of accumulation possible. Post-Keynesians point to the rise of 
rentier capitalism in firms and its negative impact on investment. For Marxists, financialisation 
derives from interest-bearing capital and fictitious capital. 
Fine et al. (2016, p. 13) note that “post-Keynesian approaches, for example, tend to see 
financialisation in terms of the impact of finance on levels of effective demand. This can come 
through distribution at the expense of wages, speculative at the expense of real investment or 
financial-interest induced austerity”. Here, the work of Magdoff and Foster (2014) is seen to 
delineate in detail the inherent potential of the capitalist economy to tend to stagnation and 
reduction in demand. Emphasis has also been placed on the rise in profits and income in the 
financial sector and its influence over other sectors of the economy by the post-Keynesians 
(Stockhammer, 2004). 
Another way to view the financialisaton literature is the scope of subject matter covered. First 
is the breadth of approaches, teasing out what are perceived to be essential features by drawing 
from a wide range of disciplines and a variety of approaches. Notably, for example, 
Stockhammer (2004) views financialisation as the penetration of finance into non-financial 
corporations. For Montgomerie (2009) and Dymski (2010), it is the penetration of finance into 
households through rising debt levels. Langley (2008) analyses financialisation as the 
increasing influence of finance in all areas of daily life. There is also analyses around the role 
of the state in advancing the influence of finance and markets in the economy (Duménil and 
Lévy, 2004; Pradella and Marois, 2013). Much focus has been on the role of financial 
corporations and their changing behaviours underpinning financialisation.  
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But much more than the increasing influence of finance in the macro economy and daily life, 
there is the need to continue to attend to the economic, political and social relations that 
underpin expansion in financial activities. Also, it is necessary that systemic understanding of 
the financialisation process is pursued, as maintained by Kaltenbrunner and Painceira (2016). 
Similar to this position, a second group aim for greater exposition of the detailed mechanisms 
or processes via which financialisation occurs.2 This position moreover views existing studies 
of financialisation as having been unable to provide novelty or uniqueness in explaining the 
rise of finance. Similarly, Christophers (2015) cautions on the use of financialisation as 
inappropriate without detailed analytical consideration of money and finance. 
Nevertheless, in linking the elements of the finance-growth nexus, including revisionism 
within it to developments in related areas, the combination of factors drawn upon are easily 
eclipsed within the scope covered by the financialisation narrative. Here, a link is made with 
the underlying neoliberal ideology and existing social relations to explain the increasing 
expansion of finance. The wide-ranging dimensions of the nexus considered in this discussion, 
with finance at the core, cannot be far removed from the various conceptualisations of 
financialisation. Also, the expansion of finance is not considered to be exclusive, but advances 
alongside other macroeconomic and social re-structuring. As Williams (2001, p. 567) notes, “it 
is imperative to investigate the conditions under which systemic transformation might occur”. 
So, it may not be enough to see expansion in finance and the impact of this on the 
macroeconomic environment, without understanding the processes, including social, through 
which these wide-reaching areas have become subjected to the control of finance. 
However one chooses to define financialisation, it is hard to disagree with Ashman and Fine 
(2013, p. 156/7) who sum up the literature, and note that there has been “a shift in the balance 
                                                          
2 See Michell and Toporowski (2014) for an account. 
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of productive to financial imperatives within the private sector whether financial or not; 
increasing inequality in income arising out of weight of financial rewards; consumer-led booms 
based on credit; the penetration of finance into ever more areas of economic and social life …; 
the emergence of a neo-liberal culture of reliance upon markets and private capital” and “its 
consequences have been perceived to be: reductions in overall levels and efficacy of real 
investment as financial instruments and activities expand at its expense”. For them, the defining 
attribute of financialisation is the “incorporation of these into further financial operations that 
constitute, at a deeper level, the extensive and intensive expansion of interest-bearing capital” 
(Fine, 2013, p. 56). 
Thus, financialisation in this thesis derives from accumulation of finance and its transformation 
of economic and social life, to potentially be at the expense of productive output and 
development in poor countries. This may be linked to the increasing penetration of interest-
bearing capital across economic and social reproduction and the increasing intertwining of 
financial and non-financial assets. Such intertwining of the financial with the non-financial is 
the case of GDP which measures the productive output of the economy but has become 
increasingly financialised. Financialisaton is in fact considered broader than the above, and 
indeed it ought to be, given other dimensions from which it might potentially be analysed, such 
as the exploitation of labour by finance not least through stagnant real and social wages 
(Lapavitsas, (2009b), and the approach of its impact across social and economic life, however 
simplistic. Notably, areas which finance now penetrates “were previously the preserve of other 
forms of productive and commercial capital” (Fine, 2009, p. 99). 
Therefore, the discussion on financialisation is seen to easily envelope the breadth and length 
of the finance-growth nexus debate, more especially in the case of developing countries in 
which more finance is said to lead to growth without consideration of who it accrues, what 
sectors it flows to or impact on development. So, whether finance is seen to penetrate 
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households or it is unevenly distributed, with forms of financialisation unique in different 
context, its distinctive characteristic to expand disproportionately from real output is the 
context upon which financialisation is located here and the critical point of departure in this 
thesis, conceivably necessary both for analysing the nexus and the inclusion of finance as 
productive in GDP computation. 
The term financialisation is drawn upon to emphasise the disproportionate growth in the 
accumulation of capital between finance and real output. This circumscribed location of 
financialisation is in relation to the overarching theme of this thesis, which is a critical re-
examination of the productiveness of finance in the nexus, with financial intermediation value 
added in growth being the variable to be focused on. Accumulation in the manufacturing sector 
is used to analyse the decline in real output in the economy, and the case used to analyse such 
system of accumulation is bank credit allocation to the private sector in Nigeria. Bank credit 
will be seen to be disproportionately allocated between the productive manufacturing and non-
productive services sectors, with much assigned to the former. The Marxist debate around the 
non-productiveness of the services sector supports this position, given its non-material output 
(see for example Vanoli, 2005; Chakraborty and Das, 2007; Rangelova, 2007; Basu and Foley, 
2011; Assa, 2017) 
Also, locating financialisation in neoliberalism would also enhance our understanding of the 
period that underpin the expansion and expropriations of finance, considering revisions made 
to GDP computation. Fine makes this link in locating financialisation as underpinning 
neoliberalism within a framework of the periodisation of capitalism (See chapter 5). This 
understanding of financialisation has been carefully used in this thesis as an anchor for locating 
the politics of productiveness of finance or more specifically the treatment of financial services 
in the Systems of National Accounts. As such, the consensus reached in the early 1990 in the 
computation of National Accounts globally, may be neatly located under the concept of 
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financialisation, in which otherwise non-productive finance is incorporated into productive 
output and subsequent revisions aim to capture all manner of financial assets (see Christophers, 
2011; Assa, 2017. Similar arguments can be found in Porter, 1995; Godley, 2001; Ertuk et al., 
2007; and Callon and Caliskan, 2009). This is taken up in chapter 5. 
So, while a major contribution of this thesis is an econometric re-estimation of the nexus, the 
new GDP variables used for such re-estimation is underpinned by the concept of 
financialisation, in that it allows for questioning the possibility of the non-productiveness of 
financial intermediation value-added in GDP. Financialisation, thus allows for the potential 
dysfunctional aspects of finance in output (see for example Basu and Foley, 2011) to be 
factored into the nexus literature, on which basis financial intermediation value added is then 
separated from GDP before econometric re-estimations are embarked upon, albeit in the 
traditional mainstream manner. In short, financialisation is the anchor upon which the political 
economy of the finance-growth nexus analysis is here located.  
 
1.4.3 Financialisation in Development Context 
Financialisation in the context of developing countries can be linked to the political economy 
debates around capital market integration and account liberalisation (Cohen, 1996 and Rodrik, 
1998) and discussions around the risks associated with globalisation and neoliberalism which 
started to gain a strong foothold in the 1990s (Palma, 1998 and Taylor, 1998).  This was re-
emphasised as the reality of the East Asian financial crisis hit hard (Kregel, 1998, Dymski, 
1999; Arestis and Glickman, 2002).  
One argument that has come to the fore is the increasing exposure of developing and emerging 
economies to advanced capitalist economies. This is shared by Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 
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(2016, p. 4), who point out in the case of Brazil, that financialisation in developing countries 
is shaped by their integration into a “structured international monetary and financial system”. 
But, amidst this integration into the global circuit of finance, needed development continues to 
be far-removed from African countries and uneven development further realised, due largely 
to the shift of finance from productive to non-productive activities in these markets. Similar 
studies which analyse financialisation in developing and emerging economies include Levy-
Orlik (2012) and Powell (2013) for Mexico, Araujo et al, (2012) for Brazil, Gabor (2013) for 
Romania and Karacimen (2014) for Turkey. 
In the above analyses, financialisation is seen to be an instrument that advances the Marxist 
position of uneven development as earlier established by Pike and Pollard (2010). “Emphasis 
is placed upon the capitalist economy as organised around the accumulation of capital through 
the production, circulation, and distribution of (surplus) value as a totality of economic 
relations, processes, structures, dynamics, and corresponding agents” (Fine, 2013 p. 48). In 
analysing the relationship between finance and growth in Africa therefore, it is necessary to 
recognise how surplus capital is being expropriated by the private sector amidst the narrative 
for financial inclusion. The key element amidst financial deepening in Africa becomes the 
expanding influence of finance, and the impact this has on Africa’s broader development. Much 
work needs to be done in teasing out the processes of financialisation in this context. 
Nevertheless, the dysfunctionality of the financial inclusion agenda is seen in studies by 
Griffith-Jones and Karwowski (2013), which confirm that despite growth in credit to the 
private sector in sub-Saharan Africa, access to finance by firms, especially SMEs, remains 
difficult. Since most finance directed at inclusion is not necessarily used to fund SME 
investments but for consumption, these fall under household debt. Soederberg (2013) shows 
that even some lending by IFIs such as the International Financial Corporation (IFC) is diverted 
away from real investment. Notably, rising household debt is believed to be a major source of 
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financialisation, since there is a tendency for these loans to be unrepaid (Karwowski and 
Stockhammer, 2016). This is evidence that finance continues to outgrow the real economy and 
consequently remains estranged from development. It also means that credit is rather 
channelled towards speculation and short-term investments for profiteering. Suffice to add that 
even the excessively high interest rates in the African financial system, albeit in sometimes 
one-off loan transactions that do not necessarily involve asset speculation, confirms the 
extraction of surplus profit. 
In view of this, extension of credit to the poor mainly serves as a means to broaden the reach 
of finance without delivering development in these countries. But the call for financial 
development continues, as seen in the implications of the threshold analysis of the nexus, in 
which finance is maintained to contribute to growth. Marois and Pradella (2015) are of the 
position that the insistence on a positive relationship in the nexus for low- and middle-income 
countries is due to the recognition of the increasing importance of emerging and developing 
countries in the sustainability of financial capitalism in the neoliberal era. They elaborate that 
as such, economic theory is used to advance policies that promote high savings, capital 
accumulation, sovereign wealth funds, massive buffers of external reserves, capital projects 
around natural resources, unregulated capital markets and the transfer of short-term funds from 
low interest rates in the USA and the global north to these countries with higher interest rates. 
The distinctiveness of exploitation of interest rate differential by foreign and domestic 
companies, and the attendant exchange rate volatility that arises from this cannot be 
overemphasised. It has served as a main rallying point for some of the literature on 
financialisation in developing and emerging economies (Powell, 2013; Kaltenbrunner, 2015; 
Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 2016) underpinned by the flow of capital into these countries. 
Nowhere is this manifestation of financialisation more defined by this process than in African 
countries, where interest rates are higher than in advanced economies, and thus attract finance 
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from abroad in the name of foreign investment, with the presumed rationale of generating 
development. Indeed, Becker et al. (2010) categorise high interest rates in developing countries 
as closely aligned to interest-bearing capital. 
Given the above processes, development is undermined in what is here referred to as the 
financialisation of development. Financialisation of development therefore, describes the new 
meaning ascribed to development. It may be seen as the growing focus on financial expansion 
and the misplaced belief that development can be achieved solely through financial 
development policy (see for example, African Development Bank, 2014, and Central Bank of 
Nigeria’s Financial Inclusion Strategy, 2016). It is the pursuit of financial expansion rather than 
more comprehensive development approaches. 
The financialisation of development may be further characterised by the increasing exclusion 
of the state from the development space, as evident in Africa, and its replacement with private 
capital. By so doing, it aims to broaden the reach of finance by capturing and including the 
(unbanked) poor in developing countries into the cycle of financial expropriation. This is 
achieved through access to credit and all manner of financial innovation, without consideration 
of the existing social structures in these countries that tend to lead to the misallocation of 
finance. Inherent in the process, is the potential for deindustrialisation and to undermine 
development through high interest rates that support only unsophisticated businesses and to re-
direct capital away from developmental investment like basic infrastructure and into the 
financial system, for speculative purposes and profiteering. This phenomenon, evident in 
Africa, has in other contexts been referred to as the ‘securitisation of development’ 






This thesis is organised as follows: a critical analysis of the finance-growth nexus literature is 
presented in the following chapter, touching on the evolution of the proposition that more 
finance produces growth. This argument, undergirded by the market efficiency hypothesis, will 
be argued to have been propagated through four separate but intertwined aspects: 
disaggregation of forms of finance; disaggregation of channels of transmission and effects (to 
growth and/or other positive outcomes); change in economic theory, especially through market 
imperfection economics with both Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and Inefficient Market 
Hypothesis (IEMH) being based on individual optimisation and limited acknowledgement of 
the systemic analyses of finance, pinnacling with the global crisis; and increasing unavoidable 
empirical developments in the literature. The disaggregation is, nonetheless, seen to be short 
of a robust analysis of causation, since its econometric approach ignores any discussion on 
factors that may be causal for the process of financial expansion, and indirectly or directly 
impact the nature of the relationship between finance and growth. 
Chapter three critically examines the threshold literature in the finance-growth nexus argument 
which emerged in response to the financial crisis. Its implications for development and the 
continual location of the nexus on econometric analyses is used as a critical point of departure. 
This is followed by chapter four, which analyses the nature of financial development in Africa 
and its implications for development. This discussion is narrowed down to developments in 
capital markets and banking in Nigeria to further elaborate on the nature of financial 
development in Africa. Chapter five critically revisits the argument on the productiveness of 
finance or not and the inclusion of value added of financial services in GDP, pioneered in the 
study of Christophers (2011). Here, revisions in computation of financial services in the 
Systems of National Accounts (SNA) and the objective of making finance productive is first 
linked to the finance-growth nexus, not least how both arguments have been used to support 
39 
 
one another. Second, the treatment of finance in the computation of GDP is located within the 
discussion on financialisation in order to better understand it. 
An empirical re-estimation of the threshold analysis of the finance-growth nexus is carried out 
in chapter six. This is done with the aim of expanding the understanding around the nexus, 
having excluded non-productive finance from output before re-estimation. Cross-sectional and 
panel regressions are employed, as developed in the threshold analysis of Arcand et al. (2011). 
















Chapter 2.0 – THEORETICAL REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The continuous evolution of the finance-growth nexus argument has, following the financial 
crisis, brought the theory to a phase, in which the claim can no longer be made, even by 
mainstream literature, that finance has an unambiguously positive relationship with growth. In 
particular, financial development does not contribute to growth at all levels of economic 
development. At best, the nexus is now alleged by economists of different schools of thought 
to be dependent on a range of factors specific to individual country levels and conditions of 
development (Beck and Levine, 2004; Rioja and Valev, 2004b; Ahlin and Pang, 2008; Ductor 
and Grechyna, 2011; Bhatti et al., 2013). This understanding of the ambiguity in finance-
growth relationship has been located in terms of threshold analysis for identification of trigger 
points at which the nexus shifts from positive to negative or vice-versa for development 
(Yilmazkuday, 2011; Arcand, et al., 2012 and Barajas et al., 2012). 
The purpose of this chapter therefore, is to trace the stages through which the finance-growth 
nexus theory has evolved and how the threshold argument came about as the most recent 
manifestation of framing the nexus. This evolution has journeyed through a number of aspects 
starting with the simple proposition that finance has a positive relationship with growth as 
denoted in the works of Schumpeter (1911) and Gerschenkron (1952). However, the nexus 
literature that came afterwards, inspired by the works of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) 
did not only ignore previous works on the relationship between finance and growth but had a 
fixed objective to legitimise the claim to the notion of a strictly positive relationship for 
liberalised financial markets – (only) guaranteed to be good for development if unconstrained 
by state interference. Such predisposed approach to the nexus became common practice for its 
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subsequently revised theoretical underpinnings and has been carried on to more recent 
literature of the finance-growth nexus. 
The nexus literature also considerably narrowed, especially initially to the skimpiest of 
skeletons, the terms of finance-growth theory to debates on narrowly conceived causal 
connections between the two. And this has remained a major point of focus within the nexus 
argument (Levine, 1997; 1999; Levine et al., 2000). But it has been contested. In contrast to 
the claim of a finance-causing growth relationship by most mainstream literature. Fitzgerald 
(2006, p. 2) maintains that “the channels of causality between finance and growth remains 
thematically and empirically unresolved and the form of financial institutions to maximise 
economic growth is unclear as there are hardly any theories that address whether banks or 
capital markets are more efficient in allocating resources”.  
Following the debate on causation, subsequent revisions of the finance-growth nexus literature 
sought to refine the relationship through addressing the unduly homogenising or amorphous 
reference to finance in the nexus by disaggregating the forms through which finance is deemed 
to contribute to growth, or not. In addition to such disaggregation in the analyses of the 
mechanisms of transmission from finance to growth and development, the nexus was also 
situated in the context of other factors, both economic and social, that might be thought either 
to condition the nexus or to be its underlying source. The inclusion of these factors, such as 
income, investment, physical and human capital, institutions and productivity among others, 
were then treated in the literature to be part of the nexus in their own right, and justified mostly 
by being randomly netted out within empirical modelling used to analyse the relationship 
between finance and growth. For example, the link between finance and growth for De 
Gregorio (1996) was through a three-step process of human capital development; that 
guarantees higher savings and; secures future consumption for growth. But as will be argued 
in this chapter, this disaggregation was only a bid to defend against the emergent flaws in the 
42 
 
finance-growth theory which became apparent in financial market volatility, yet failing to 
achieve this objective because of the neglect of the increasing contextual complexity of finance 
and growth across space, time and form. In other words, one relatively simply causal nexus 
was replaced by another that was both more complex and flexible in terms of conditioning 
variables but otherwise as deterministic as previously.  
A closer scrutiny of the empirical methods used to establish the finance-growth nexus, and the 
corresponding results that have followed, also illustrates the extent of this complexity, 
evidenced by the mixed and sometimes conflicting outcomes. Thus, the methodology by which 
the nexus was thought to be justified is further argued in this chapter to be inconsistent, yet 
predictable, not least in the unremitting objective of teasing out a simple alliance between 
finance and growth, however much buried within statistical complexity. In addition, while the 
nexus theory will be seen to be established mainly by the results produced by correspondingly 
inadequate empirical methods, the experience of financial markets and countries caught up in 
this interaction between finance and growth at different periods of development have continued 
to provide swelling evidence contrary to the empirical results produced. More finance has, in 
addition to market volatility, stalled development in many countries which not only questions 
the validity of the method used in obtaining positive results but also indicative of the 
elusiveness of a positive relationship between finance and growth. 
The literature on finance-growth nexus theory is also contended in this thesis to have been 
extended through incorporation of the market imperfections approach and a corresponding shift 
from the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) to its modified form in what Fine (2013) refers 
to as the Inefficient Market Hypothesis (IEMH). This was an opportune application of the 
longstanding asymmetric information microeconomics, already applied to financial markets, 
in the face of extreme market volatility and failure. Yet, there has been earlier market 
imperfections literature addressing the finance-growth nexus, not least in terms of debates on 
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market- versus bank-based systems of finance (Fine, 2007, appendix 1, p. 4). This literature, 
however, was more systemic in content, emphasising the institutional and interest group 
aspects of the nexus. By contrast, its resurrection through asymmetric information offered an 
example of what Fine (2010) dubs Bringing Back In (BBI) what had been excluded by the 
EMH, but doing so in the analytically reduced form of imperfectly informed and coordinated 
optimising individuals. 
As will be seen, the scholarship and rhetoric surrounding market imperfections was well-
represented in the nexus literature leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. Thus, the GFC 
became an important definer of the landscape in the nexus literature; a culminating point for 
the study of the interaction between finance and growth. While there has been some attention 
in the mainstream literature on the finance-growth relationship following the crisis, these are 
mostly narratives that dwell on ‘causes and effects’. Some of these do, however, start to 
question whether there can be ‘too much finance?’, with the aim of determining the threshold 
at which the marginal effects of more finance begin to have a significant negative impact on 
growth (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Yilmazkuday, 2011; Barajas et al., 2012; Arcand et al., 
2012). This will be taken up in detail in chapter 3, which is an extension of the literature review. 
Therefore, the GFC is seen in this thesis as the tipping point from which the finance-growth 
nexus could no longer be pursued in its traditional manner, of estimating more or less 
complicated linear models, but proved in need of revision (Arcand et al., 2012, p. 4). 
The framework for organising this literature is depicted by Fig 2.1, and herein lies the 
contribution made to the nexus literature in this review. It brings together the literature on the 
finance-growth nexus within a recognition of the broader link from its simplistic correlation, 
to causation and eventual disaggregation by forms of finance and channels of impact, 
throughout these stages underpinned by developments in old and new economic growth 
theories. It also shows how the market efficiency theory retained a positive nexus despite shifts 
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in the theory. These changes continued until the financial crisis compelled a revision. However, 
the main apparatus for maintaining a positive nexus is seen to be through econometric 
techniques. As a limitation of these methods, the nexus has thus been reduced to quantitative 
elements without consideration for other broader causal factors of finance and growth. This 
analytical framework helps to show that other factors may be causal for both finance and 
growth, and yet more, affect the relationship, even econometric results. But these have been 
mostly ignored in the literature. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: The following section 2 reviews the simple 
correlation of the finance-growth nexus literature. It discusses the theory underpinning the 
nexus, including its causation argument and the consequent homogenisation of finance in 
section 2.2. This is followed by a review of the literature on disaggregation of the forms of 
finance in section 2.3, located heavily in the market- versus bank-based debate of the nexus. 
Section 2.4 analyses further disaggregation of the nexus in the literature on transmission 
mechanisms of finance to growth. A critical analysis of the empirical methods used in 
achieving mostly a positive correlation of the nexus is then analysed in section 2.5. Section 2.6 
reviews the literature on changes in the economic theory of finance within the shifts from 
efficient to inefficient market hypothesis arguments. This is followed by a critical analysis of 
the GFC in influencing yet another necessary revision in the finance-growth theory in section 
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2.2 Finance-Growth Nexus Theory 
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role in determining or conditioning the nature of the relationship. While approaches and 
methods around the literature have generally been similar, the positions taken by economists 
on the nexus have differed even if with a dominant core of an unrelenting commitment to a 
positive relationship between finance and growth. Despite this, the arguments on both sides of 
the debate will be analysed, in keeping with the objectives of this thesis, to understand the 
variegated nature of finance and its impact upon economic performance, of which growth is 
but one aspect. 
The long-debated relationship between finance and economic performance has not always 
necessarily taken the nexus form (see for example Schumpeter, 1911; Robinson, 1952; Minsky 
1974). Much of the earlier debate has now been stripped down, forgotten and reduced to the 
nexus. The inclusion of finance in growth theory was initially anchored on the understanding 
of the functions of money (derived from Keynes’ motives for holding money) to include: 
facilitating payment for future and unforeseen circumstances; cash for current production; and 
for reducing transaction cost. Here, finance plays a major role for growth, in the neoclassical 
textbook manner, by increasing savings for investment, increasing efficiency of allocation of 
resources for production, and increasing the turnover rate of such savings. Goldsmith (1969) 
stressed the marginal productivity of capital as the channel for financial repression, and that 
low interest rates setting discourages investments. Thus became established the putative 
connection between finance and growth. 
The finance-growth nexus argument by McKinnon (1973) assumes money and physical assets 
to be complementary. He argued that the increase in real money stock M/P will increase 
investment and consequently lead to growth (Keynes effect). This was derived from the Solow 
growth model with the assumption of constant savings ratio s, an increase in total savings shifts 
the investment curve upwards, so that constant capital k* rises above initial capital k and actual 
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investment is greater than break-even (i.e. k > 0) at this level until balanced growth is reached.3 
In the long run, however, changes in savings rate will have only a level effect on per capita 
growth (Jorgenson, 2005). “But, as in the long run, the presumption in the short run is that all 
resources are fully employed, and that savings both drives the level of investment and is fully 
converted into investment” (Fine and Dimakou,2016, p. 49). However, if finance is to explain 
economic growth, there have to be theories that illustrate the process by which financial 
development influences allocation decisions of savings for productivity growth to occur, since 
physical capital accumulation which is assumed to exert a permanent effect on long-run growth 
rate, cannot alone, account for long-run economic growth. Simply put, what factors determine 
savings? 
Still, financial development was considered to be exogenously determined by government 
regulation and control – what McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) call the degree of financial 
repression (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991), comprising interest rate ceilings, high reserve 
requirement and restrictions on credit allocation. This, they argued, caused low savings and 
investment, and was responsible for the poor performance of growth in developing countries 
and globally in the 1950s and 1960s. McKinnon insists that, rather than curtailing inflation by 
reducing the real stock of money M/P, countries should, as a policy response, try to increase 
the demand for cash balances by increasing interest rates, thereby encouraging savings. An 
increase in savings will therefore increase the total real supply of credit, which will induce a 
higher volume of investment. His main argument is that there should be no quantitative 
restriction on credit as finance is a major pre-condition for growth and, as such, should not be 
repressed in any manner. In the same vein, Shaw (1973) agreed with McKinnon that a 
liberalised economy increases deposits, adding that financial liberalisation will promote 
competition and increase efficiency in the financial system. He also argued that a free-floating 
                                                          
3 See Fine and Dimakou (2016, Chapter 4) for an expanded discussion including critique of this theory. 
48 
 
interest rate extends the loanable funds supply which in turn increases investment in the 
economy. 
However, Bandiera et al. (2000) criticised McKinnon and Shaw for not taking into 
consideration the ambiguous nature of interest rates in promoting economic development. Such 
ambiguity is informed by broadening the scope of the analysis and the role of interest rates and 
money market within it. Systemically, raising the interest rate to promote financial 
development may not guarantee a corresponding increase in savings and economic 
development, since it involves interactions with other factors, such as aggregate levels of 
consumption, investment and inflation. The impact on these other factors may stall growth. For 
example, an increase in interest rates to enhance savings and curtail inflation may be at the 
expense of immediate consumption which is necessary to boost economic growth through 
aggregate demand. Consequently, a reduction in consumption will lead to a reduction in long-
term income as well. Furthermore, “abrupt increases in interest rates cause the exchange rate 
to appreciate rapidly thus damaging the real sector” (Arestis and Sawyer, 2005 p. 12). 
Therefore, interest rate changes that may be deemed pivotal in developing the financial system 
will be insufficient or in some cases negative for economic development. Arestis and Sawyer 
(2005) show that in a bid to demonstrate that a positive relationship exists between finance and 
growth, the empirical literature is ambiguous and unable to explain what they term hedge and 
curb effects – the fact that high interest rates from financial liberalisation have in some cases 
decreased the supply of credit as opposed to increasing it. 
Apart from this, McKinnon and Shaw’s finance-growth nexus argument was also imbued with 
the notion that liberalised financial markets are efficient in allocating resources to the most 
productive investments and, therefore, lead to economic growth. Following their thesis, free-
floating interest rates policy became the model for more liberalised financial markets. But this 
argument has many flaws: first, it was obviously without any consideration for the instability 
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experienced in financial markets. Arestis and Demetriades (1998) note that the impact of 
adopting financial liberalisation policies as recommended by McKinnon and Shaw has been at 
the core of the frequent banking and financial crises of the last 30 years, which have come with 
real economic costs. Second, the argument makes no distinction between volume and 
development of finance, which they use interchangeably. Here, the size of financial 
intermediation is erroneously conflated with financial development. 
Furthermore, Arestis and Sawyer (2005, p. 17) argue that the McKinnon-Shaw model, which 
directly links savings and investment, is flawed because “savings cannot finance capital 
accumulation; this is done by the banking sector, which provides loans with which investment 
expenditure is financed, without necessitating increases in the volume of deposits […]. A 
second problem with the McKinnon-Shaw model is the assumption that deposits create loans. 
In modern banking systems, including most LDCs, loans create deposits not the other way 
round.”  
FitzGerald (2006) also disagrees with the savings-investment theory of finance. He is of the 
opinion that there is little evidence that financial liberalisation has resulted in higher savings 
rate. Higher savings may be as a result of value simply changing from one form to another, and 
not necessarily of new savings generated from investment. For example, precious metals, 
commodities and other properties may be converted to bank instruments and other non-metallic 
securities. Second, financial liberalisation can also increase access to consumer credit and 
loans, without necessarily generating more savings through interest ceilings. The increase in 
savings may well depend on other factors as demographic and tax influences on pension 
provision, funding for health and education, family organisations or ownership structure of 
corporations (taken up in figure 2.4 below). As such, the only real advantage of financial 
development, according to him, is the spreading of risk between borrowers and lenders as 
financial institutions become available. 
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The responsiveness of accumulated savings to interest rates was investigated by Fry (1997) 
who found that higher interest rates will only stimulate savings and impact growth positively 
through what he calls the efficiency channel. That is to say, accumulated savings from interest 
rate adjustment still needs to be channelled to the most productive investments, if financial 
development is to have any positive impact on growth, and the idealised efficacy of the 
financial system does not in itself guarantee such. 
Following displacement of old by new growth theory, the nexus argument from the mid-1980s 
continued the tradition of linking economic growth to financial development through savings 
and its efficient allocation to investment (Pagano, 1993). As a core assumption of endogenous 
growth theory, there is not necessarily diminishing marginal social returns to capital at the 
aggregate level. Increasing savings, therefore, is expected to exert a long-run effect on the 
steady state growth rate, with major contributions from Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991), and Pagano (1993). 
But, as with earlier contributions, Levine (2005, p. 870) points out that the nexus theory must 
be able to “describe how financial development influences resource allocation decisions in 
ways that foster productivity growth and not aim the analytical spotlight too narrowly on 
aggregate savings” if finance is to have a positive influence on growth at all levels of 
development. The nexus also needs to show how higher returns “affect savings due to well-
known income and substitution effects” and “how lower risks ambiguously affects savings 
rates.” King and Levine (1993) also consider financial development as endogenous but go 
beyond savings to other measures of financial development which they found to be highly 
correlated with future rates of capital accumulation and investment. In the same tradition, 
Pagano (1993) and De Gregorio (1996) emphasise that the allocation of investment in human 
and physical capital would lead to economic growth. In particular, it was argued that financial 
development that promotes the accumulation of human capital by way of skills acquisition will 
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lead to economic growth, since human capital accumulation is not subject to diminishing 
returns at a social level. Similarly, with respect to capital accumulation, Arestis and 
Demetriades (1997) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) link financial development to the financing 
of firms. 
It became easy for the literature to make the connection between finance and growth. Fine 
(2000 p. 260) notes that any short-run negation of the neutrality of money, as in most 
macroeconomic theories, especially in the presence of micro- as macro- imperfections, is 
readily translated into growth effects through a variety of indirect mechanisms as the level and 
composition of savings and investment are affected. These studies, therefore, established a 
broader theory for well-functioning financial systems and pointed to the channels (taken up 
below) via which finance affects growth positively. Thus, the argument continued for 
unrestricted financial investment that then allows for an increasing marginal productivity of 
capital, as underpins the endogenous growth theory. 
Thus, endogenous growth theory generally advocates that financial development, irrespective 
of whether it is through banks or stock markets, is important for economic growth for 
generating savings and mobilising them as (increasing returns on) investment. The nexus, 
underpinned by endogenous growth theory and the functions of the financial system further 
conceived that financial institutions were more productive investors than individuals because 
of their ability to better identify the most efficient and productive investment; reduce the cost 
of costlier external funding relative to internally generated funding for the firm. Therefore, a 
higher rate of return is guaranteed with financial institutions, thereby impacting growth 
positively. 
But the endogenous growth theory on which finance-growth nexus became anchored was itself 
problematic. This is because it “was heavily implicated in the traditional and strengthening 
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microeconomic foundations of neoclassical economics” (p. 246) – the use of representative 
optimising individuals, full employment at all times and the microeconomics of market 
imperfections.4 One implication of this approach as pointed out by Keen (2011, p. 323), and as 
will be seen within the nexus, is that it refuses to model economic processes at an aggregate 
level of the economy. Rather, it reduces economic processes to one-way relationships, 
neglecting their aggregated nature with other variables. 
 
2.2.1 Causation in the Finance-Growth Nexus 
As with endogenous growth models, the literature on finance and growth was quickly drawn 
to previous causation debates, with the presence of finance becoming a major causal 
explanatory factor for development or absence of financial development for lack of 
development. Earlier causation debates attempted to justify logically and theoretically whether 
one caused the other. An early theoretical presentation of causation is observed in the work of 
Robinson (1952), who argued that economic growth preceded financial development. 
According to her, increase in production will cause a corresponding demand for financial 
intermediation to meet the increasing levels of production. By this simple logic, growth 
preceded and stimulated financial development. The evidence for Robinson’s argument is 
found in the work of Chandler (1977) which suggests that the financial sector in the United 
States in the nineteenth century, made up of investment banks and the corporate bond market, 
emerged to meet the financing needs of the transport sector as railroads were being developed. 
A theory of causation for the nexus was put forward by Patrick (1966) who identified two 
possible patterns, one being demand-following. In this case, growth in the productive sectors 
                                                          
4 See Fine (2000) for an expanded discussion on the limitations of these assumptions in microeconomics and 
economic theory in general and their implications for the discipline as a whole. 
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of the economy would require corresponding financial intermediation to meet the ensuing 
demand for financial transactions which would in turn cause financial development. He also 
argued that causation could be supply-leading, in which case, the flow of finance and financial 
sector development stimulates real investment and causes the economy to grow. He further 
adds that whether causation will be demand-following or supply-leading will depend on the 
stage of development of a country. Hence, for him, low-income countries will generally exhibit 
supply-leading causation while advanced economies will be demand-leading. He added that 
causation in the nexus in the case of middle-income countries may be unidirectional, which 
means that an equal interaction between finance and real investment could cause economic 
growth. 
A lot of the earlier empirical studies admitted some level of complexity in establishing whether 
financial development causes growth or vice versa, whilst remaining committed to its being 
one or the other (Goldsmith, 1969; Fritz, 1984; Jung, 1986; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; 
Arestis and Demetriades, 1997). Nevertheless, one of the earliest empirical attempts at 
assessing causality, carried out by Fritz (1984) using the Granger Causality (GC) test to 
investigate Patrick’s hypothesis of different directions of causality at different stages of 
development, found, as suggested by Patrick, that at an early stage of development, financial 
development causes growth and vice versa at a later stage. In another attempt to test Patrick’s 
hypothesis, Jung (1986) also using GC found evidence to support the claim that financial 
development leads economic growth. This was found to be true for both low- and high-income 
countries, although stronger in the former. 
The finance-growth nexus literature then started to draw on the differences in causality for 
developing and advanced countries but mostly concluded that, while developing countries 
exhibited a supply-leading type of causality, advanced countries exhibited more of a demand-
pull causality (Jung, 1986; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; King and Levine, 1993). This 
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differentiation between causality in developing and advanced economies, meant discarding the 
arguments of the new development economics with its deductive and reductionist empirical 
approach and over-simplistic position on causality, in which one-size-fits-all. However, the 
uniformity of causality for different countries, whether they are within similar levels of 
development or not, ignores the heterogeneity evident across them. 
Apergis, et al. (2007) have categorised the causation arguments in the nexus into two schools 
of thought: one, being those who argued that causation was mutual, and the other which argued 
that there was no evidence at all that finance and growth had any causal relationship with one 
another (see for example, Lucas, 1988). Despite this, Levine (2005) maintained strongly that, 
since evidence abounds that financial markets and institutions are an important part of the 
growth process, the level of financial development is a predictor of future developments and 
technological innovations. He adopted the position that developing countries’ per capita GDP 
would grow faster if they increased their financial depth. He argued that countries with more 
developed financial systems and more access to financial capital have grown faster than those 
with less developed financial systems and relatively constrained access to finance. 
Empirical analysis of causality became established with King and Levine (1993) who, on the 
basis of the Granger Causality approach which uses the post hoc, ergo propter hoc,5 tested the 
direction of causality between finance and growth for a period of between ten and thirty years. 
This approach (as with most causality tests) more or less investigates the predictive power of 
financial development on growth by regressing initial values of financial development on the 
average growth rate of the following period. They regressed financial development values in 
1960 on average growth rate of the following decade and found financial development to be a 
                                                          
5 Latin phrase for “after this, therefore because of this”, which is a logical fallacy of causation that assumes 
sequence to be integral to causation. For example, if event X precedes another event Y, therefore Y must have 
been caused by X - does not follow just as a hurricane warning does not cause a hurricane!  
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good predictor (said to be causal) of growth. Similarly, Levine and Zervos (1998) found that 
stock market liquidity, but not size, is causal for economic growth. Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
also discuss causality based on the assertion that industries dependent on external finance grow 
more in countries with larger financial sectors, as such, causality must be from finance. Levine 
et al. (2000) and Beck et al. (2000) though use different econometric methods to show finance 
is causal for growth. 
Nevertheless, Arestis and Demetriades (1999) show that the cross-sectional work of King and 
Levine (1993) is insufficient to address causality in the nexus by pointing to its flaws. These 
include the unsatisfactory use of cross-sectional data to address causality due to variability 
across different countries. Arestis and Sawyer (2005, p. 8) point out that “once the 
contemporaneous correlation between the main financial indicator and economic growth has 
been accounted for, there is no longer any evidence to suggest that financial development helps 
predict future growth.” This is so, because the GC is an empirical method that only shows 
whether past values of one variable help explain future behaviour of the other, within certain 
assumptions. It neglects the possibility that a variable might behave in a certain way today, in 
anticipation of the future, and not necessarily always in reaction to past influence from another. 
It is also unrealistic to assume that a variable in one period would continue to Granger Cause 
the other over the (extensive) period covered in the data, since other factors set in with time. In 
addition, the GC test has been contended to be applicable to only large sample sizes, given that 
the co-integration technique used requires a long series of data to establish causality (see for 
example, Narayan and Smyth (2005),  
The issue of reverse causality remains problematic in causality studies, as it may be the case 
that financial markets develop in response to economic growth or its anticipation. This point 
has only been simplistically acknowledged in the literature. For example, Rajan and Zingales 
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(1998) use difference-indifference6 models applied to industry-level data to address reverse 
causality. Barajas (2012) points out that much of the nexus regressions, more commonly, 
engage in the practice of regressing growth rates over relatively long periods on initial values 
of financial development, in order to address potential reverse causality (see for example, Beck 
et al., 2000). Given the agreement on the possibility of reverse causality, one implication is that 
financial development is being induced by greater demand for financial services as the 
economy grows. 
Another issue addressed in the nexus regressions is simultaneity bias, which arises from either 
reverse causality or omitted variables. A common method for controlling for simultaneity bias 
in the empirical literature is through Instrumental Variables (IV). It is assumed that such a 
variable is independent of, at the same time helps to explain, cross-country differences in 
financial development, and is exogenous to growth. Thus, the conventional choice of IV in the 
finance-growth nexus literature is a measure of legal origin (see for example, La Porta et al., 
1998; Levine, 1998; Levine et al., 2000; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001). The notion is that 
laws and traditions underpin investor friendliness. These are also said to predate financial 
development, which has been allegedly located around the industrial revolution. These laws, 
derived from British, French, German or Scandinavian legal systems, are said to be 
independent of finance and exogenous to growth, as such, form a causal link between finance 
and growth. 
Markedly, similar variables to legal origin, such as legal investor protection and regulatory 
environment – which in themselves derive from legal origin – have been modelled as possible 
links to growth (Berglof and Bolton, 2002) in the disaggregation of the channels of impact of 
finance, as discussed below. As such, the condition of exogeneity of legal origins to growth is 
                                                          
6 A statistical technique that attempts to analyse differential effects on groups of observations, say treatment 
versus control groups. 
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in question. More theoretically, Qin et al. (2016) challenge the econometric validity of using 
IVs on the basis that it cannot be applied to multivariate regressions since the textbook proof 
of its consistency is limited to bivariate analysis and does not extend to multivariate models (as 
in most nexus estimations). 
Therefore, the causality theory of the finance-growth nexus theory, like other mainstream 
economic theories of causality, is an empirical method premised on an axiomatic method of 
economic deduction, which assumes a manner of proposing that one thing causes the other 
without taking into account the systemic, social and historical conditions of such relations. The 
finance-growth causality, can therefore be faulted for lack of a convincing theoretical and 
empirical foundation. As such, it is insufficient to establish that finance causes growth. 
 
2.2.2 Undue Homogenising of Finance and Growth in the Nexus 
The consequence of the simplistic nexus and its consequent causation theory in the literature, 
was the undue homogenisation of both finance and growth. This narrowed drastically the 
complexity of causes, effects and their diverse nature, which is underpinned by uneven 
development of finance across space, time, form and structure (of activity). For example, 
Levine (2000, p. 4) observes that most cross-country analyses assumed the same financial 
structure and depth for different countries, ignoring the heterogeneity of financial activities in 
these countries. These could range from market takeovers as corporate controls in the USA, 
the extent to which banks own shares or vote proxy shares as in Germany, bank ownership by 
corporations in Japan, and so on and so forth, across countries. 
Also, Bezemer, (2013, p. 3) points out that there is no distinction in the literature between credit 
flows that support growth in the real economy and credit flows that speculatively inflate the 
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value of financial assets. An appropriate distinction will show that credit to the nonfinancial or 
real sector directly translates into growth while financial credit – i.e. credit to the finance, 
insurance and real estate (FIRE) sectors does not. It is regarded as the economy’s net build-up 
of debt, and the cause of financial fragility and instability. For example, “prolonged booms in 
mortgage flows and consumer lending tend to create larger net debt burdens than lending to 
non-financial businesses” (p. 4). The creation of futures or debt claims and credit instruments 
in excess of current output have also been found to lead to financial instability (Fink et al., 
2006). The tendency of some forms of debt instruments to appreciate in value (through sheer 
speculation) without necessarily contributing to the real economy is implicitly presumed 
irrelevant in the nexus. Within the nexus literature itself, these more specific forms of finance 
were initially neglected, crunched into one for the convenience of advancing a putative positive 
correlation between finance and growth. This is illustrated in figure 2.2 below7: 
 






Homogeneity in the nexus was not only presumed for finance but also for growth, as a marker 
of development. Studies either narrowly focussed on a few set of countries with similar levels 
                                                          
7 Figures 2.2 to 2.5 are adapted from Fine (2010b) where they are applied in the entirely different context of 







of GDP per capita or include a wide range of countries with very diverse GDP per capita, with 
the supposition that heterogeneity has been accounted for. The fact that growth figures are 
computed with different methodologies and accounting systems in different countries was also 
neglected. This will be taken up in chapter five, in the discussion on GDP computation and the 
nexus.  
Some of this over-simplification and excessive homogenising of the nexus is alluded to in the 
seminal paper of Rajan and Zingales (1998) by reference to omitted variable. They note that 
potential (omitted) variables that might be proxies for financial sector development comprise 
a larger set than is usually modelled whilst the explanatory variables to include is always a 
matter of conjecture. Therefore, this mode of investigation, as in the simple correlation of 
finance and growth, is in itself flawed by the possibility of “its result being subject to what has 
been omitted” (p. 2). 
Such a simplistic approach taken in the nexus has been likened to middle-range theory8 by Fine 
(2010, p. 23), which is a “systematic understanding [of linking a concept to another, making 
it] possible to ignore wider considerations and deeper determinants and other consequences.” 
It allowed for the initial simplification of the complexities of finance, subject to available data. 
Then previously omitted factors are introduced into the relationship on a piecemeal basis 
through empirical evidence of what may be observable and measurable.  As such, with slow 
but steady realisation of the complex nature of both finance and growth, both elements “in the 
correlation diagram [figure 2.2 above, were] bursting to break out of [their] narrow confines 
and to restore the fragmented multiplicity of causes and consequences from which it derives” 
(p. 24). These bursting out of factors that were hitherto ignored in the nexus are discussed in 
                                                          
8 Middle range theory is an approach to the construction of theory developed by Robert Merton. It starts with the 
empirical phenomenon (as opposed to abstract theorising), abstracting it to general statements about the social 
world, which it then tries to test with the use of data. In other words, it does not seek the total structure that is 
adequate to derive [the] themes. 
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this thesis first, in the way in which the literature narrowly disaggregated the forms of finance 
from which consequences are deemed to be realised, of which growth is only one. Second, 
attention is drawn to the disaggregation of the channels of causation between finance and 
growth. These are discussed in the sections that follow. 
 
2.3 Disaggregation of Forms of Finance in the Nexus 
In a bid to address the unsustainable putative homogeneity of finance and growth in the nexus, 
the literature started to disaggregate finance into the different forms said to cause growth. The 
debate on form was centred on bank- versus market-based finance. Initial debates started with 
whether the German bank-based financial system was responsible for propelling their economy 
past that of the UK in light of the latter’s market-based financial system (Goldsmith, 1969). 
This debate was later extended to include Japan, with similarly developed bank-based financial 
system, on the side of Germany, and the USA, with its market-based financial system, on the 
side of the UK. 
But a more critical look at the finance-growth nexus literature reveals a preference for, and 
larger concentration of the literature on, capital market based finance. Earlier studies like 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) and Levine (1991) emphasised that market-based finance 
diversifies investment, sustains risk transfer and ownership and meets liquidity needs, thus 
allocating savings to the most productive investments. Market-based financial systems were 
also argued to promote innovation and monitor investments, thereby enabling a higher level of 
efficiency that guaranteed growth (King and Levine, 1993; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996). 
The argument for capital markets is that they function to provide a platform for trading risks, 
as such, continuous liquidity. This position is also backed by the suggestion that some 
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investments and production technologies have long gestation periods (Bencivenga, 1991; 
Bencivenga and Smith, 1995). Therefore, there is the need for the ownership of such 
investments to be transferable from one saver or investor to another throughout the life cycle 
of the production process. These studies argue that such continuous transfer of risk among 
investors is only made possible in a securities market, as its instruments ensure liquidity can 
be met at any time. In addition, Levine (1997) notes that more liquidity could induce a shift to 
investments with longer gestation and consequently higher-return technologies. But it is not 
enough for firms to be listed on the capital market per se, he adds, “rather, it is the ability of 
agents to exchange ownership claims on an economy’s productive technologies that is relevant 
for growth” (Levine, 2005, p. 905). 
However, Levine (1997, p. 199) points out that the form in which finance impacts growth may 
be largely irrelevant, arguing that finance will contribute to growth irrespective of whether it 
is channelled through banks or capital markets, insofar as it is targeted at the most productive 
areas of investment. He then investigated whether bank- or market-based finance contributes 
more to growth, using country analysis, and draws the conclusion that form is unimportant. He 
argues that the efficiency with which finance is distributed is more important, and that the bank 
versus capital market argument be considered analytically vacuous (Levine, 2000). Levine’s 
location of the efficiency of finance is however limiting in the sense that it is relegated to the 
development of a regulatory environment for the enforcement of contracts, as he puts it. Given 
that the sustainability of investments are vulnerable to the reality of market instability and 
crises, a broader approach to efficiency therefore is for efficiency to be measured by the 
allocation of finance to the most sustainable investments. 
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Nonetheless, Levine’s position resonates with the Capital Structure Irrelevance Principle of the 
Modigliani-Miller Theory.9 It assumes, under a set of neoclassical assumptions, that the value 
of a firm is unaffected by the means through which it is financed, whether through debt or 
equity. Arestis and Sawyer (2005, p. 7) note that this view “is consistent with the perception of 
financial markets as independent entities from the rest of the economy, so that finance and 
growth are unrelated.”  But Stiglitz (1969) points out that besides investors’ rationality, 
Modigliani-Miller had assumed perfect markets with symmetric information. If markets are 
imperfect, as evidence has shown they are, then the nature of financing (whether debt or equity) 
can alter firms’ behaviour, since this will determine whether firms pursue business productivity 
or profit for their shareholders. It therefore makes a significant difference how financing is 
realised. 
In other research that compared whether banks or capital markets provide faster liquidity, 
Mayer (1988) found that equity sale finances only a small percentage of new investment in 
firms. A larger percentage was financed by savings and debt. This goes to show that the 
function of the provision of liquidity is not exclusively nor even better performed by the capital 
market as the proponents of market-based finance suggest. Suffice to say that this function may 
be better performed by banks. First, bank-based finance (more especially development banks 
in low income countries) can achieve this objective better by the use of targeted credits to the 
most productive sectors of an economy, which will be much needed to spur investment. 
Second, banks, by the availability of readily liquid forms of finance, should outperform capital 
markets as most forms of finance in banks need not be converted before being used to facilitate 
transactions, unlike shares and bonds that must be traded in the stock markets to obtain value. 
                                                          




Third, banks, unlike capital markets, do not offer room for excessive speculation, which could 
ensure that the most productive investments get funded. 
On the other hand, Levine and Zervos (1996) use cross-country regressions to investigate 
whether capital markets or banks impact more on growth. They found market liquidity as a 
measure of banking to be more correlated with growth, capital accumulation and productivity 
than stock market capitalisation, used as a measure for market-based finance. Their study was 
also among the earliest to capture bank lending to the private sector which they found to have 
a significantly high and independent impact on growth. This position is similar to Ergungor’s 
(2008) findings which, in a cross-sectional study, show a bank-oriented system to be positively 
correlated with growth. 
While Levine (1997) favoured capital market over bank-based finance in his discussion of the 
functions of stock markets, he conceded a larger tendency for information asymmetry in the 
capital market compared to banks. At the same time, he added that larger capital markets are 
able to stimulate information acquisition. Capital markets were eventually preferred over bank-
based finance in the literature as they were alleged to promote the dissemination of information 
and, by so doing, lower the risk in financial intermediation. But the case for bank-based 
financial system thrived on the critique of markets as inefficient in carrying out its functions 
(Levine, 2005). 
This information dissemination of capital markets was investigated by Stiglitz (2000), 
following earlier studies, using the share price index and market capitalisation fluctuations 
against economic growth. He argued that there is no sufficient theoretical evidence to suggest 
that capital markets potentially lead to economic growth. He added that capital market 
liberalisation “inhibits the use of counter-cyclical monetary policy; […] leads to overall 
economic volatility, and more volatility of consumption; [and] exposes the country to new 
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shocks, and weakens the built-in shock absorbers in the economy, provided by price system” 
(Stiglitz, 2004, p. 63). In a time-series cross-country study, Arestis et al. (2001) find that that 
large financial sectors can in fact be detrimental to growth, and that there is a larger significant 
positive relationship between the banking sector and growth than the stock market and growth. 
More recently, Schularick et al. (2012) also point out that there is no robust link between capital 
market and economic growth. They argue that experience shows growth trends in capital 
markets are often wiped out after a certain period of time. Bank funding, according to them, 
may be a more efficient process of simply injecting funds into firms and spurring economic 
growth in comparison to the capital market that gives room for speculation and inefficiency as 
it seeks to transfer stock ownership from one investor to another. Banks may simply focus on 
investing household savings into a diversified portfolio, thereby making investment decisions 
on their behalf. And based on their capacity, resources, technical knowledge and access to 
customers’ information from ex ante investment processes, they are more capable of 
overcoming market challenges of high transaction costs and information asymmetry than 
capital markets. 
Similarly, in a study of East Europe and Central Asia and Latin America and Caribbean regions, 
Yu et al. (2012) investigate the impact of finance on growth, using domestic credit by banks 
and domestic credit to the private sector both as percentages of GDP. Their conclusion is also 
that there is little probability that economic growth can be achieved by simply enhancing 
financial and, in particular, capital market development. Reviewing a large body of theoretical 
literature, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013) argue that banks are better at financing lower risk 
projects, while decentralised markets are better at financing high-risk projects with limited 




The literature dubbed bank-based finance as repressive and limited in its ability to promote 
both long-term liquidity and provide capital for risky investments. This one-sided argument 
was made without reference to banks as performing the parallel function of information 
dissemination and minimising risk as well, albeit through a different process. The studies 
neglected the distinct role of banks, which generally include: acquisition of information on 
firms; exerting corporate control; provision of risk-reducing arrangements; pooling of capital 
and ease of making transactions. 
While stock markets mainly disseminate information in the publishing of stock prices, banks 
do so in the vetting process of loans and other investments before decisions are taken. Banks 
also function to reduce costs of information acquisition and enhance corporate governance 
(Levine, 1997). It can be argued that this distinction between the processes of intermediation 
between financial systems sheds light on the degree to which each might be appropriated by 
vested interests. Therefore, market-based financial system can be said to be more prone to 
distributive inefficiency, given the fast pace at which emerging stock prices fluctuate in relation 
to the long waiting time before causes of such fluctuations are known. In this sense, the delay 
in disclosure of causes of price changes means that only a few investors will initially have 
insider information on stock performance and benefit from such by hedging their investments 
ahead of others. Other investors may react to buy/sell signals from others, leading to over-
speculation. 
However, the changing nature of financial transactions makes more complex the traditional 
bank- versus market-based forms of finance disaggregation, as banks become more market-
oriented in their dealings and less focused on traditional banking activities. There is evidence 
that the traditional banking business of accepting deposits from savers and making loans 
available to businesses has declined significantly in the USA (as with other more financially 
developed countries) and that banks have switched from holding direct assets to managing 
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pension and mutual funds (Allen and Santomero, 2001). Also, Bazot (2013) notes that banks 
now concentrate less on traditional banking activities in which profit came mainly from net 
interest spread, preferring more lucrative market-based activities and profiting from capital 
income and fees. He adds that the development of shadow banking10 to increase intermediation 
is also evidence of the shift away from bank- to market-based activities. The scale of credit to 
the private sector by both financial and non-financial institutions is also evidence that financial 
and non-financial institutions are now more engaged in market activities than before, as 
opposed to traditional banking activities which sought profit by investing in productive 
industries. These developments have made the bank- versus market-based debate insufficient 
for assessing the relationship between finance and growth. 
In a similar manner to the disaggregation by forms of finance in the nexus literature, growth 
was disaggregated through aspects of development or outcomes other than growth, as depicted 
in figure 2.3. In each study, one form of finance is usually selected as most appropriate for an 
outcome, ignoring other micro and macro aspects of the interaction of such a form with its 
putative outcome. Bank-based finance was alleged to cause growth (Goldsmith, 1969; Levine 
and Zervos, 1996 and Ergungor, 2008) and to cause capital accumulation and productivity for 
growth (Levine and Zervos, 1996). Market-based finance in the same vein was considered to 
cause growth (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991 and Levine, 1991; 1997). Both forms of finance 
have also been found to lead to higher productivity (Levine, 1997). Development finance was 
later brought into the discussion (although briefly, and not necessarily through econometric 
methods) in relation to its impact on welfare and poverty (Barth et al., 2004 and Demirguc-
                                                          
10 The term was coined by Paul McCulley in 2007. Shadow banking refers to financial intermediation, 
particularly the deployment of banking activities by non-banking institutions and bank act-alikes. These non-
bank actors engage in taking short-term loans borrowed from the money markets to fund the purchase of assets 
with longer-term maturities. However, because they are not traditional banking institutions, they are not 
regulated by the monetary authorities, and for the same reason, they are not insured by the government’s deposit 
protection arrangement. This means they cannot borrow from the Central Bank in periods of emergency to cover 
short-term liquidity. The IMF called it one of the major failings of modern financial system in the period leading 
up to the 2008 crisis. 
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Kunt et al., 2008) and to impact growth or not. This disaggregation led to multiplicity of causes 
and consequences, as extended financial forms and outcomes are alleged to be interlinked, each 
now causing any number or aspects of growth in different studies of the nexus. What now 
obtains is a superfluity of causes and impacts, raising questions over the specification of the 
nexus theory. 
One implication of the bank- versus market based argument of the nexus is that it ignores the 
fact that, not only can both exist together to provide financial services that lead to economic 
development (Levine, 2000; 1997; Boyd and Smith, 1998; Levine and Zervos, 1998), but also 
that it is insufficient in of itself in explaining the complexity of the nexus, given that it is located 
only in form, and neglects issues of space, time and other factors that are requisite for economic 
development. And as stressed by Merton and Bodie (2004) and Levine (2005), there is not one 
optimal institutional structure for providing growth and enhancing financial functions in the 
economy. 
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2.4 Disaggregation of Transmission Mechanisms of Finance 
The other manner in which the finance-growth nexus literature has evolved has been through 
the disaggregation of the channels through which finance is alleged to contribute to growth. 
This disaggregation was achieved in the literature in two closely related theoretical 
interpretations. First, it was alleged that the relationship between finance and growth can be 
indirect through other positive outcomes of development, such as income growth and 
institutional development, poverty reduction, etc. The literature assumed that these other 
broader issues of development were part of the finance-growth nexus as benefits in their own 
right. Much of the nexus literature thus examined the role of financial development on growth 
conditional on broader variables of development. Here, rather than linking these factors on 
their own terms to growth, they are seen as sources and/or conditioning variables of finance. It 
becomes a way to widen the scope and definition of the nexus in order to incorporate other 
factors necessary for growth. The impact of finance on these broader developmental factors, if 
positive, was inferred to indirectly translate into economic growth as well. But the weak 
theoretical connection between finance and these other factors of development found by the 
studies themselves also necessitated a further investigation of other growth-reducing factors 
such as poverty, inflation (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2001) and inequality (Jalilian and 
Kirkpatrick, 2002). 
Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2002) and Blanco (2009) found the link between finance and growth 
to be through income and poverty reduction. Financial development was found to increase 
income (and consequently reduce poverty) which in turn causes growth. These studies find that 
finance can reduce poverty if it can boost income. They conclude that there must exist a positive 
relationship between finance and growth. Nonetheless, they also point to the fact that financial 
development needed to be measured by its impact on income inequality rather than just income 
growth to ascertain its impact on poverty reduction. However, efficient allocation or 
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distribution has been insurmountable and remains a constraint for finance, as evidence has 
shown. Financial development is rather seen to increase income inequality. 
The second aspect of disaggregation in the literature is through channels of transmission of 
finance to growth. Some of these are evident in the studies of De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) 
which linked the impact of financial intermediation on growth through volume and efficiency 
of investment in firms. Similarly, Rajan and Zingales (1998) found, using a large sample of 
countries, that industrial sectors which are relatively more in need of external finance grow 
disproportionately faster in countries with more developed financial markets. They “suggest 
that an […] indirect channel through which financial development […] influences growth is by 
disproportionately improving the prospects of young firms”, with finance having twice an 
impact on the growth of the number of firms as it has on the size of the firms (p. 4). In the same 
manner, De Gregorio (1996) links finance to growth through a three-step process of human 
capital and, the accumulation of higher savings that, guarantees future consumption. Levine et 
al. (2000) examine the nexus focussing on productivity growth, physical capital accumulation 
and savings as causal factors of growth. 
As such, the debate became located on the channels of transmission. Beck et al. (2000) and 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2002; 2007) find that finance contributes to growth through 
productivity growth rather than physical and human capital accumulation as a conditioning 
variable. Similarly, Rioja and Valev (2004b) show that the positive effect of finance and growth 
occurs through capital accumulation for low income countries. More recently, in 
disaggregating the transmission mechanism of the nexus through the development of the 
productive industries, Ductor and Grechyna (2012) show that the e ffect of financial 
development on economic growth depends on the growth and characteristics of other sectors. 
They argue for technological development in the non-financial sectors of the economy. 
Furthermore, Bhatti et al. (2013) examine the nexus conditional on R&D. While they find that 
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the positive effect of financial development is conditional on the level of R&D, they add that a 
high level of R&D is associated with a negative effect of financial development on growth. 
More contradictory conclusion is reached by Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) who find that 
financial sector growth is rather a drag on productivity growth. 
Moreover, the nexus argument has been linked to well-functioning institutional frameworks, 
for a significant positive relationship between finance and growth (De Gregorio and Guidotti, 
1995; Levine, 2000; Levine et al., 2000; Beck and Levine, 2004). Beck et al. (2003) find that 
lasting institutions are perquisite to financial development. While attempting to make a case 
for a legal structure for finance, Levine (1998; 1999; 2000), succeeded in putting forward the 
argument that finance will contribute significantly to growth via an efficient regulatory and 
legal system. This resonates with Demetriades and Law (2006) who argue that institutional 
underdevelopment is a major drawback factor in the nexus especially for developing countries. 
In another study of developing and advanced countries, Ergungor (2008) found that the 
relationship between finance and growth is contingent on the stability of the judicial systems. 
Similarly, Ahlin and Pang (2008) model financial development and corruption and find a 
correlation between them. Rajan and Zingales (2003) even emphasise how political economy 
actors can create policies beneficial for a positive finance-growth nexus. 
Studies that link much broader factors of development to the finance-growth nexus are those 
by Levine et al. (2000) which attempt to disaggregate the nexus through ethnic diversity. Guiso 
et al. (2004) analyse the role of social capital in financial development. Granato et al. (1996) 
include cultural attitudes as a possible link in the finance-growth relationship in a study of 
Taiwan. Interestingly, Cultural attitudes are found to be an explanatory variable for the nexus. 
This proves how far-reaching the nexus literature has gone, and indicative of how any factor 
can be part of the nexus, in its own right as far as the theoretical literature is concerned and as 
far as econometrics allows. 
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Figure 2.4 Diagrammatical Representation of the Narrowness of Disaggregation in 
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other variables. Therefore, the disaggregation of the nexus through channels tends to overlook 
that other conditioning variables could also directly or indirectly be independent underlying 
determinants of growth, not least financial development. This is illustrated diagrammatically 
in figure 2.4 above with some representative variables. The disaggregation by forms of finance 
and channels of impact in 2.3 above has been erased for simplicity, to show that growth is not 
a consequence of finance alone but other direct and indirect variables in boxes A and B. For 
example, remittances from abroad, aid and conditionality, emergence of financial interests at 
the expense of others and industrial policy, etc. are directly causal for finance, which could 
lead to growth. They may also be directly causal for growth on their own or indirectly through, 
for example, increase in wages, which may stimulate demand and spur growth. Still, the 
intermediate variables on their own may indirectly stimulate growth through a direct causal 
effect on finance. For example, the impact of natural resource underperformance in a 
development context is recognised by Barajas et al (2012) as capable of inducing a downward 
pull on the financial sector through the real exchange rate and other institutional, political and 
socio-economic factors that may impact negatively on growth. The possibility of other causal 
factors for growth has been raised by FitzGerald (2006). 
In other words, evidence for the finance-growth nexus could be spurious, mistaking correlation 
for causation in light of other directly or indirectly conditioning variables on outcomes. These 
features of the nexus debate, therefore, bring to the fore the simple argument, as Fine (2010b, 
p. 27) puts it, of the “cautionary tale of not conflating correlation with causation and of taking 
full account of otherwise omitted variables and relations between” any two variables. This 
reveals a bias for overstating the role of finance, with it, serving as a “proxy or conduit for 
more important determinants” of growth (p. 26). 
The disaggregation of forms of finance and channels of causation in the nexus argument reveal 
other gaps. One is that the relationship between finance and growth is not direct but often 
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complex and ambiguous, as such necessitates linking it to other factors. It also makes obvious 
a fundamental point: the inability of finance by itself to have an absolute significant positive 
relationship on growth. Therefore, it is necessary to recognise that implicitly the nexus is a 
middle-range theory, which leaves aside a potential broader causal structure for both finance 
and growth. Thus, research focussing on the nexus alone is based on a misinterpreted 
theoretical and causal structure of development. This also has profound implications for 
empirical (mis)estimation as the nexus will be credited, and its contradictory results mixed up, 
with other causal relations, as discussed in the section that follows. 
Despite these criticisms of the nexus argument – that it is biased towards finding a positive 
relationship and that it brings in complexity in a piecemeal if cumulative fashion – the critical 
exercise engaged in charting the trajectory of the debate has not been entirely negative. It has, 
revealed the disaggregated forms of finance and the channels through which it has effects and 
is itself affected (in relation to growth and more, and both directly and indirectly). This allows 
for the possibility to step back from the evolutionary path taken by the nexus debate and take 
diversity, complexity, context and closer consideration of underlying developmental 
determinants as starting point for the analysis rather than as an uncomfortable endpoint that 
otherwise only seems to allow for more disaggregation and contingent empirical results. Given 
that the nexus is ultimately situated in terms of the bigger question of the determinants of 
development, it is hardly surprising that its middle-range character should both offer positive 
if skewed insight and, ultimately, constrained understanding. 
 
2.5 Mixed Empirical Methods for, and Results from, the Finance-Growth Nexus 
The combination of empirical methods with which the above discussed disaggregation of the 
relationship between finance and growth was addressed, generally in pursuit of establishing a 
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positive nexus, is analysed below. The ensuing results are shown in this section to be mixed, 
despite the similar methods used to examine the nexus in different studies. Each successive 
method for investigating the nexus empirically is seen to produce both positive and negative 
relationships for the nexus across the various studies. This strengthens the argument against 
the conclusion of a one-way line of causation from financial liberalisation to economic 
development. 
In an extensive summary of the nexus literature, Levine (2005) categorised empirical evidence 
on the finance and growth nexus in the following manner: cross-country studies, dynamic panel 
studies, time-series studies, country case studies, and industry and firm level analyses. While 
this classification may be generally understood in the literature to reflect the manner in which 
empirical investigation has developed in the, it is understood in this thesis as reflecting 
developments in economic theory in general, particularly with regards to the narrow 
econometric methods for establishing theory. The shift from cross-sectional to panel 
regressions with its multi-dimensional data became convenient for disaggregating the nexus by 
channels of impact. Firm- and industry-level regressions made it possible to extend this 
disaggregation even further. These shifts in methods, especially the later focus on cross-country 
analyses, also reflect the increasing recognition of the heterogeneity and complexity of the 
finance-growth process. 
This section summarises the empirical methods and results of the finance-growth nexus 
literature in a similar manner as Levine (2005). Section 2.5.1 discusses cross-country 
regressions and the challenges of finding appropriate representative measures of finance and 
growth in empirical investigations of the nexus. Panel data analyses, on which much of the 
nexus is based, is discussed in Section 2.5.2. It is observed to increase heterogeneity in the 
nexus, not least in light of omitted variable, simultaneity and unobserved country-specific 
biases. Some time-series studies are discussed in section 2.5.3, many of which are used jointly 
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with panel analyses. Sections 2.5.4 and 2.5.5 discuss firm- and industry-level and country 
regressions, respectively. The empirical limitations of these methodologies are discussed in 
section 2.5.6. It is argued that these render the empirical analyses inadequate in drawing 
conclusions on the nexus.  
 
2.5.1 Cross-Country Studies 
One of the earliest empirical studies on the finance-growth nexus was by Goldsmith (1969). 
He compiled data on financial intermediation assets as a share of economic output for 35 
countries over a 100-year period from 1860 to 1963, and draw conclusion of a positive 
relationship between finance and growth. However, given that data were unavailable for a 
broad range of countries, as such, limiting for a cross-country analysis, this was more of a case 
of conflating the size of the financial sector with development. Levine (2005, p.890) notes that 
Goldsmith’s work raised several problems that subsequent empirical work tried to resolve by: 
extending the analysis to cover a broader and larger range of countries; controlling for other 
factors influencing economic growth; examining whether financial development is associated 
with productivity growth and capital accumulation as emphasised in growth accounting 
literature; finding indicators that accurately gauge the functioning of the financial system; 
identifying the  direction of causality; and understanding the role of financial markets, non-
bank financial intermediaries, and a combination of both on economic growth. 
To address some of the problems identified above, King and Levine (1993) focussed on bank-
based finance, to investigate whether financial development is a predictor of long-term 
economic growth, for 77 countries over the period 1960-1989. They use liquid liabilities of the 
financial system – comprising currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks 
and non-bank financial institutions – as a percentage of GDP as a measure of financial 
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development. They construct more measures of financial development such as the ratio of bank 
credit as a percentage of banks and central bank assets, and credit to private enterprises as a 
percentage of GDP. Their control variables, representing a matrix of conditioning factors that 
might be causal for growth, include income per capita, education, political stability, exchange 
rate, trade and fiscal and monetary policies. They also measure all their independent variables 
against other growth indicators: average rate of growth per capita; average per capita rate of 
growth in capital stock; and total productivity growth.11 They find a significant positive 
relationship between all their measures of financial development and all three growth measures. 
Several variables have been used as proxies for financial development. As with the work of 
Goldsmiths, these variables have continued to be based on quantity of finance, measured by 
the volume of financial intermediation and size of the financial sector. As such, the variables 
have generally been inadequate in capturing the productive, inclusive or distributive impact of 
finance on the economy, albeit intended as studies that attempt to investigate the relationship 
between financial development and inequality or poverty. Jung (1986) uses the ratio of money 
to GDP as a measure of financial development. La Porta et al. (2002) use the degree of public 
ownership of banks as a measure of the impact of financial development on growth. They 
conclude that higher degrees of public ownership of banks is associated with lower financial 
development and growth. Bank-based factors have included the ratio of liquid liabilities (i.e. 
M2) to GDP and credit to the private sector by banks as a ratio of GDP. Rousseau and Wachtel 
(2000) use annual data of the ratio of M3 to GDP as a measure of bank development. Market-
based factors of financial depth on the other hand have included market capitalisation (i.e. total 
stock market capitalisation) to GDP and the ratio of the value of shares or equity to GDP, and 
                                                          
11 This is a very broad ‘Solow residual’ defined as real GDP per capita minus 0.3 times the growth rate of the 
capital stock per person. It essentially incorporates everything that may affect growth except capital. 
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total market capitalisation (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Barajas, et al., 2012), sometimes deflated 
by the stock market share price index to eliminate price changes. 
Levine and Zervos (1998) investigate the relationship between capital market and economic 
growth, and the turnover ratio, which is the total value of shares traded in a country’s stock 
exchange as a percentage of total stock market capitalisation as a measure of financial 
development. They find this to be significantly correlated with future rates of growth and its 
other measures as in King and Levine (1993). However, Levine (2005, p.894) notes that the 
turnover ratio as a measure of financial development “exhibits substantial cross-country 
variability. Very active markets such as Japan and the United States had turnover ratios of 
almost 0.5 during the 1976-93 period, while less liquid markets, such as Bangladesh, Chile, 
and Egypt have turnover ratios of 0.06 or less.” As such, it is a significant source of 
heterogeneity (which may be considered good) when used in cross-country regressions. But he 
adds that the direct cost of conducting equity transactions is not measured by this ratio and it 
does “not control for the possibility that the arrival of information and the processing of that 
information may differ across countries and thereby induce cross-country differences in trading 
that does not reflect liquidity as defined by theory” (p. 896).12 This indicator of financial 
development, which supposedly captures firms’ liquidity in domestic markets, may also be 
driven by speculation, and not necessarily provide domestic liquidity to local firms. This is 
typically the case in countries that are highly integrated with the international financial system, 
as such, most financial transactions may be in short-term assets for profit and not long-term 
investments. Consequently, the turnover ratio may not be linked to growth. 
Credit to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions is mostly used as the 
generally agreed measure of financial development. (King and Levine, 1993; Arcand, et al., 
                                                          
12 See Levine (1991). 
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2012). It is also said to reflect the size of the financial market. This is because, “until the late 
1990s, bank credit to the private sector was almost identical to total credit to the private sector. 
However, the two series started diverging at the beginning of the new millennium and there are 
now several countries in which total credit to the private sector is much larger than bank credit 
to the private sector” (Arcand, et al., 2015, p. 111). Whether this variable is in itself 
contributory to growth is ignored in the literature. The direction of flow of such credit (mainly 
towards household consumption) may not be directly linked to growth, not least the widening 
debt forms which make it up. In fact, Beck et al. (2014, p. 53) agrees that this is a “crude 
indicator focusing on the financial system’s contribution to the economy, rather than reflecting 
the broader concept of its socio-political importance.” Notably, the use of credit to the private 
sector as a measure of financial development in the literature is underpinned by the assumption 
that a financial system that lends to the private sector stimulates growth through risk evaluation 
and corporate control, as opposed to providing credit to the government, public enterprises or 
government-favoured private enterprises – in the case of directed credit (Arcand et al., 2015). 
Also, a measure of the ratio of bank credit to bank credit plus central bank domestic assets is 
used to compare the degree of efficiency of credit allocation between commercial banks and 
central banks. This is also usually underpinned by the notion that commercial banks are more 
likely to provide better financial intermediation than central banks (Arcand et al., 2012, p. 9). 
However, this can easily be refuted on the basis of the inability to direct commercial banks’ 
credit to targeted areas of the economy for growth. Rather, commercial banks’ intermediation 
is inefficiently allocated to areas with the highest return on investment for shareholders. These 
show how measures of financial development have been dubiously used to advance a positive 
impact of finance on growth in the literature. 
FitzGerald (2006) notes that some major indicators of financial development are yet to be used 
in analysing the finance-growth nexus, mainly due to data unavailability. For example, the 
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duration of bank loans and fixed income securities, which should convey investment 
sustainability can be a major indicator of financial development, but this is yet to be used in 
analysing the nexus. Also, financial inclusion, as a measure of financial development, 
especially for developing countries, has not been adequately represented in the finance-growth 
nexus analysis (taken up in chapter four). In cases, where financial inclusion has been the focus 
of financial development, this has only been located around measures of nearness of banking 
institutions, neglecting the presence of non-bank financial institutions (Beck et al., 2007; Cull, 
2009) or the actual flow of these funds towards redistributive elements and poverty reduction. 
  
2.5.2 Dynamic Panel Methodology 
Following the conventional cross-country analyses in response to the issues raised in earlier 
works, De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) use panel analysis to find a long-term positive 
relationship for low- and middle-income countries. Despite arriving at a positive relationship 
for some countries, they found a significant negative relationship for the nexus in Latin 
America. Levine et al. (2000) and Beck et al. (2000) use a panel GMM estimator, derived from 
Arellano and Bond (1991), which attempts to account for both time-series and cross-sectional 
variations in cross-country data. It considers biases in cross-country regressions by first-
differencing to eliminate country-specific effects and provides for more precise estimations by 
instrumenting all explanatory variables. Their panel data consisted of seven non-overlapping 
five-year periods of 77 countries, covering the period 1960-1995. Both Levine et al. (2000) and 
Beck et al. (2000) found a significant positive relationship between the exogenous components 
of financial development and growth, and productivity, after controlling for simultaneity bias 
and omitted country-specific effects. 
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Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) use panel estimations of annual data and the difference estimator 
to examine the relationship between growth and stock markets and banks. Loayza and Ranciere 
(2006) differentiate between short- and long-run in the nexus and use panel data to investigate 
a model of the short and long runs, with credit to the private sector as their measure of financial 
development. They find that the relationship between finance and growth is positive in the long 
but negative in the short run, noting also that short-run volatility in bank lending can cause 
financial crises. Beck and Levine (2004) try to control for potential biases with the difference 
estimator in their panel investigation. They then use GMM and conclude that both capital 
market and bank–based finance have significant positive relationship with growth even after 
correcting for biases as omitted variables, simultaneity and unobserved country-specific 
effects. Christopoulous and Tsionas (2004) also use an Error Correction Model (ECM) for their 
panel data for ten developing countries and conclude that a significant positive relationship 
exists between finance and growth. Zang and Kim (2007) also find a positive relationship 
between finance and growth using panel analysis. 
But not all panel studies found a positive nexus. Benhabib and Spiegel (2001) use dynamic 
panel data analysis and control for country fixed effects. They find that different measures of 
financial development have different impacts on the growth effect. Using the same method. 
Spiegel (2001) found that different measures matter and shows that bank domestic asset 
exhibited a more significant positive relationship with human capital development at both 
country and cross-country levels. In the same vein, Fink, et al. (2006) use domestic credit and 
bonds to show a significant positive relationship while private credit and stock market 
capitalisation showed no significant relationship with growth in their study. 
Furthermore, Levine and Zervos (1998), Levine et al. (2000), Favara (2007) and Beck et al. 
(2009) use enterprise credit and find that finance reduces income inequality but with no 
significant relationship with consumption sensitivity. They conclude that there is no significant 
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relationship between household credit and growth. They add that there is no evidence of 
heterogeneity in their cross-country analysis. Despite Favara (2007) finding a positive 
correlation, he draws the conclusion that there is no evidence that financial development causes 
growth. 
Some use of dynamic panel methodology produced outright contrary results. Levine et al. 
(2000) and Beck et al. (2000) found a less robust relationship between financial development 
and capital accumulation. Using GMM in a panel data covering 85 countries from 1960-1998, 
Favara (2003) also found a weak and insignificant relationship for the nexus. Levine (2005) 
further notes that endogeneity of all other explanatory variables in these cross-sectional 
estimators is not controlled for and, as such, can lead to inappropriate inferences on the 
coefficient on financial development. With panel data, there is the problem associated with 
using five-year periods, which do not adequately proxy for long-run relationships, making the 
panel method imprecise for the finance-growth nexus. This was taken into consideration in the 
study of Arcand et al. (2012) who added ten-year growth spells to capture long-run effects of 
finance on growth. 
The study by Blanco (2009) used dynamic panel analysis and found that financial development 
has no significant relationship on growth, income inequality nor human capital development. 
Demetriades and Rousseau (2011) also use cross-sectional panel data and find a significant 
relationship for the nexus but draw the conclusion that the weakness of banking supervision 
exerts significantly more of a negative relationship with growth. In the same vein, Barajas 
(2012) used dynamic panel analysis for non-overlapping five-year averages of 130 countries 
from 1975-2005 and show that the relationship between finance and growth is heterogeneous. 
His results suggest a significant positive relationship for high-income countries and 
insignificant for low-income and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. Another 
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inconclusive result is the study done by of Rousseau and Wachtel (2007) which concludes that 
financial development has an insignificant long-term impact on growth. 
 
2.5.3 Time-Series Analyses 
Not many empirical investigations of the nexus have been solely based on time-series analyses, 
as this method is mostly combined with panel investigations for cross-country analyses. Arestis 
and Demetriades (1996) had argued that cross-sectional country studies, and in particular the 
work of King and Levine (1993), are statistically fragile and unable to address the issue of 
causality for the finance-growth nexus. They add that correlation between financial 
development indicators and growth is not necessarily causality. As such, there is no evidence 
that financial development predicts future growth. They argued for use of time-series data and 
approach as in the work of Granger (1988), which used co-integration techniques to show that 
different countries exhibit different causality patterns. 
Another frequently used time-series technique in the nexus is the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 
approach. It is used to analyse linear independence among multiple time series. Xu (2000) used 
a multivariate VAR approach with impulse response analysis to find a significant positive 
relationship between finance and growth. Also, Ghirmay (2004) used annual time-series data 
of 13 sub-Saharan African countries from 1970-2001 with the VAR approach and finds a 
significant positive relationship for the nexus in 12 out of the 13 countries. Also, Rousseau 
(1999) investigates the historical role of financial development in expanding the economy of 
Japan between 1868 and 1884, using the VAR approach. He found that the financial sector was 
responsible for growth in Japan. 
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However, the use of time-series stationary co-integration tests for the nexus has also yielded 
contrary results. Demetriades and Hussein (1996) use time-series co-integration techniques to 
show that there is little or insignificant evidence that financial development has a positive 
relationship with growth. Luintel and Khan (1999) use the VAR approach and find an 
insignificant relationship between finance and growth. Lee and Islam (2008) use the same 
method and find heterogeneity of the impact of finance on growth across countries. Most of 
these studies combined time-series analysis with other methods. 
 
2.5.4 Industry- and Firm-Level Analyses 
Empirical studies of the finance-growth nexus have also included firm- and industry-level data, 
which analyse the impact of financial intermediation on firms and industries. One of the early 
studies here is done by Rajan and Zingales (1998) who investigate whether industries that are 
more dependent on external finance grow faster in countries that are more financially 
developed. They use data from 36 industries and 42 countries covering the period 1980-1990. 
Their findings suggest that financial development has a significant positive relationship with 
the growth of industries needing external finance. Financial development also was found to 
have a positive impact on the formation of new industries and the expansion of existing ones. 
Beck et al. (2001) use firm-level data of publicly traded manufacturing firms in 26 countries to 
investigate the relationship between a firm’s growth rate and its need for investment. They find 
that both bank finance and market liquidity contribute to the growth rate of firms. Locating 
banking competition measure around industrial organisation, Claessens and Laeven (2005) 
show that competitive banking systems promote the growth of industries that are more in need 
of external finance, but found no link between banking industry concentration, or what may be 
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termed volume of finance, and growth in industries. Their finding supports the view that 
banking sector competition has a positive impact on growth. 
Contrary results for firm and industry analyses are the findings of Claessens and Laeven (2003) 
who use industry-level analysis to investigate whether financial development and the quality 
of property rights protection increases firms’ access to external finance. They find that financial 
development does not promote growth since firms do not have access to external finance. The 
absence of property rights could be detrimental to growth as well, given that access to property 
rights could cause a concentrate of investment in tangible assets.  
 
2.5.5 Empirical Conundrums 
With these methods and results, some major limitations are often overlooked. Studies that link 
the positive impact of the nexus to degree of competition in the financial sector have been 
unclear about the connection between finance and competition, what sort of competition and 
the level of competition required for a positive nexus. As such, results have been inconsistent 
for developing and advanced economies. Empirical analyses of the nexus is rife with 
investigation of convergence. But, convergence – sometimes referred to as the Solow-Swan 
convergence effect – is the assumption that countries with lower per capita growth will grow 
faster (as financial depth increases), so that all countries converge in per capital income. 
However, in practice, countries are far from converging. While there is mixed evidence of the 
catch-up effect, notably, Delong (1998) examines a century of historical data and finds no 
evidence of the so-called catch-up effect. This is despite increasing financial development. 
In interpreting these (Barro-type) regressions therefore, it is necessary to be cautious of both 
country-wide and cross-country specificities. With this approach, the shortcoming remains that 
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observation for each country is determined by a generic joint distribution of variables, without 
consideration that measures of financial development or growth are unevenly developed in 
different countries. For cross-country regressions especially, different measures of finance 
from different institutions in different country settings are lumped together and assumed to 
elicit similar impact on growth measures. Data from different countries also tend to be 
influenced by different social factors. It is necessary to bear in mind what these variables used 
in the finance-growth nexus empirical studies might represent and what they actually measure 
and how different these might be from one country to another. 
The case for insufficiency of these regressions used in growth models, and applied to empirical 
analyses of the nexus is expanded upon by Fine (2000). He points out that they simply have 
growth as the dependent variable and a negative sign in the regression on per capita income as 
evidence of convergence, and suggestive of an exogenous growth relationship. Other, 
independent variables are then thrown in as indicative of sources of endogenous growth to 
account for cross-country differences. Any variable can also be made to look significant in 
these models, since “when one continuously changes different combinations of explanatory 
variables, there is bound to be significant change in the coefficients at some point” (Sala-i-
Martin, 1994, p. 6). The stability of regression coefficients is also overlooked and consequently 
unaccounted for, as well as whether variables remain significant as other control variables are 
added or omitted13 (Fine, 1998, p. 8). 
In an extensive research on the growth experience of SSA, Ndulu and O’Connor (2007, p. 27-
28) acknowledge that “If the determinants of growth were assigned to countries on an 
experimental basis, OLS regressions would pick up the ceteris paribus impact on growth of 
each determinant, given a sufficiently large set of observations. But history is not a controlled 
                                                          
13 Fine (1998) argues that, from Galton’s regression to the mean, if changes in growth is randomly and 
identically distributed across countries, there would be a negative correlation between it and income. 
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experiment. The typical growth regression is therefore likely to be subject to some degree of 
endogeneity bias, whether from true simultaneity – investment determines growth, but growth 
also determines investment – or from the omission of key determinants that are correlated with 
the included variables.” They recommend regressions going beyond descriptions and 
conditional predictions by the use of a combination of conditional models, reduced-form 
models, fixed-effects estimations and instrumental variables to identify variables that affect 
growth. They add however, that despite these approaches, no single econometric approach (or 
investigation) can determine the relationship between growth and the factor(s) that impact upon 
it. 
These nexus estimations often contain endogeneity bias that cannot be eliminated even with a 
large data set (p. 95). This is the case, when a correlation exists between finance and other 
independent variables. Endogeneity can also be caused by omitted variables, self-selection, 
unobserved heterogeneity or country-specific effects, simultaneity and reverse causality. These 
are bound to exert a bias in regression results that cannot be completely addressed, since it is 
impossible to include enough control variables (or IVs as the case may be) in a model. Levine, 
et al. (2000) attempted to address this problem in the nexus by using the instrumental variable 
technique in a panel data set. But the use of IVs has its limitations as discussed in section 2.2.1 
above. 
The GMM has commonly been used to address endogeneity, applied to investigating the link 
between financial markets and economic development, in both microeconomic and 
macroeconomic models (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000; Beck and Levine, 2004; Rioja and 
Valev, 2004b, 2004; Favara, 2003; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2000; Arcand et al., 2012). Founded 
by Hansen (1982), it is originally applied to estimate non-linear rational expectation models. It 
is now being extended to control for heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and nonlinearities 
(Wooldridge, 2014). As observed by Shabani and Toporowski (2014, p. 76-77), the “GMM 
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stands out from other econometric approaches in that, […] it does not require assumptions on 
the distributions of data variables. [It] uses the method of moments to estimate parameters of a 
data generating process, so that sample averages are used to estimate unknown parameters. [… 
Where] there are more moment conditions than parameters, more weight should be given to 
those moment conditions that contain more information on the population parameters” or less 
variances. Despite the argument for GMM being unbiased, it is still insufficient to address the 
shortcomings in panel regressions, since the variance is not specified. Another limitation is 
pointed out by Stock et al. (2002) who show that the usual large-sample approximations to 
GMM statistics in nonlinear models can be poorly applied. This can result in misleading 
inferences. 
Given these shortcomings, the empirical estimations in the nexus may suffer from what Fine 
(2007) refers to as the XY syndrome, in which two complex variables are brought together, as 
with finance and growth in this case. First, they are stripped of their complexities as variables 
and their locations in cause and effect in order to posit a simple causal relation from X to Y. 
Here, growth, by itself is complex, with Barro-type regressions of endogenous growth, offering 
as many as 150 variables that might affect its behaviour, thereby partially bringing back in 
those complexities that have been set aside to get going. And, by the same token, the 
complexities of finance have equally been discussed extensively across the literature. Be this 
as it may, growth, X, and finance, Y, are brought together, and “presumed to render a doubling 
and interaction of complexity into simplicity” (p. 9). The complexities surrounding growth and 
finance are assumed to evaporate, rather than intensifying, complexity when X and Y are 
brought together. This feature is further deepened with the addition of more control variables 
in the regressions, to become the XYZ syndrome, and so forth. Inexplicably, the complexities 




The econometrics tends to become analysis increasingly removed form economic theory as 
such. Fine (2000, p. 255) adds that variables are incorporated more or less arbitrarily, “this all 
begins to look like statistics without theory other than as an initiating impulse. A theory is used 
to derive a simple equation to which a range of modifications, including the addition of error 
terms, are made prior to statistical testing. There are serious problems with this.  First, the 
independent variables in this context will inevitably be related to one another, since the 
correlates of growth are systematically connected, quite apart from the mutuality of dependent 
and independent variables. […] Second, the econometrics is highly selective in terms of the 
relations that it does examine as opposed to those that it does not. In so far as it only focuses 
on growth rate outcomes as opposed, for example, to the processes by which those outcomes 
are achieved, there is a neglect of the models' implications which may not be borne out by the 
data.” Again, it bears evidence of the use of econometrics to propagate the notion of a positive 
relationship between finance and growth, where it may not exist, with the aim of achieving a 
targeted objective of supporting financial markets. 
As a consequence, conflicting results abound. This continues to limit our understanding of the 
role of finance in economic development. Schularick and Steger (2010) note that it has become 
difficult to synthesise results in the finance-growth nexus literature. And for this reason, the 
literature remains inconclusive. Given the multiplicity of results and inadequate empirical 
techniques in the nexus literature, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Arestis and 
Demetriades (1997) warn that results for cross-sectional finance-growth relationship must be 
interpreted with caution. They point out that just because financial data and growth are 
behaviourally correlated across a certain period, does not make it valid to assume a consistent 
and stable correlation over a long period of time. Levine (2005, p. 899) adds that “these types 
of conceptual experiments must be treated as illustrative”. Especially since “it is difficult to 
measure financial development and link empirical constructs with theoretical concepts” (p. 
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903). Moreover, it is unclear what factors determine financial development. As such, it is 
necessary to match empirical results with theoretical methods, with experience of finance on a 
country-by-country basis and with the global impact of financial development, before 
conclusions are drawn. 
 
2.6 Change in Economic Theory of the Nexus through Efficient– to Inefficient –
Market Hypotheses 
Much of the debate around the finance-growth nexus has been underpinned by consideration 
of the efficiency, or not, of financial markets in allocating resources. Market efficiency, in 
itself, has been debated from at least the 16th Century, and less regulated financial markets have 
been alleged to allow individuals and institutional investors to achieve the maximum return for 
a chosen risk level (Crotty, 2011). This was one of the main conclusions in the studies carried 
out by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). Interrogation of the proposition, that more finance 
produces greater growth, is contended in this thesis to have been addressed through changes in 
economic theory, whether through appeal to market imperfection, or approaches such as the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), with both being based on individual optimisation and 
limited acknowledgement of systemic behaviour of finance. This section traces developments 
in the economic theory of efficient markets, which underpins the finance-growth nexus. 
With the assumptions of rational expectations and perfect and complete information, the EMH 
holds that the market is always in equilibrium. If not the latter, it is only because of the arrival 
of new information, which will quickly be absorbed into the market to return it to an 
equilibrium state. “More importantly, with financial markets viewed as the means of mobilising 
and allocating resources in the real economy, the EMH further postulates that asset prices are 
correctly valued, in the sense that they reflect the real economy’s equilibrium price. Hence, any 
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deviations from the equilibrium prices will be random (rather than systemic)” (Fine and 
Dimakou, 2016, p. 3). 
The idea that asset prices are a reflection of all available information in the market – upon 
which the EMH was built – can be traced back to Bachelier (1900). This idea was later 
developed by Samuelson (1965), who upheld the consensus that in an efficient market with 
rational expectations, asset returns could be predicted over a short period of time. As such, 
markets where prices reflect all available information made arbitrage opportunities impossible. 
In contrast, Keynes put forward the idea that stock prices are a reflection of the volatility of 
long-term expectations, not least the pressure on investors to follow short-term price 
movements and forego long-term returns for speculative capital gains (Shabani and 
Toporowski, 2014). 
In an event study, Fama, et al. (1969) used time-series regressions to study the behaviour of 
stock returns on stock split announcements. They found that stock returns could be predicted 
in the short run according to market fundamentals. Following an earlier work which argued 
that stock markets were difficult to predict in the short run as they follow a random walk, Fama 
(1970) published his seminal work: Efficient capital markets: a review of theory and empirical 
work. Here, he designates markets as perfect as if they are able fully to reflect all available 
information. He put forward the idea that a market is to be considered efficient with respect to 
an information set, if the price of an asset ‘fully reflects’ that information set, i.e. the price 
remains constant when full information is made available to all participants in the market. 
He categorised market efficiency into three types: weak, semi-strong and strong forms of 
efficiency. Weak form efficiency is when current asset prices reflect historical prices, but are 
unable (technically) to predict future prices. Semi-strong form efficiency is when current prices 
incorporate past historical prices and publicly available information, such as company earnings 
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and other announcements and economic conditions. Thirdly, strong form efficiency is when 
current prices reflect past historical prices, publicly available information and private 
information held by employees and stock brokers. 
Fama argued that to test the market efficiency hypothesis – the assertion that deviations from 
expected returns are unpredictable and, therefore, not the source of systemic gain – first, the 
actual expected return on assets needs to be known. This returns depends on the earning 
potential of a security which, is noted by Guerrien and Gun (2011) to be allegedly made up of 
market fundamentals such as quality of management and economic outlook. However, an asset-
pricing model (of equilibrium) is required to determine the actual expected return on assets. 
Second, deviations from the expected returns need to be captured and used to determine 
whether markets are efficient (absolutely unpredictable) or not. Therefore, Fama formed the 
joint hypothesis, made up of the asset-pricing – together with the market equilibrium – model. 
Fama’s model for determining predictability in relation to risk and return on stocks became the 
model for market efficiency. It was used for testing the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).14 
Later on, Fama applied his model to the bond market by testing Irving Fisher’s theory, which 
alleged that expected inflation would affect nominal interest rates. He argued that since 
inflation is a variable that is based on actual results rather than forecasts, it should be the 
dependent variable and the expected interest rate should be the independent variable as against 
                                                          
14 CAPM, developed by Sharpe (1964) and founded on Mertowitz portfolio theory, was used to determine the 
prices and returns of financial assets by capturing the risks in these assets. CAPM used time-series regression of 
stock returns to generate estimates of their market betas, and then used cross-section regression of average asset 
portfolio returns (on groups of stock) on the estimated bs and other variables. Many, however, raised concerns 
about the accuracy of the beta coefficients of the regressions and the small standard errors given the high level 
of market volatility. To address this problem, the standard errors of estimated coefficients of monthly 
regressions were used to conduct tests of cross-correlation of residuals. The incorporation of the effect of 
standard errors of residuals in cross-correlation became a favoured approach in the literature of asset-pricing 
analysis. It was known as the two-step approach. The difference between return for small stocks and big stocks 
(market value factor) and the difference between returns for high stock-to-market stocks and low stock-to-
market stocks (value and growth factor) were later added to the regression model to correct for differences in 
average stock returns across stocks in the two-step approach. See expanded discussion in Shabani and 
Toporowski (2014) for more details of this approach. 
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previous literature that regressed interest rates on lagged inflation variables. He found the bond 
market to be efficient, like the stock market, with interest rates alleged to contain correct 
information about future inflation (Fama, 1975). In addition, he contributed to the literature on 
the term structure of interest rates by applying the same methodology of regressing ex post- on 
ex ante –variables in the context of the foreign exchange markets. Later, Fama and Schwert 
(1977) argued that expected stock returns are not constant over time, but high interest rates 
may well be associated with lower stock returns. And in some cases, the capacity to predict the 
expected returns on stocks and bonds is related to variations in business conditions (Fama and 
French, 1989). This link between stock variability and business conditions was intended to 
support the notion that investors are rational and simply reacting to the variations in the real 
economy. 
However, Fama’s work has been met with a string of criticisms. Guerrien and Gun (2011, p. 
4) are critical of the validity of the “joint test". They note that since the EMH involves a “joint 
test of efficiency [asset-pricing model] and of the model of [market] equilibrium”, by 
implication, “the theory is not falsifiable: if the data doesn’t fit with the efficiency hypothesis 
– whatever it is – there is always the possibility to accuse the underlying model of equilibrium 
of not being the appropriate one.”  In fact, it is impossible to determine the “right price” or the 
“intrinsic price” because asset-price depends on factors such as investors’ experience, mood 
and how they foresee the future. 
Also, the CAPM has been criticised for being ignorant of its own limitations of applicability; 
derived from the estimation of numerical utility for a single outcome in one-off gambles. 
Instead, it is applied to estimating probability in long-run frequency distribution involving 
repeated experiments15 (as in, investors’ behaviour in the market). Keen (2011) insists that the 
                                                          
15 See Keen (2011, p. 379-384), who argues that “both neoclassical and behavioural economists ignore the 
caveat of repeated experiments which von Neumann and Morgenstern developed to situations of one-off 
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concept of expected value may therefore be inadequate in determining rational behaviour in 
the manner presented in behavioural economics and finance. Furthermore, Shabani and 
Toporowski, (2014, p. 67) observe that the extended application of Fama’s three-factor model 
to foreign exchange markets “suggested that forward interest rates contained information on 
the future expected return (premium) but less information on future spot rates. In effect, 
forward rates cannot predict future spot rates beyond one month.” 
Despite these limitations, Jensen (1978) asserted that there is no other proposition in economics 
which has more solid empirical evidence support than the EMH. He explained that a market is 
efficient with respect to information set θt if it is impossible to make economic profit by trading 
on the basis of information set θt. However, Keen (2011) notes that the data that underpinned 
the EMH claim in stock markets, were from a short sample period, between 1950 and 1960. 
Stock markets were less developed at the time. As such, it is deficient in drawing conclusions 
on market behaviour from that period. More recent evidence from the late 1970s shows that 
stock market data support a different argument, one of market inefficiency. Markets became 
characterised by high volatility, following a massive credit boom in the wake of deregulation. 
This has necessitated government intervention through regulation and a series of bail-outs. As 
such, doubts have emerged around the EMH. 
Questioning the EMH mainly on the basis of the volatility of stock markets, Shiller (1981) 
argues that markets exhibit systematic deviations from rational expectation of future earnings. 
These deviations give rise to bubbles as speculation increases. Because the price of the 
expected present value of future dividends is not known, investors make forecasts of optimal 
dividend value with the assumption that it is equal to the actual stock price. He showed that the 
                                                          
gambles, in which the objective risk that would apply in repeated experiment was replaced by subjective 
uncertainty of a single outcome. From here, neoclassical economists combined the concept of expected utility 
with ordinal, indifference curve theory of consumer choice to develop the Capital Asset Pricing Model.” 
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variance of the stock price index is much larger than the variance of the present discounted 
value of future dividends. His methodology was to discount the expected present value of future 
dividends, then compare it to the price of the index. Shiller used the same methodology on 
bond markets and found similar excess volatility. Therefore, he disproved the market efficiency 
model of rational expectations of the term structure of interest rates, which supposes that long-
term interest rates can be expressed in the form of weighted averages of rationally expected 
future short-term rates plus the addition, possibly presumed constant, of slow moving risk 
premia. 
Based on evidence of high volatility in both the stock and the bond markets, Shiller (1984, p. 
459) rejects the EMH and concludes, contrary to Jensen (1978), that, “the argument for EMH 
represents one of the most remarkable errors in the history of economic thought.” He argued 
further that the subjectivity of stock price expectations (extended to real estate, in the second 
edition of his paper) to ‘social movements’ of attitudes, fashion, fad and crowd behaviour, 
rather than market fundamentals, will lead to unsustainable increase and to speculative bubbles. 
He cautioned that the only way in which finance can increase income, improve social welfare 
and reduce inequality is through the extension of financial and legal advice, technological 
innovation, and access to finance and market information. These conditions will eliminate 
adverse market circumstances (Shiller, 2000). Nevertheless, Shabani and Toporowski (2014, 
p.74) are of the position that this view still conveys a naïve belief in the role of finance, which 
extends from “the 19th Century […] defence of futures markets, [insisting] that such markets 
can provide certainty in a world that is increasingly volatile and unpredictable.” 
Also located within the world of rational expectations and EMH is the work of Hansen (1982) 
who found evidence of market inefficiency. He puts forward the proposition that the volatility 
of stock prices cannot be justified by the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM), 
a hybrid version of CAPM. The CCAPM provides a dynamic consumption-based asset pricing 
95 
 
model of stock returns. It is explained by the inclusion of a representative agent for the 
economy with a maximising expected utility function. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) showed the impossibility of market efficiency on the basis of 
information asymmetry. They argued that due to the high cost of information in the market, it 
is difficult for prices to reflect the true cost of available information, as there will be no 
incentive for investors to channel their resources to the most efficient investments. In a seminal 
study following his long-standing research on information asymmetry, Stiglitz (1989) 
established the shift in the literature from EMH to inefficiency of markets. He argues 
extensively why it is uncertain that developed or large capital markets will enhance the 
monitoring of managers and the exertion of corporate controls simply by stimulating 
information acquisition – the main reason for capital market development and financial 
liberalisation advanced by the proponents of a significant positive relationship between finance 
and growth. 
Such inefficiency arising from information asymmetry can be seen to have implications for 
both financial markets and the real economy. First, Stiglitz points out that the availability of 
information by one large firm could cause ‘crowd behaviour’ in the purchase of shares, which 
will then cause prices to rise unnecessarily in financial markets. Likewise, a firm disseminating 
information will not be able to maximise its cost of research since other firms will have implicit 
access to such information. As a result, it could discourage dissemination of information by 
(larger) firms. The lack of research and dissemination of information will lead to capacity 
underutilisation, and consequently, unemployment in the economy. He asserts that the public 
good nature of takeovers, which makes increase in share prices accrue to both new and original 
equity holders after a takeover, may also be a disincentive to research. The reason for this is 
that the one-sided level of contribution in research investment, which can benefit all equally, 
may hinder future research in a competitive and hostile market environment. 
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Second, the actions of a firm’s management to maintain their positions within the firm may not 
necessarily be checked by corporate control measures. This can lead to inefficiencies in the 
firm’s investment decisions – with corresponding inefficiency implications in both the 
financial market and the economy, depending on the nature of the firm’s investment. Third, a 
firm may use its market share to influence the direction of flow of resources through lobbying 
to increase its profit. There is also a possibility that non-market forces could affect prices. All 
these factors will result in inefficiency in both the financial market and the real economy. 
Crotty (2011) questions the crude positivism – associated with Milton Friedman, which claims 
that the realism of assumptions is not relevant in determining the validity of a theory but its 
legitimacy is derived from (econometric) testing from empirical – as the fundamental problem 
in the EMH and other mainstream economic theories. In a comparative analysis, Crotty 
suggests the superiority of the Keynes-Minsky theory of financial markets over the EMH. He 
argues persuasively against the assumptions that financial markets have perfect information 
and that market prices are optimal equilibrium prices set by rational utility maximising agents 
who have perfect information. He maintains that these assumptions are unrealistic. Therefore, 
their adoption is only for the purpose of deriving a desired conclusion of unregulated markets, 
upon which capitalism thrives. 
Shabani and Toporowski (2014, p. 80) observe that much of the empirical work that analyses 
stock volatility and pricing (Fama, 1969, 1970, 1975; Shiller, 1979, 1981; Hansen, 1982; 
Hansen and Singleton, 1982) uses techniques that try to determine how long a given deviation 
from a mean value of a time series needs to be to establish a stationary value or a new mean. It 
is alleged within these models, from which the EMH is derived, that such deviations from a 
mean value are caused by holders of financial assets who trade these assets in response to new 
information, thereby triggering crowd behaviour, until prices of the asset stabilise at a new 
market expected discounted future return on the asset. If this is the case, Shabani and 
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Toporowski (p. 81) argue that it is assumed in these models that “financial investors are holding 
their preferred portfolio of stock, and then trading in response to new information […] The 
logical flaw concerns a time inconsistency around the volatility of today’s market’s estimate 
of the value of future returns from a stock. This estimate, incorporating all new information, is 
supposed to supersede yesterday’s estimate of the true value of that stock. […]. In that case, 
why should the rational investor […] bother rearranging the portfolio to a superior one today, 
when another rearranging will have to be undertaken tomorrow?” 
Given the above inconsistency in the behaviour of investors, rationality is in question. The 
existence of financial markets for trading of short-term assets further negates the notion of 
rational individuals and, consequently, efficient markets, since supposedly rational investors 
do not wait until the maturity of their original/initial assets before disposing them off for new 
ones. Initial purchases of assets are supposed to yield an expected return in the long run. As 
such, it should be unnecessary to relinquish those initial long-term returns for speculative short-
term capital gains. This irrationality of investors contravenes the EMH, including any modified 
versions that retain similar assumptions. 
Therefore, the EMH is as hypothetical as the name affirms. Guerrien and Gun (2011) point out 
that only ideological (strong a priori beliefs) commitment can explain the continued existence 
of belief in an anomaly such as efficient markets. They observe that Pareto Optimality cannot 
be achieved, whether in goods or stock markets, because of the extremely stringent assumptions 
required. In a goods market, it entails an auctioneer setting prices for all present and future 
goods, with rational expectations of the future; the inability of market actors to influence prices; 
and market demands and supplies compared by the auctioneer to determine equilibrium prices. 
In the stock and equities markets, firms’ present and future profits must be known and the 
amount of dividends that will accrue to the investors throughout the lifetime of the firm, in 
order to determine a competitive equilibrium price. 
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Haugen (1999) presents an extensive data set on market speculation that contradicts EMH. He 
shows that stock market speculation is mostly based on how investors think the rest of the 
market will react to incoming information, and they do so with great imprecision. He identifies 
three reasons for market volatility: event- , error- and price-driven factors. The first is the actual 
information that impacts the market, to which investors react. The second is due to the market’s 
attempt to self-correct after overreaction to information. The third, derived from the second, is 
due to the market adjusting to the ensuing volatility from crowd behaviour as prices 
continuously adjusts upwards. He contends that only the first is considered in the EMH while 
the last two are ignored as they cannot exist in an equilibrium of efficient markets. Therefore, 
he asserts that volatility is endogenous to markets and leads to the misallocation of resources 
which then causes the economy to grow less rapidly by reducing the level of investment. 
Following evidence of distortions in the market and the ensuing scepticism around market 
efficiency, there is now caution around financial development. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) warn that the processes of financial development need to be implemented 
sequentially. Fry (1997, p. 759) lists the following preconditions for financial liberalisation: 
“prudential regulation and supervision of commercial banks, price stability, fiscal discipline, 
banking sector competition and a tax system that does not penalise financial intermediation.” 
Similar financial liberalisation sequencing can also be seen in McKinnon (1991) and World 
Bank (1989) which argue that financial liberalisation failed due to inadequate banking 
supervision and macroeconomic stability, leading to excessive risk-taking by banks, coupled 
with the provision of deposit insurance and bailouts. They add that it created an environment 
to institutionalise the moral hazard16 of excessive risk-taking by banks. Sachs (1988) argues 
                                                          
16 Fry (1997) explains how moral hazard can arise from information asymmetry. When interest rates increase in 
a market, only fewer agents, who are able and willing, engage in borrowing. They tend to do so even more with 
fewer agents. As such, they can become complacent, engaging in riskier investments beyond the agreement with 
the lenders. This could lead to huge losses of capital, unknown to the lenders, who may carry on lending to such 
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for the possibility of maintaining financial repression in the early stages of financial 
development, which could be in conflict with other economic programmes – what he calls 
competition of instrument – thereby causing disruption to the real sector in the process. As 
such, he calls for liberalisation of the domestic– before the foreign – financial markets. 
Oftentimes, recommendations as listed above hardly acknowledge the systemic complexity of 
an economic variable such as finance, making impossible the implementation of these 
recommendations in practice. Also, their combination is often contradictory. For example, how 
reconcilable can be the regulation of commercial banks and a tax system that does not penalise 
financial intermediation? One undermines the other. Arestis (2005, p. 256) remains sceptical 
of these recommended preconditions for financial liberalisation, also referred to as sequencing. 
Using the conflicting country cases of Chile and Uruguay, he argued that “sequencing does not 
salvage the financial liberalisation thesis for the simple reason that it depends on the 
assumption that financial markets clear in a Walrasian manner, whereas the goods markets do 
not. But in the presence of asymmetric information, financial markets are also marred by 
imperfection.” Therefore, the above preconditions may be insufficient for financial 
development. 
Despite the acknowledgement of financial market inefficiency, the EMH continues to retain 
the ideological foundation of the rationality and optimisation of individuals that underpin 
markets, and ignores the systemic complexity of finance in the economy. Crotty (2011) 
observes that within mainstream economics, assumptions of theories such as principal-agent 
conflict, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts and psychologically-grounded investor 
irrationality undermine to a large extent the conclusion of market efficiency. Yet, neither of 
these theories is intended to challenge the dominant position of market efficiency. Rather, they 
                                                          
investors. This becomes a case of mis-allocation of resources, and assets could become over-valued through the 
risky activities of investors, and cause crises. 
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aim to support EMH in the behavioural finance literature by explaining away inefficiencies in 
the market. “The most popular response to the failure of the EMH has been to argue instead 
that investors are in fact irrational – or rather that their behaviour deviates from a pure 
rationality in systemic ways. This is then used as part of the explanation as to why the stock 
market is not efficient – as the Efficient Market Hypothesis defined the word – so that asset 
prices deviate from their fundamental values in systemic ways” (Keen, 2011. p. 379). 
Nevertheless, the pseudo-acknowledgement of inefficiency in the market is sometimes referred 
to as the Inefficient Market Hypothesis (IEMH). Keen (2011) defines the IEMH as a market 
system which overacts to information, as a result causing asset price volatility, with a tendency 
to divert resources away from the real economy. Fine (2010b), argues that the novel idea of 
imperfect information in explaining why markets might not allocate resources efficiently, not 
clear nor fail to emerge in some cases, ought to concretise the rejection of the notion of efficient 
markets. Instead, elements of market inefficiency are alleged to be externalities, to be addressed 
through protecting property rights, reducing transaction costs and improving institutions, which 
were hitherto ignored with the aim of promoting market efficiency. Again, he likens the 
movement from EMH to IEMH to a concept he refers to as ‘Bringing Back In’ (BBI). For this, 
more or less all relevant considerations are taken out in the first place in order to get EMH, 
then the theory begins to bring them back in, albeit with methodology, theory, and a continuous 
conceptualisation of the efficiency of financial markets as starting point. 
More importantly, what the EMH conspicuously ignores is distributional efficiency, in the 
sense that the market is supposed to be able to allocate resources efficiently, as emphasised by 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). But this is not considered within the assumption of market 
efficiency. Rather in explaining away distributional efficiency, the IEMH maintains that 
inefficiencies in the market arising from instabilities are only slight disequilibria, such that 
some individuals may be better-off in one equilibrium and others worse-off. And in other cases, 
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one equilibrium could Pareto dominate, making everyone better off (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001). 
In practice however, there is no point in the market where everyone is better off. This assertion 
is simply to trivialise efficiency despite being admitted (brought back) in the IEMH. 
Therefore, it is necessary to discard completely the notion of rationality of individuals together 
with the other assumption of perfect market informational efficiency, and to understand that 
the market cannot be in equilibrium, and its volatility is in fact due to its own internal dynamics. 
That financial markets, like goods markets, do not clear in a Walrasian manner. Market agents 
individually and systematically react irrationally to information in the market, resulting in 
inefficiency that distorts both asset pricing in the market and the economy as a whole, leading 
to crises – evident in the 2008 financial crisis – discussed in the section that follows. Moreover, 
it is noteworthy, as Crotty (2011) points out, that financial liberalisation – as advanced by 
proponents of a positive finance-growth nexus – would not have been possible without the 
economics profession upholding this theory of ideal financial markets. 
 
2.7 The Global Financial Crisis and the Nexus 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 is now considered to be the worst economic crisis 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s, measured by its impact on consumption, investment, 
unemployment, income and inequality, poverty and per capita output. This section focuses on 
the cause and effect of the crisis, with a bias towards a less popular heterodox view. The section 
aims to achieve two main objectives. One, to show – in view of the GFC – the cost implication 
of an unrelenting pursuit of financial development as proposed by the proponents of a positive 
finance-growth nexus. Two, to describe the actual incidence and cause of the GFC that 
necessitated a revision of the nexus into threshold analysis. In the mainstream literature, the 
causes of the crisis have included poor risk management practices, excessive debt leveraging, 
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increasingly complex financial products and weak regulation, not least in underwriting 
standard for mortgage contracts. As a result, the cost of systemic banking crises has been 
estimated to range between 13.3 and 50 percent of GDP in fiscal costs, net of recoveries, 
associated with crisis management. Output losses (deviations from trend GDP) are estimated 
to be an average 20 percent of GDP during the first four years of the crisis, and can be as high 
as 100 percent, as industries dependent on the financial sector in high-income countries 
experience disproportionate negative growth (Laeven and Valencia, 2008).  
It is striking to see how the crisis revealed the inability of mainstream economics to 
comprehend the contradictions of the capitalist market economy it promoted (Sardoni, 2015). 
Most mainstream literature admits to a lack of understanding of the GFC. This is because of its 
estrangement from standard business cycle models, including those in which financial 
fluctuations reduce economic growth. However, the literature is not oblivious to how the 
impact of this crisis differs from previous post-World War II recessions (Ohanian, 2010). In 
what is referred to as the financial view of the crisis, the failure of large financial institutions 
and decline in value of asset-backed securities made the crisis worse. But reduced financial 
intermediation as a result of rising interest rate spreads exacerbated it into a recession (p. 55). 
Despite these acknowledgements, the mainstream literature still demonstrates excessive faith 
in existing financial institutions accompanied by the unrelenting notion that financial 
development causes growth. 
Some economists believe the origin of the crisis is to be found in the financialised credit-based 
global economy crafted by capitalism, founded on a neoclassical and free market economic 
theory and characterised by liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of public enterprises 
and shareholder value maximisation (Stiglitz, 2013; Weeks, 2014; Bateman, 2014a). The effect 
of financial sector deregulation is emphasised as the root cause of the crisis. This started with 
the abolition of the Glass-Steagall regulation, which led to the removal of fetters that kept the 
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financial sector in check. This was followed by the expansion of shadow banking in the USA 
and the proliferation of financial debt instruments expanded to other Western economies, 
giving rise to a debt bubble that was soon followed by the economic crisis (Keen, 2011).    
The crisis has also been linked to the sheer expansion of the securitisation of mortgages in the 
so-called innovative financial markets. This has been encouraged by the expansive scale of the 
financial sector, aided by previous policies that encouraged the growth and development of 
private capital and finance in general. As such, the growth in banks and the availability of 
finance has in turn increased a willingness of borrowers to incur debt, which further increases 
the debt level in the economy. Therefore, household indebtedness was only made possible by 
the expansion in the financial sector. 
Contrary to the claim that absolves hedge funds from blame but indicts bankers as sole 
perpetrator of the crisis, Lysandrou (2012, p. 227) points out the role of hedge funds. “Had it 
not been hedge funds’ intermediary position between the investors seeking yield on the one 
hand and the banks that created the high yielding securities on the other hand, the supply of 
these securities would never have reached the proportions that were critical in precipitating the 
near collapse of the whole financial system.” He adds that, hedge funds, by the enormous 
amount of money available to them, diverted to sub-prime backed securities, and were a major 
source of pressure to banks to create and distribute products that were highly toxic. Therefore, 
it was because of hedge funds that the nature of the crisis was agreeably described by most 
people as taking the form of a subprime crisis. This position however is in contrast to 
Eichengreen (2008, p. 14) who maintains that hedge funds played no significant role in the 
crisis. He claims that they had no special role in the crisis but only mirrored the banks, pension 
and mutual funds and insurance firms in their level of risk-taking, the use of credit and pro-
cyclical portfolio adjustments, the use of Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) and other 
conduits to high-yield investment. 
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The activities of hedge funds, banks, pension and mutual funds created collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs) that grew in size, large enough to wreak sufficient havoc in the economy 
when it collapsed. CDOs were made up of “structured credit products created by pooling 
mortgage-backed securities, mainly comprising those backed by subprime and other 
nonconforming mortgage loans, with other asset-backed securities as collateral” (Lysandrou, 
2012, p. 228). The techniques for putting these products together were too opaque, such that 
they compounded the panic that arose when debt obligations could not be met. It was a vivid 
case of information asymmetry in the financial market, in which those who bought these debts 
were unaware of the impossibility to realise their value in liquid form. Eventually, liquidity-
solvency spiralled to the banks and the rest of the financial sector. Lysandrou argues that the 
“rapid growth of CDO issuance before 2007 could not have been due to the pull of external 
demand but that, on the contrary, it must have been powered by the issuing banks to promote 
their own material interests” – to boost asset returns by the significant amount of leverage 
CDOs. This was possible because, unlike other financial market products, the complex and 
heterogeneous nature of CDOs prevented the development of a broad customer base. “The fact 
that substantial amounts of CDOs remained within the banking sector at the time of the 
subprime crisis further confirms this impression” (p. 229). 
The staggering increase in CDOs between 2002 and 2007 was remarkably concomitant with a 
rising concentration of wealth among a few, who continually sought to maintain and even 
increase their wealth by ploughing it into hedge funds. According to Goda and Lysandrou 
(2014, p. 302), this concentration of wealth in the hands of high net-worth (HNW) individuals 
– comprising 0.6% of the total world population, worth $41 trillion in assets, out of a total 
world GDP of $55 trillion in 2007 –  makes the causal effect of the crisis attributable to 
inequality in financial distribution. They see the concentration of wealth as one of the ‘demand-
pull’ factors. This wealth was mostly invested in hedge funds, which were the major buyers of 
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CDOs. And the drive for high yielding investment from HNW individuals “not only helped to 
lower the yield of highly rated traditional bond classes […] but also led to increasing assets 
being placed under the management of hedge funds”. 
Toporowski (2015) notes that most of the literature that analyse the crisis considers it a crisis 
of liquidity in money and capital markets owing to deregulation, financialisation, speculation 
and neoliberalism. He argues that the crisis cannot be understood without a critique of the 
processes of capitalism, integrating the theory of production with distribution and the financing 
of capital accumulation. Such critique, he emphasises, has to go beyond just the addition of 
new forms of debt to theories of capitalist production and distribution as some heterodox 
literature do.17 The “incorporation of finance into the analysis of capitalism [should include] 
identification of debt structures, the processes by which balance sheets are kept liquid, and the 
effects of this on capitalist institutions” (p. 1). He adds that the cause of the crisis, within such 
functioning of capitalist enterprises and the economy, was the over-reliance of non-financial 
institutions on short-term finance to facilitate mergers and acquisitions. Insufficient liquidity 
in these institutions led to decrease in fixed investments. Reduction in investment then impaired 
the economy’s ability to support the growing debt structure, and culminated in the crisis. 
Toporowski (2015, p. 3), explains how different the 2008 financial crisis is from the “financial 
crisis that is typical of classical capitalism”. The difference is in the inability of banks to meet 
the demand for long-term borrowing by the capitalist entrepreneur in the GFC, thus leading to 
a squeeze of liquidity and eventually company failures. The history of the crisis can be traced 
to the emergence of financial markets for long-term debt and shares transaction in capitalist 
institutions in the 1860s. This transformed capitalism into its modern form of dominance by 
joint stock companies as against control of capital by individuals (Kindleberger, 1993, chapter 
                                                          
17 See for example Lapavitsas (2013) 
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11). Long-term debt markets provided the capitalist entrepreneur with the platform for 
refinancing short-term debt with long-term bonds, ensuring that the capitalist entrepreneur had 
sufficient liquidity to service interest and dividend payments on long-term debt or equity. 
Financial markets then provide liquidity for long-term securities with short-term borrowing. 
“Such layering of credit (lending in order to buy debt instruments) constitutes proliferation of 
debt”. In addition, there was a rise in monopoly capital due to the attendant expansion of long-
term finance. Increase in monopoly capital is considered to promote growth through the 
acquisition of competitors’ long-term debt rather than engaging in productive competition and 
increasing returns to scale (Toporowski, 2015, p. 4-5). 
He emphasised the importance of distinguishing between the role of non-financial business 
corporations and SMEs in access to finance. Corporations, through banks, capital markets and 
derivatives, have access to a full range of domestic and international financial products, without 
capital controls. This allows for corporations to take advantage of long-term debt and avoid the 
need to roll over debt. The provision of unlimited capital to corporations, he adds, “require[s] 
a massive inflation of capital and long-term debt markets that, without a corresponding 
inflation of intermediary institution to maintain the liquidity in these markets, would increase 
financial instability well beyond anything that has been experienced so far in the capitalist 
world. Large corporations [also] account for the vast bulk of fixed business investment [… and 
are a] key private sector determinant of the business cycle” (p. 10-11). On the other hand, 
SMEs, which actually account for the majority of private sector employment, do not have 
access to long-term debt. This dichotomy provides a framework for understanding the crisis. 
Given that borrowing for fixed capital investment by large corporations declined to 
unsustainable levels, the ensuing reduction in investment, made it impossible to service these 
debts, resulting in economic depression. 
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The above argument is validated by the OECD data which show a decline in fixed capital 
investment in plant and machinery of 23% in the UK, 15% in the USA, and 18% in the 
European Monetary Union – the countries most exposed to the financial crisis – between 2007 
and 2012. In the same period, household consumption fell by only 5% in the UK and even rose 
in the USA and EU area. These figures prove that, “it is a decline in investment, rather than 
any fall in the consumption of indebted households that has caused the so-called ‘Great 
Depression’” (p. 14). 
Remarkably, there has been a dramatic comeback, since 2010, of the same neoliberal policies 
that caused the crisis accompanied by acute downplaying of the supposed reforms in response 
to it. Some mainstream economists even accept as true the notion that the crisis was a 
normalised low in the business cycle. Nonetheless, the empirical analyses of the finance-
growth nexus have been revised into a threshold analysis, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
Yet, the belief in the fundamental assumptions and theories that underpin the original nexus 
arguments lingers. The financial sector has almost been absolved of any responsibility for the 
crisis with an even heightening return of shareholder value maximisation by way of bonuses in 
the sector. Responsibility for the crisis is often shifted to the state for not regulating the 
financial sector effectively. In some circles, the lower working class are accused of consuming 
more than they earn, as the causal factor of the crisis. 
The reversal of a prolonged growth period from the late 1990s to 2007, when the financial 
crisis materialised, inevitably raises questions over a significant positive relationship between 
finance and growth. It also demonstrates the unsustainability of economic growth arising from 
financial development at the expense of the real economy, given that such growth is often 
wiped out with the eventual failure of the economy. Judging by the impact of the great financial 
crisis, it becomes necessary to riposte the argument that financial development is always 
accompanied with the propensity not only to eliminate any initial positive impact of growth, 
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but also reverses the positive impact as well that other factors may have on growth. Thus, 
financial development could be the very antithesis of growth itself. 
 
2.8 Conclusion  
This chapter has presented a critical review of the finance-growth nexus literature roughly up 
to the point of the Global Financial Crisis. It contends mainly that the theoretical and empirical 
developments in the nexus literature have been underpinned by a targeted pursuance of a 
positive relationship between finance and growth. This objective has been hinged on an 
enigmatic process of treating finance and growth as homogenous components in delineating 
causality, and their disaggregation through market- and bank-based forms of finance and 
various channels of impact on growth. These are the mainstays of the analytical framework. 
The limitations of the econometric techniques in the literature have been discussed. More 
importantly, the results of these techniques are understood to be conflicting, in that different 
conclusions abound for these techniques, largely dependent on the authors. The shifting 
modifications in the underpinning efficient market hypothesis, which the literature employs to 
sustain the finance-growth nexus, has also been analysed in this chapter. This has been closely 
followed by a selective discussion of views on the financial crisis and how this may have 
impacted upon the nexus. The crisis is markedly the point at which accrued growth from 
financial development is reversed, and the basis upon which the nexus is now being revisited. 
The crisis has necessitated a shift to threshold analysis, which is yet another attempt at 
salvaging the remains of, or building upon, the nexus in the wake of uncomfortable and 
unavoidable empirical developments. This will be taken up in the following chapter. 
Despite the flaws in theory and methodology, mainstream economists continue to unearth 
arguments and reasons why a positive impact of financial development should be maintained. 
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In practice, financial expansion continues for advanced countries and is being encouraged for 
developing countries as well. Some have noted against all odds that a negative nexus is a 
foregone conclusion, denying the glaring reality of the crisis. For others, however, the 
overwhelming evidence of the 2008 crisis has shifted these arguments towards financial 
caution. But caution is not enough. Indeed, one cannot continue to rely on the abstract market 
efficiency approach to finance and development. With these developments in the nexus, it is 
not farfetched to draw the same conclusions as Stiglitz (1994, p. 20), that the relationship 
between finance and growth and the pursuit of financial liberalisation is "based on an 
ideological commitment to an idealised conception of markets that is grounded neither in fact 













CHAPTER 3.0 – THE THRESHOLD ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCE-GROWTH 
NEXUS: DELAYED REVISIONISM 
3.1 Introduction 
The relationship between finance and growth was initially alleged to be, or at least estimated 
as if, linear. Later on, empirical investigations started to show that the relationship might be 
non-linear. These later studies found the relationship to be dependent on other factors, not least 
a country’s level of development. However, this non-linear relationship of the finance-growth 
nexus was downplayed or simply disregarded in pursuit of evidence in support of financial 
liberalisation. As a response to the 2008 financial crisis, and its impact on economic growth 
mainly in advanced but also in some developing countries, there has been a revision of the 
literature on the relationship between finance and economic growth. The growth in output 
accruing to countries from financial development was wiped out during the crisis. As such, the 
non-linear relationship of the nexus could no longer be ignored, given that the GFC exposed 
the loopholes in a dogmatic pursuit of financial development. Arcand et al. (2012; 2015) point 
out that the financial crisis raised concerns about the size of some countries’ financial systems 
in relation to the size of their domestic economies. Therefore, the finance-growth nexus theory 
has now been located in a threshold analyses mainly in an attempt to capture possible 
nonlinearities in growth equations (Yilmazkuday, 2011).18 
This chapter therefore traces this revision, and critically analyses the threshold literature. The 
most cited work of Arcand et al. (2012; 2015) in the finance-growth nexus threshold literature 
is examined extensively, among other studies, in order to probe some of the econometric 
techniques used in the literature. Also, the disproportionate focus on the paper “Too Much 
                                                          
18 Tellingly, the revised literature refers to itself in terms of non-linearity, which captures generality at the 
expense of making explicit that finance’s effect might even be negative. 
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Finance” by Arcand et al. is because its approach and data serve as a point of departure for this 
thesis. This chapter further aims to show that the literature on threshold analysis of the nexus 
does not fundamentally deviate from the unrelenting notion of a significant place for finance 
in development, despite the recognition of its flaws. The threshold analysis is seen to retain the 
deficient techniques of previous empirical investigations that have resulted in conflicting and 
inconclusive results for the nexus, and it also makes very little contribution to correcting the 
problems it has itself identified. Considering this development in the literature, this chapter 
draws out the implications of the threshold analysis of the nexus for developing countries, 
among other limitation. Including pointing out the role of the World Bank and IMF in 
advancing these types of research. This is taken to be an original contribution to the literature 
since the implications of the threshold analysis of the nexus is yet to be analysed for developing 
countries, despite being applied to African countries in the studies carried out by Ikhide (2015). 
Despite the assertion of a revised body of literature, there is not much that is fundamentally 
new about the threshold literature as it takes its cue from previous non-linear studies. Easterly 
et al. (2000) were among the first to point out non-linearity by investigating the relationship 
between financial development and volatility in growth. They find a convex relationship and 
concluded that financial development after a certain level starts to have a positive effect on 
volatility. Deidda and Fattouh (2002) used cross-country data to find a statistically significant 
positive relationship between finance and growth for high income countries, and positive but 
statistically insignificant impact for low income countries. In the same vein, Rioja and Valve 
(2004) used a panel data of 72 countries (categorised into high, middle and low levels of 
financial development) and find that at high levels of financial development, finance has a 
positive and insignificant impact on growth, a positive and statistically significant impact at 
intermediate or middle levels of financial development, and negative and statistically 
insignificant impact at low levels of financial development. However, they set their threshold 
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of financial depth for the high region of financial development at a low of 37% of GDP. This 
resonates with their earlier work (2002) which used GMM to show insignificant relationships 
for low- and high-income countries and positive impact for middle income countries. Both 
Deidda and Fattouh (2002) and Rioja and Valev (2004) control for non-monotonicity between 
financial and economic development. 
Some contrasting non-linear findings from the studies above are those of Shen and Lee (2006), 
who use panel data of 48 developing and advanced countries from 1976 to 2001, and find that 
the relationship between finance and growth is non-linear but with a U-shaped curve for both 
developing and advanced economies. This is, however, in contrast to the findings of Huang 
and Lin (2009) who use cross-sectional data for 71 countries from 1960 to 1995. Though they 
find that the relationship between finance and growth is non-linear, it is more positive in 
developing than in advanced countries. 
With the use of panel error correction models to estimate the short- and long-run effects of 
financial development, Loayza and Ranciere (2006) try to reconcile the inconsistencies in the 
literature between studies that find a positive relationship between financial development and 
growth, and those that find a negative relationship. Their findings revealed that a significant 
positive relationship exists in the long run, while a negative relationship exists in the short run 
due to volatility and crises. This was alleged to be explained by the inevitability of financial 
crises at higher levels of financial development. Evidence of non-linearity in the nexus 
literature was assumed to be part of a normal business cycle.   
Non-linearity in the finance-growth nexus was also later hinged on the impact of inflation. 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) found that the impact of finance on growth becomes negative 
when inflation crosses a threshold of 13.4 per cent. However, it was dependent on the measure 
of financial depth used – with stock market capitalisation showing a higher negative 
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relationship than other measures of finance. Using a different method, they also found that high 
inflation crowds out the long-run effect of financial depth on growth. The second method was 
at 8 per cent inflation threshold and was also dependent on the financial depth measure used. 
Khan, et al. (2001) also investigated the impact of inflation on the finance-growth relationship 
in a large number of advanced countries, and found that beyond a certain level of inflation, 
financial development negatively impacted economic growth. 
These non-linear studies of finance and growth were also alleged to shed light on the overall 
development of countries at various levels of financial development. Rousseau and 
Yilmazkuday (2009) showed that before low-income countries can start to experience a strong 
positive relationship between finance and growth, they have to reach a threshold of $665 per 
capita income in 1995 constant US prices. And, at a per capita income of $1,636 in 1995 
constant US prices, low income countries experience a higher positive finance and growth 
relationship than the average in high income countries. This is what Gerschenkron (1952) 
described as the ‘catch-up effect’ – which says that low income countries start to experience 
more growth than high income countries. Here, in relation to finance, financial capital may be 
substituted for physical capital. 
The rest of this chapter reviews the major theoretical considerations of the threshold analysis 
of the nexus, starting with Arcand et al. in section 3.2. It analyses in detail the methods used in 
their research, drawing out its strengths and weaknesses. Section 3.2.2 discusses the 
contributions of other authors to the threshold analysis, highlighting techniques used and 
comparisons with Arcand et al. This is followed by some emergent explanations for drawing a 
conclusion of a threshold relationship between finance and growth, in section 3.2.3. A critique 
of the literature and the reasons offered for the existence of a threshold relationship in the nexus 
follows in section 3.3. It also discusses the role of the World Bank and the IMF in advancing a 
threshold conclusion for the literature. It is revealing that the revision into thresholds since the 
114 
 
Global Financial Crisis has been largely driven by the IMF and World Bank, which bears 
evidence of the influential role that these institutions play in determining the direction of the 
literature, and for the study of development in general. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 ‘Too Much Finance’ Threshold Analysis of the Nexus 
The threshold analysis investigates whether there is a level beyond which financial 
development starts to exert a negative effect on growth. It attempts to link the significant 
positive relationship between finance and growth to thresholds of financial development. 
Arcand et al. (2012; 2015) point out that the studies which find only non-linearity in the nexus 
and nothing more, do not allow for a non-monotonic effect of financial depth. They use credit 
to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions as a measure of financial depth, 
and investigate the non-monotonic effect of the marginal effect of financial depth on output 
growth. With country-level data covering 1960-2010, they estimate models for different sub-
periods. Their regressions include log of initial GDP per capita in order to control for 
convergence, and credit to the private sector as a second measure of finance. They use initial 
stock of human capital, trade openness, inflation and the ratio of government expenditure to 
GDP as control variables – to show a positive relationship going from financial depth to 
economic growth. 
In simple cross-sectional regressions, they replace the log of credit to the private sector with 
the level of credit to the private sector (PC) and a quadratic term of the same variable (PC2) to 
test for a “too much” finance hypothesis. They find that both variables are statistically 
significant, and the coefficient of the linear variable is positive, while that of the quadratic term 
is negative. This is a necessary condition for a non-monotonic relationship between credit to 
the private sector and economic growth. Their test of a sufficient condition is in accordance 
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with Lind and Mehlum’s (2011) and Sasabuchi’s (1980) (as cited in Arcand et al. 2015, p. 114-
115) likelihood ratio approach, which test the hypothesis of a monotonic relationship in the 
following manner: 
Given a model of the form 𝑦𝑦1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 +  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝛽𝛽 +  𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 +  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖, the SLM test for an inverted-𝑈𝑈 
needs to be based on the following joint null hypotheses: 
𝐻𝐻0 ∶ (𝛼𝛼 +  2𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚  ≤ 0) ⋃ (𝛼𝛼 +  2𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  ≥ 0)   (1) 
𝐻𝐻1 ∶ (𝛼𝛼 + 2𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 > 0) ⋂ (𝛼𝛼 +  2𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 < 0)   (2) 
Where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 are the minimum and maximum values of the credit to the private 
sector, respectively. Their results show that the marginal effect of credit to the private sector is 
positive and statistically significant at 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 but negative and statistically significant at 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚. 
Thus, the SLM test, based on the slope of the estimates of their regressions, rejects 𝐻𝐻0, 
indicating that their results are consistent with the presence of an inverted-𝑈𝑈 relationship 
between credit to the private sector and economic growth. They show that the marginal effect 
of financial development on growth becomes negative when credit to the private sector reaches 
80-100% of per capita GDP. They note that their threshold is similar to where Ramey and 
Ramey (1995) and Cerra and Saxena (2008) find that financial depth starts having a positive 
effect on volatility. 
However, Law and Singh (2014, p. 5) have criticised the technique used by Arcand et al. (2012) 
to investigate a non-linear relationship in the nexus, particularly their approach to investigating 
‘too much finance’. According to Law and Singh, “the square term of the financial 
development variable used to capture the threshold impact of finance and growth imposes an 
a priori restriction that the effect of finance on growth monotonically and symmetrically 
increases and decreases with the level of financial development.” Therefore, such relationship 
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is bound to behave in a prescribed non-linear manner, and results obtained are bound to be 
biased if the true relationship is linear or not quadratic. 
Arcand et al. (2012), however, note that the variable, legal origin, is not a good Instrumental 
Variable (IV) for addressing causality in a model that includes both the level and square of 
credit to the private sector as endogenous variables. Based on the literature that proposes that 
it is possible to identify causality through exploiting the existence of discrete regimes or not, 
with different levels of heteroscedasticity, they assume a model: 𝑌𝑌1 = 𝑎𝑎 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋 +  𝛾𝛾1 𝑌𝑌2 + 𝜀𝜀1, 
with endogeneity problems because 𝑌𝑌2 = 𝑎𝑎 +  𝛽𝛽2 𝑋𝑋 + 𝛾𝛾1 𝑌𝑌1 +  𝜀𝜀1. They argue that besides the 
standard assumption that 𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝜀𝜀1) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝜀𝜀2) = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 (𝑋𝑋,𝜀𝜀1 𝜀𝜀2 ) = 0. They also assume that there 
is heteroscedasticity in the data, i.e. 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 (𝑋𝑋, 𝜀𝜀22) ≠ 0. If so, then, 𝑋𝑋𝜀𝜀2 can be used as an IV for𝑌𝑌2, 
because the assumption that 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 (𝑋𝑋,𝜀𝜀1 𝜀𝜀2 ) = 0 guarantees that 𝑋𝑋𝜀𝜀2 is uncorrelated with 𝜀𝜀1 and 
the presence of heteroscedasticity i.e. 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 (𝑋𝑋, 𝜀𝜀22) ≠  0 guarantees that 𝑋𝑋𝜀𝜀2 is uncorrelated with 
𝜀𝜀2 and thus with 𝑌𝑌2. If 𝑋𝑋 includes more than one variable, the condition 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 (𝑋𝑋, 𝜀𝜀22) ≠ 0 needs 
to hold only for a subset 𝑍𝑍 of the 𝑋𝑋 matrix. If this subset 𝑍𝑍 includes more than one element, the 
model will be over-identified and can be efficiently estimated with GMM (Arcand et al., 2015, 
p. 117). 
They exploit the time variation of their data using GMM system estimator, by splitting the data 
into 6 non-overlapping 5-year periods and estimate the same regressions with time fixed 
effects, and lagged values of the log of the control variables. They apply the inverse hyperbolic 
sine transformation to zero values, in the form 𝑥𝑥� = ln (𝑥𝑥 +  �𝑥𝑥2 + 1), and find that the 
relationship between financial development and economic growth decreases and their results 
become less statistically significant as more recent data are used for estimation. These results 
for panel regressions are similar for parametric and semi-parametric estimators (the linear and 
quadratic fit), and country- and industry-level data. Cross-country analysis using panel data 
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also suggests that the relationship between credit to the private sector and growth, estimated 
by a quadratic functional form, is concave and non-monotonic. 
By altering periods, length and samples of their data, they emphasise that their “results are 
robust to different specifications, different length of growth spells, different definitions of 
financial depth, and for controlling for the convergence effect of financial depth” (Arcand et 
al., 2015, p. 126). Their results are positive and statistically significant for observations where 
credit to the private sector is less than 90%, and negative and statistically significant for 
observations with credit to the private sector greater than 90% of GDP. For ten-year growth 
spells, they find the same results, except that the correlation between finance and growth is no 
longer statistically significant for 1960-2000 data, when credit to the private sector is between 
80-90%. Here, the marginal effect of financial depth is negative. Also, financial depth – with a 
negative and statistically significant interaction term or coefficient – has a positive effect on 
convergence for the ten-year growth periods (also interpreted as the speed of convergence) but 
has no effect on long-run growth. 
By using bank credit as their measure of financial development to replicate a non-monotonic 
relationship (at a lower threshold), they show that their results are not dependent on their 
preferred measure of financial development – credit to the private sector.  Furthermore, they 
maintain that their results of non-monotonicity are not completely driven by crises and 
volatility by controlling for macroeconomic volatility and banking crises – creating dummy 
variables of ‘one’ for countries above the “within-country standard deviation” of the annual 
output growth for each of the five-year spells, and ‘zero’ for countries below this threshold), 
as put forward by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Easterly et al. (2000), Rousseau and Wachtel 
(2011), and Schularick and Taylor (2012). Volatility and banking crises are negatively 
correlated with GDP growth, and controlling for them does not change the baseline result of 
the non-monotonic relationship of the nexus. They also show that the result is robust to 
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controlling for institutional quality by interacting credit to the private sector with International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index of quality of government, since credit to the private sector 
is not statistically significant with low institutional quality. The conclusion, then, is that the 
relationship between finance and growth is consistently non-monotonic, irrespective of 
volatility and crises, and other heterogeneous factors such as institutions. An implication of 
this is the possibility of ‘too much’ finance, since finance can, in of itself, be negatively 
correlated with growth. This implies that there should be a limit to financial depth in an 
economy.  
In addition, Arcand et al. test the robustness of the non-monotonicity of the relationship 
between financial depth and growth using household-, firm- and industry-level data. They 
obtain similar results for household credit, with a statistically significant non-monotonic 
relationship between household credit and growth. Growth is maximised when total credit to 
the private sector reaches 50% of GDP for household credit, 80% of GDP with insignificant 
quadratic term for firm credit. They note that these results suggest that the non-monotonic 
relationship of the nexus may be driven by excessive lending to households. Industry-level data 
show that financial depth starts having a negative impact on industry-level growth when total 
credit to the private sector reaches 120% of GDP. The results remain the same even after 
controlling – as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) – for the interaction between external dependence 
and GDP per capita; augmenting their model with the interaction between external dependence 
and the square of GDP per capita; controlling for outliers; and changing the index of external 
financial dependence from 1990s to 1980s as commonly used in the literature and to control 
for differences in technology between industries in the USA and the average of other countries 
in their sample. 
Arcand et al. observe that different financial depth thresholds is the only reason why their result 
differs from Rioja and Valev (2004), who set their financial depth threshold for high regions at 
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37% of GDP, and find that even for financially advanced economies, finance still has a positive, 
albeit small, impact on economic growth. And, as indicated, they also observe that the threshold 
at which they find that financial development starts having a negative impact on growth is 
consistent with the threshold at which Easterly et al. (2000) (and other literature on finance and 
volatility) show empirically that financial development starts to cause volatility on growth. For 
Easterly et al., volatility growth starts increasing when financial development, measured by 
credit to the private sector reaches 100%, with the relationship between financial development 
and growth being an inverted-U and non-monotonic. Also, their results is consistent with other 
studies (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Pagano, 2012; Law and Singh, 2014; Aizenman et al., 
2015) which use different data sets, methodologies and measures of growth. 
They add that their result is consistent with the “vanishing effect” of financial depth on growth 
found by Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) and also consistent with De Gregorio and Guidotti 
(1995) who find credit to the private sector and growth to be positively correlated only up to 
the 1970s. As suggested by the term, the vanishing effect refers to when financial development 
starts to have less and less impact on economic growth. They argue that this vanishing effect 
is not due to any fundamental change in the relationship between finance and growth, but 
caused by the rapidly growing financial sector over the last twenty years. They maintain that 
as a result of this vanishing effect, models that do not allow for non-monotonicity between 
finance and growth are mis-specified and neglect the vanishing effect of financial development, 
because they omit the quadratic form of credit to the private sector. This omitted variable 
increases with increasing financial development, so does its impact on the models. 
To test this, they use a standard biased formula and a simple Monte Carlo simulation to show 
that the downward bias increases with the expansion of the financial sector. Suppose the true 
relationship between the left- and right-hand sides of an OLS regression is given by 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼 +
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𝑧𝑧𝛽𝛽 +  𝜀𝜀, but one estimates 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑥𝑥𝛼𝛼 + 𝑢𝑢 instead, 𝑧𝑧 is therefore an omitted variable. Given the 




Where 𝑥𝑥 is credit to the private sector, 𝑦𝑦 is economic growth and 𝑧𝑧 is the quadratic form of 𝑥𝑥. 
They show that: bias = 𝐸𝐸[𝛼𝛼𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 −  𝛼𝛼] < 0, since, from their results, 𝛼𝛼 > 0, 𝛽𝛽 < 0 and 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐[𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧] = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐[𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥2] > 0 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 𝑥𝑥 > 0. To see how this bias increases over time, leading to the 
“vanishing effect” phenomenon, they add a time index to the variables, and show that if credit 
to the private sector increases at a positive rate 𝜃𝜃,  and 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = (1 +  𝜃𝜃)𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡, then the bias at 𝑡𝑡 +






= 1 +  𝜃𝜃 > 1, which shows that the bias increases in absolutes terms over 
time as credit to the private sector increases. Nonetheless, the bias is likely to be small for 
regression with few countries with high financial development above the threshold at which 
the marginal effect of financial development becomes negative (Arcand et al., 2015, p. 121). 
Arcand et al. (2015, p. 109 put forward, quite rightly, that the hypothesis that the reason for a 
vanishing effect in the relationship between finance and growth would either be that something 
fundamental has changed in the relationship or the true nature of the relationship is non-
monotonic. But the word ‘true’ is used elusively. They also assume a strict and narrow kind of 
relationship between finance and growth without an explanation of the social changes that 
could have occurred in the economy as finance increases. Surely, it is not only that something 
fundamental has changed in the relationship as they claimed, but such relationship is not 
exclusively between finance and growth and should not be so reduced. Also, Arcand et al. draw 
conclusions on the nature of finance based only on statistical methods, conflating correlation 
with the so-called ‘true’ relationship. This understanding of the nature of the relationship 
between finance and growth is deficient, as discussed around diagram 2.4. 
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In seeking for an explanation for their results, they argue in the later version of their paper that 
“if the optimal structure of the financial system evolves with the level of economic 
development”, then countries may not necessarily have too much finance but the wrong sort of 
finance. This is because, the results show that certain countries have too much credit and not 
enough financial services. This is also underpinned by the notion that, as countries become 
richer, credit to the private sector, which becomes the dominant measure of finance, has a less 
significant impact on economic growth. Arcand et al. (2015) further show, by developing a 
model that ‘endoge nises’ the probability of a default and credit rationing, that the presence of 
a bailout may cause firms to engage in excessive credit taking which could also lead to “too 
much” finance with respect to the social optimum – one in which there is a correlation between 
the size of the financial sector and the political and lobbying power that ‘endogenises’ the 
probability of a default. 
Apart from the moral hazard of firms taking excessive credit, the rest of the argument narrowly 
focuses on size alone as the problem with finance, without recognising the problematic nature 
of the interest-bearing or speculative nature of finance – despite issues raised around volatility. 
This is not in and of itself related to the size or the level of economic development, although 
the problem may be enhanced by the volume of finance. It is also not logical for countries to 
have too much credit and not enough financial services as they argued, since the proliferation 
of credit is due to the presence of financial and non-financial institutions that provide financial 
services. Except by financial services they mean those of a (required) certain kind. Therefore, 
the problem of finance and the issue of ‘too much’ finance or not, cannot be narrowly explained 
away as treated in their contributions, but should be hinged on the productiveness of finance 
or not – whether the growing financial system is contributory to economic development or not.  
One main implication of Arcand et al.’s analysis (as they acknowledge) is that there is no 
guarantee that increasing financial development will necessarily increase economic growth, 
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given that as more and more years (with corresponding financial development) are added to 
their regressions, the share of countries which fall below their threshold goes from 96 to 34% 
of their sample. The growth effect is thus reversed with increasing financial development. 
Despite this, they offer no concrete explanation for this anomaly other than a reference to 
Minsky’s financial volatility theory (Minsky, 1974, Kindleberger, 1978) and Tobin’s financial 
sector suboptimal allocation of talents (Tobin, 1984). They do, however, admit that there is a 
tendency for lending to be misallocated to non-productive assets or used to “feed speculative 
bubbles” (p. 110) in mortgage lending or other excessive household consumption, besides 
financial fragility arising from hedging opportunities. Indeed, it might be argued that Arcand 
et al. spend disproportionate effort empirically establishing lack of monotonicity without a 
corresponding depth of interrogation of why and how it should prevail. 
In their empirical study, inflation figures have an upper limit of 500 percentage points, with 
those above this bound rounded up to 500. Also, negative figures are excluded, because they 
cannot be captured in a regression analysis. One would imagine that the reason for exclusion 
of excessively large values was to reduce the disproportionately large effect of high inflation 
figures on the best unbiased (linear) estimator. But this is unnecessary, since the test was to 
capture non-linearity. Such containment of inflation values, for minimising the effect of one 
variable and for the sake of statistical conformity, has, in of itself, the potential to create a bias 
that undermines and conceals the impact of fluctuating price levels (including high asset prices 
that cause bubbles). The elimination of high inflationary prices that capture credit bubbles and 
periods leading to crises, and deflationary negative prices that capture credit bursts and the 
effects of crises may be the reason for one of their findings; that financial crises and volatility 
have no impact on the non-monotonicity of the nexus. Perhaps, if inflation variables are 
included without any upper limit, their finding would be different. The inclusion of both 
negative inflation variables and those above 500 percentage points may reveal the real 
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fluctuating nature of financial development, even a possible negative relationship for middle-
income countries. This, therefore, requires further investigation. 
Nonetheless, Arcand, et al. further attempt to infer on the nature of the nexus with respect to 
the short- and long-runs. They find that their results are consistent with longer-growth spells 
of ten years, that is, a positive nexus in the short run and negative in the long run. This however, 
contradicts Loayza and Ranciere (2006) who find a positive nexus in the long run and negative 
nexus in the short run, and explain that it is possible that countries with large financial sectors 
pay a price in volatility but are rewarded with higher growth. Despite finding a negative 
relationship in the long run, they affirm the convergence of countries with financial 
development. Arcand et al. (2015, p. 107) assert that, “the presence of a non-monotonic 
relationship between finance and growth is robust to controlling for the convergence effect of 
financial depth.” This construed linkage of convergence despite non-monotonicity in the nexus 
resonates with the finding of Aghion et al. (2005), who had noted that financial depth had no 
effect on steady-state growth – alleged to be in the long run. For them, “the long run is a fixed 
equilibrium and cannot be affected by anything, including the short run and whether its 
deviations from the equilibrium are due to monetary or other disturbances” (Fine and Dimakou, 
2016, p. 41). The flawed notion of growth convergence is taken up below as part of the critique 
of the threshold analysis and within the context of non-convergence of developing countries. 
 
3.3 Other Threshold Analyses of the Nexus 
Yu, et al. (2012) investigate the general economic assumption that financial development, stock 
markets in particular, acts as a catalyst to economic growth especially for highly developed 
OECD countries. They allude to mitigating the shortcoming of heterogeneous cross-sectional 
country data and homogeneity of geographical regions and income, as discussed earlier, by 
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using homogeneous panel data both across geographical regions and different income groups. 
However, their approach is flawed in that their panel data lack the required cross-sectional 
dimension. They use the World Bank nested panel data structure of 172 countries, which 
categorises all WB member states with population of more than 30,000 by seven geographical 
regions and four income groups – from which they obtain average values of financial 
development across countries of same geographical regions and similar income groups. As 
such they assume that high income countries automatically have higher levels of financial 
development. 
Surely, there is an exaggerated claim of homogeneity of financial development among the 
clusters of countries in the work of Yu et al. (2012) given that these countries are bound to 
have heterogeneous and asymmetric levels of financial development. They use number of years 
of financial institutions to measure financial depth, whereas it is not necessarily the case that a 
country’s financial depth level increases as years pass by. Financial underdevelopment is 
largely dictated by other social and institutional factors, and has little to do with the length of 
time these financial institutions have existed. An example is the case of Nigeria and Zimbabwe, 
with the latter having financial institutions almost twice as old, but lower financial 
development. Such unsubstantiated method of achieving homogeneity is bound to produce 
biased results as the World Bank country grouping, they agree, is riddled with “homogeneity 
in the level of financial development, stock market development and economic growth to some 
degree” (p. 3480). 
They investigate the real impact of different financial development indicators on growth. Their 
findings reveal that stock market development indicators have no significant impact on growth.  
Having also investigated Granger causality across these different geographical regions and 
income groups, they find stock market proxies to be significant in Granger-causing growth in 
other low/middle income countries like South Asia, SSA and MENA. The finance-growth 
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relationship was found to be weak in low income economies like East Europe, Central Asia 
and Latin America, and strong in the OECD countries. Therefore, they conclude that different 
policy bearings should be pursued depending on the income level, geography and institutional 
development of a country. However, they do not provide an explanation for the differences in 
results for these regions apart from alluding to the role of financial speculation. 
With the above findings, they generally advocate an increase in savings and investment 
irrespective of geography or income level to increase economic growth. This position is 
compromised by their research because despite finding no relationship between the financial 
variables used with growth in East Europe and central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean 
and South Asia, they insist on increasing savings for investment and growth. Also, the Middle 
East and North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa only show a short-run relationship between 
credit to the private sector and growth. Yet, they make policy recommendations with no 
justifiable reason that increased credit to the private sector and domestic savings across all 
regions are necessary. Despite the feature of this study in seeking to capture homogeneity 
across geographical regions and income groups, there is minimal acknowledgement, nearly a 
denial, of the enormous negative impact of the GFC. The inclusion of time-fixed effects in the 
empirical estimation is alleged to capture the periods of crises, and leads to a conclusion of a 
positive relationship between finance and growth. However, the problem is that the period 
examined, 1980-2009, was saddled with numerous banking and financial crises (lost decade in 
LAC, Asian crisis of 1997, Russian crisis of 1998, and many more), with very debilitating 
effects of financial development on both developing and advanced economies. These observed 
negative experiences of finance make the conclusion of a positive impact of finance on growth 
questionable. 
Yilmazkuday (2011) observes that the threshold analysis of the nexus now cuts across levels 
of financial development, deviations from optimal financial development, rates of inflation and 
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levels of economic development. And, since these thresholds have been achieved through 
discrete analyses, there remains within it the tendency to suppress the real nonlinear long-run 
relationship between growth and the variables investigated. Therefore, he used the rolling-
window two-stage least square regression with constant and large sample sizes to capture 
nonlinearities and thresholds in his analysis. With a data set for 84 countries over the period 
1965-2004, Yilmazkuday (2011) used the growth rate of real per capita output averaged over 
5-year periods, together with control variables of log of initial per capita GDP, log of initial 
secondary enrolment, the ratio of liquid liabilities (M3) to GDP, the ratio of M3 less M1 to 
GDP, inflation rate, openness and government size to measure thresholds in the finance growth 
nexus. The rolling-window two-stage least squares regression, with a constant window size of 
120 after ordering the data according to the threshold variable, was used to produce a 
continuous threshold analysis. 
He found that inflation impacted negatively on the positive effect of financial depth on growth 
in the long run. And the size of government had a positive relationship with the finance-growth 
nexus in low-income countries and a negative relationship in high-income countries. In terms 
of trade openness, a high level of trade was needed for low-income countries for a positive 
relationship between finance and growth and vice-versa for high-income countries. Finally, the 
supposed catch-up effect for the finance-growth nexus was higher for moderate per capita 
income countries. This implied that middle-income countries would benefit more from 
financial development than low- and high-income countries. The study succeeded in capturing 
thresholds in other control variables other than financial development and inflation. 
However, Yilmazkuday (2011) initiates his research on an unfounded proposition that 
instabilities have no impact on growth in the long run. He argues that the impact of instabilities 
on an economy is negligible, especially when viewed from the perspective of the poor as they 
are not directly affected in a financial crisis. He assumes this position because of the short-term 
127 
 
nature of instabilities, and that it will be possible to achieve long-term growth despite these 
short-term fluctuations. However, instabilities and indeed financial crises can be seen to have 
adverse effects on the economy and in particular aggregate demand, given the high level of 
unemployment and low income that follow, as was evident in the 2008 GFC. 
It is appropriate to be wary of the econometric techniques used in the threshold analyses, not 
least the questionable methods of disaggregating income groups, types or levels of 
development, and geographical regions. As pointed out by Rousseau and Yilmazkuday (2009) 
and Rousseau and Wachtel (2011), the splitting of countries in most research was only based 
on discrete measures that suppressed the actual nonlinear relationship between other variables 
and growth. However, Rousseau and Wachtel, (2002; 2011) tried to account for this problem 
by using a rolling regression that ordered data according to inflation rate averages that are 
continuous rather than discrete. Other variables, such as initial per capita income, trade 
openness, government size and financial development, were also used to reduce the 
generalisation in ranking countries. But Yilmazkuday (2011) notes that not much information 
was obtained from this type of rolling-regression ranking. He also observes that sequential 
regressions tended to have different sample sizes and so the estimated coefficients would have 
been incomparable to the changes in the power of the estimation. 
Barajas et al. (2012) re-examine the finance-growth nexus argument by theoretically and 
empirically testing whether all countries benefit equally and whether impact differs across 
countries and regions depending on type of economy. They found that the relationship between 
finance and growth is weak in low income countries, although increasing with income level, 
and significantly positive at high income levels. This is in contrast to Arcand et al.’s findings 
of a significantly weak relationship in more financially developed economies. Their finding, is 
however influenced by many factors such as whether countries are oil exporters or not. For 
example, in the Middle East and North African countries, financial development (measured by 
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banking sector depth) produced lower growth when compared to non-oil producing regions of 
the world. The level of regulatory framework in place also tends to affect the strength of the 
nexus. In any case, they found that weaker growth may be derived from the banking sector 
depth and higher growth from stock market depth. Therefore, they maintain that MENA 
countries may lack the necessary institutional infrastructure to exploit the existing level of 
financial depth. Institutional inefficiency, thus, weakens the impact of finance on growth. 
Other threshold analyses with findings akin to Arcand et al. (2012) are those of Hassan (2011), 
Ductor and Grechyna (2011), Cecchitti and Kharroubi (2012) and Law and Singh (2014) which 
use dynamic panel data to arrive at a significant positive relationship between finance and 
growth up to a certain level of financial development, beyond which finance exerts a negative 
impact on economic growth. Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) find a threshold of 90 per cent, 
using credit to the private sector by banks relative to GDP as a measure of financial 
development and, similar to Arcand et al., they use the square term of their financial 
development variable to investigate thresholds. They also find a threshold for employment 
level in finance, for which, if the financial sector employs more than 3.9 percent of total 
employment, further financial development will have a negative effect on economic growth. 
Law and Singh (2014) use a dynamic panel threshold method that extends static setup to 
endogenous regressors. They lay emphasis on the appropriate type and quality of finance as 
opposed to a simplistic expansion of the financial sector. 
More recently, some economists have put forward reasons why there may not be an absolute 
and consistent positive relationship between finance and growth. Beck (2013) revisits the 
finance-growth nexus theory and offers three reasons for a negative relationship across high-
income countries. First, the problem with finance may be its directions of flows. He notes that 
household credit, mostly comprising mortgage, constitutes 80% of overall bank credit. The 
empirical evidence between household credit and growth shows an insignificant relationship, 
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while on the other hand enterprise credit is found to have a positive correlation with growth. A 
second reason is in line with Tobin’s financial sector sub-optimal allocation hypothesis, which 
presents a possibility that the financial system outgrows the real economy and attracts more 
talents towards it by extracting excessively high information rents. 
Third, he points out that the measures of financial development in the literature may not capture 
efficiency and development, the absence of which may cause a divergence of financial 
development from growth. The make-up of private credit may capture financial intermediation 
functions of institutions but it remains a crude and imperfect measure of efficiency and 
economic development. This measure has become incongruous with the reality of modern 
financial systems. Beck (2013) points out that the choice of the measure of financial 
development in the literature is usually underpinned by the view of the financial sector to which 
one subscribes. On the one hand, academics mostly focus on the facilitating role of the financial 
sector – which includes the mobilisation of funds for investment and the efficient allocation of 
capital to productive areas of the economy. On the other hand, there is the view (to which 
policy makers often subscribe) that questions whether financial services contribute to growth 
or not. This third dichotomy is alleged (having only been nuanced) to be expanded upon by 
Beck et al. (2014) who used a sample of 77 countries in the period 1980-2007 and find that 
financial intermediation increases growth and increases volatility in the long run. However, it 
has no long-run effect on the real sectors of the economy. In the short run, however, the increase 
in growth incurs higher volatility, especially in high-income countries. This finding, 
nonetheless, raises questions around the productivity of financial services, which will be 
discussed in detail in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
In an effort to exonerate finance, particularly banks, Beck (2013) puts forward the case that the 
fragility and non-linearity in the finance-growth nexus implies that the growth benefits of 
financial intermediation do not derive from finance and banks, but from financing and banking 
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(with the risk of becoming tautological as the latter are defined as what contributes to 
development). However, this is only a technical differentiation, and a poor attempt at 
differentiating banks from their non-productive activities. But Beck makes no clarification of 
which banking or financing activities are unproductive and impact negatively on growth. It is, 
in fact, difficult to separate finance from financing or financial actors, and banks from banking 
or bankers. Earlier on, De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) hinted more simply that the negative 
effect of financial development in high income countries may be hinged on the proliferation of 
finance outside the traditional banking system. 
 
3.4 Critique of the Finance-Growth Threshold Analysis 
Remarkably, most of the threshold literature finds a pattern that informs the conclusion of a 
strong positive correlation between financial depth and economic growth in countries with 
small and intermediate financial sectors. This conclusion situates the nexus argument in a 
simplistic dichotomy between the level of development and the level of financial deepening. 
“This is entirely to overlook the composition of assets in reality, and those particularly 
associated with contemporary shifts in financial deepening […], namely the proliferation and 
expansion of assets associated with speculation and financialisation more broadly” (Fine and 
Van Waeyenberge, 2013, p. 11). Table 3.1 below presents a summary of the conclusions drawn 
for the threshold above studies. A few of them, such as Yilmazkuday (2011) and Barajas et al. 
(2012), find a weak relationship for low income countries. But Yilmazkuday also 
indiscriminatingly finds that higher levels of trade openness are needed for low-income 
countries for a positive nexus, while high-income countries need low levels of trade openness. 
Apart from Barajas et al. (2012), they all find a weak and negative relationship for high income 
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countries. This conclusion of a negative nexus for high income countries in the threshold 
literature is at best, only a seemingly response to the recent financial crisis. 
Notwithstanding threshold conclusions that point to constraining financial markets, there is 
markedly a shift towards the endorsement of financial development for emerging economies. 
Some of these conclusions are drawn despite findings in some of the research that the 
relationship between finance and growth is never statistically significant within the LDCs 
(Arcand et al., 2012 for example). Unfortunately, this conclusion is drawn without any 
consideration for the short-term nature of finance predominant in these countries nor the 
directions of flows of finance. The flow of finance in these countries is exploitative, mostly to 
facilitate domestic short-term consumption or short-term investment from abroad for the 
purpose of speculation in assets. The increasing levels of finance in developing and emerging 
economies therefore, is not necessarily used to fund investment for development. Contrary to 
the threshold literature, finance will have no positive impact on long-term growth. In short, it 
has the tendency to undermine development. This is exactly the point alluded to by Berglof 
and Bolton (2002) in the context of the transition economies of East and Central Europe, when 
they argued that an excessive focus on financial development has the potential to undermine 









Table 3.1 Table of Selected Threshold Studies and their Conclusions. 
Authors/Dates Methodology/Period Nexus Conclusions for Countries 
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Nonetheless, the consensus in the threshold literature that a negative relationship exists 
between finance and growth for high income countries can be explained by the fact that 
financial liberalisation exposes the economy to instabilities, making any gains from finance 
elusive. Also, the insignificant relationship for low income countries in most cases, will be 
obvious, given the unequal distribution of finance, largely leaving the poor out of economic 
development. What is left of a positive nexus argument is the conclusion drawn for middle-
income countries. A concentration on middle-income countries, henceforth, for examining the 
nexus might be thought to be able resolve the finance-growth once and for all. Some 
conclusions from regional cross-country specific studying middle-income countries are already 
tending towards a negative nexus. For example, Samargandi et al. (2014) revisit the nexus and 
investigate monotonicity for a group of middle-income countries. Using mean group 
estimations in a dynamic heterogeneous panel data to estimate a threshold model, they find an 
inverted U-Shaped relationship in the long run and an insignificant relationship in the short 
run. 
This threshold analysis of the nexus has been tested for African countries. Ikhide (2015) use 
the conventional dynamic panel data methodology for a cross country analysis of 21 sub-
Saharan African countries between 1970 and 2013 and found a positive relationship between 
financial development and growth. The presence of a threshold is then found by using a 
multiple equilibria model. For African countries, the data is divided into the periods 1970-
134 
 
1980, 1981-2005 and 2005-2013. An inverted U-shape is also said to exist in the case of Africa. 
The positive relationship in the period between 1970 and 1980 is explained as a period of 
financial repression and underdevelopment in the continent, and the negative relationship 
between 2005 and 2013 is explained as a slowing down of growth due to higher levels of 
financial development. Again, this is simply to conflict number of years or periods for levels 
and stages of financial development. 
These conclusions of the threshold analysis for different income groups raises questions on the 
nature of finance. Does finance exhibit differing behaviours depending simply on a country’s 
level of development or does its behaviour depend on a complex combination of social 
relations? Even beyond the very form in which finance is composed, there often exists complex 
systematic social relations between classes in the flow of financial transactions. Whether it is 
high volume of finance, as with high-income countries, or low volume as with low-income 
countries, these complex social relations in the flow of finance remain pervasive, steadfastly 
embedded in its interest bearing and profiteering nature, beyond the form of finance or a 
country’s level of development. In the end, its uneven distribution is inevitable. This attribute 
seems to be consistent, and also independent of the level of financial development. For this 
reason, it is unlikely for finance to exhibit different behaviours depending only on the 
geographical environment in which it exists or the level of financial development within that 
environment.  As such, there is a need to capture more of the complexities in the nexus by 
focussing systematically on what sort of finance, what sort of economic activity, and how they 
interact with one another in specific contexts with necessarily heterogeneous outcomes across 
time, space and form. It is also important to find out the nature (amidst form) of financial 
development that might be best suited to developing countries. 
As with other studies of the relationship between finance and growth, the threshold literature 
contends that despite short-term systemic shocks in the short run, the growth of developing 
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countries will converge with those of advanced economies in the long run. However, there is 
the misconception of a dichotomy between the short and the long run. It is also unclear when 
the long run starts to set in. Despite the convergence narrative, evidence has shown that 
developing countries have become farther apart from advanced economies in their per capita 
income. This is amidst perpetually increasing levels of financial liberalisation and openness in 
developing countries. It becomes necessary to ask, how long it will take for such convergence 
to be achieved through financial development, given that no developing country has 
‘converged’ solely on the basis of financial liberalisation, as put forth by the threshold 
literature. 
The notion that instabilities have no impact on long-term growth also points to attempts at 
justifying this long-run convergence. Just as in DSGE models, where short-run income 
distribution has no long-run effect on macroeconomic outcomes, these conclusions of long-run 
convergence through financial development is seen to be in line with the notion of a steady-
state growth through financial development. This is simply an excessive commitment to 
finance. If anything near convergence is possible, evidence has shown that it is not through 
financial liberalisation and openness, but through industrial policy tailored to meet 
developmental goals. As Keynes pointed out in the General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money, there can be no long-run solution to the problem of development without a demand 
boost. As such, financial development, in of itself, is insufficient to achieve so-called 
convergence, if its inherent re-distributional efficacy is not addressed, to boost aggregate 
demand. Within development, one way to address such inefficiency of redistribution arising 
from financial appropriation, is through development finance as opposed to speculative 




What cannot be neglected about this revisionism is that it has been heavily driven by research 
at the IMF, the World Bank and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs). The study on 
“too much finance” by Arcand et al. (2012) was first published as a working paper with the 
IMF. Two of the three authors in the research done by Barajas et al. (2012), Adolfo Barajas 
and Ralph Chami, are staff of the IMF. Yilmazkuday’s (2011) cross-country analysis on 
thresholds in the finance-growth nexus was also published in the World Bank Economic 
Review. Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012/2015) are economist at the Bank for International 
Settlements.  Despite the disclaimers that accompany these publications, indicating that the 
views represent those of the authors and not necessarily the institutions, there is undoubtedly 
an association, even subtle endorsement. A lot of the discussion papers in the research 
departments of these institutions subscribe to these views. It is well known that these 
institutions are not usually associated with views that are contrary to theirs. Another point o 
note here is that all these studies have been done in the same period – after the GFC – and all 
drawing very similar conclusions. 
It is striking that these institutions, which were hitherto of the putative belief in a positive 
relationship between finance and growth, pursuing this in all their areas of influence, now turn 
to a threshold nexus beyond which finance will no longer contribute to growth. The reason for 
this cannot be far-fetched. In the wake of the GFC, and the corresponding loss of legitimacy, 
having been at the fore front of the financial liberalisation agenda and corresponding 
commitment to markets, the World Bank and the IMF have sought to regain their position of 
dominating scholarship around the economics discipline and development in particular. This 
revisionism of the nexus into thresholds serves as another attempt in keeping with its tradition 
of historically revisiting its scholarship after every crisis. However, it is as inconsistent across 
time, space and form of finance, as with other policies from these institutions. It is seen to 
sustain the “complex, diverse and shifting set of combinations of scholarship, ideology and 
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policy in practice” of the World Bank (Fine and Van Waeyenberge, 2013 p. 1). So, the 
threshold analysis retains these inconsistencies of results and applicability across regions and 
levels of development. But, at the same time, it maintains the unrelenting drive for a market 
and financial liberalisation agenda for developing countries, in its “promotion of private capital 
in general and finance in particular” (p. 2).  
Marois and Pradella (2015) believes that the unrelenting prominent role assumed by the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) is due to their survival being dependent on the 
progress of the world capitalist economy – increasingly defined by financial globalisation 
which ensures that hot money flows freely in and out of emerging economies. Hence, the reason 
for persistent support of financial development in these countries. The effect of such 
arrangements is that it reduces developing countries to centres of accumulation, where quick 
profit is made from short-term investments at the expense of human capital and industrial 
development. These implications for development finance and countries in general will be 
taken up more broadly in chapter four. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has critically analysed the threshold literature of the finance-growth nexus and the 
implications of this revisionism. The threshold argument has been located as an extension of 
the non-linearity literature found earlier in the nexus. The gaps and questions in this revisionism 
have also been discussed, not least the role of the IMF in advancing it. The flaws in the literature 
remain even if it places difficulties over drawing conclusions that financial development is 
necessary for growth, or causal for that matter. Nevertheless, threshold investigation of the 
nexus implies an increasing recognition of the complexity of financial markets and their 
channels for attaining growth and development. But having admitted the complexity of the 
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nexus, this revisionism has fallen short in other ways. One is that it identifies the problem only 
in part. By simplistically reducing the nexus to thresholds, it fails to recognise more 
importantly, the broader factors that affect this relationship, not least the social relations that 
accompany financial development. As Fine and Dimakou (p. 17) put it in the context of DSGE 
models and macroeconomics in general, such “refinement at the technical level [is] considered 
without sufficient critical reflection on the methods, techniques and aims of the research 
programme as a whole as opposed to minor modifications to its individual parts.” 
Second, conclusions in the revised threshold have been drawn solely on the basis of 
econometric modelling, despite its known limitations. Therefore, revisionism does very little 
to correct the limitations of the empirical literature. As it is impossible to correct all the flaws 
of empirical modelling, it is important to recognise the limitations that accompany such models 
and be cautious when drawing conclusions. One fundamental problem that remains with the 
threshold analysis, as with other econometric estimations of the nexus, is that it continues the 
error of drawing conclusions on the relationship between finance and growth, by conflating 
correlation with causation. Econometric modelling should draw from theoretical debates in the 
discipline, together with empirical cases. Within the context of the finance-growth nexus, one 
of these considerations is how finance and growth are computed and what economic activities 
should be included in their computation. The overall evidence of the destabilising effect of 
finance on growth should be taken into consideration and factored into any finance-growth 
regression, given that finance does not necessarily have a fixed let alone a positive relationship 
with growth. A correction of the nexus model that recognises this deficiency is taken up in 
chapter seven. Yet, Arestis (2005) goes further to proposes that the available evidence can be 
interpreted as indicating that the theoretical propositions of the nexus are at best weak, as is 
inadvertently, painfully slowly and in piecemeal revealed by the literature, and as such, ought 
to be abandoned. 
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Therefore, it is necessary to turn to African countries, and Nigeria in particular, in the next 
chapter to investigate the claim of a positive impact of increasing financial development on 
economic growth of middle- and low-income countries as results in the threshold analyses 
show. As argued in this thesis, it is necessary that such impact of finance on developing 
countries is measured against development objectives of poverty, inequality, infrastructure and 
broader development required in these countries. This approach is taken, to account for the 
context-specific impact of finance on growth. The case of Nigeria aims to correct the limitation 


















CHAPTER 4.0 – FINANCIALISATION OF DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 
“We are throwing more and more of our resources […] into financial activities remote 
from the production of goods and services, into activities that generate high private 
rewards disproportionate to their social productivity.” - James Tobin (1984) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
There has been an upsurge in finance across Africa, characterised by increase in financial flows, 
expansion of commercial bank branches, growth of regional banks, expansion of capital 
markets, rise in microcredit and success of mobile payment systems (Allen et al., 2012). 
Particularly, the increase in flows is also changing the nature of finance in Africa from public 
to private capital, intensified since the 2008 financial crisis (IMF, 2014). A significant driver 
of the growth of finance in Africa is shaped by China’s investment which rose steeply in the 
mid-2000s (Weisbrod and Whalley, 2012). This has changed the landscape of finance in Africa. 
The literature on financial development in Africa has been largely optimistic about this 
expansion, with most country and regional studies of the impact on growth, poverty and 
inequality painting a strikingly positive picture (Beck et al, 2007b; Agu and Chukwu, 2009; 
Beck et al., 2009; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2013). Despite so-called evidence of a positive 
relationship between finance and growth, reinforced by econometric results, finance has also 
demonstrated the potential to outgrow real output, shift towards speculative purpose and be 
unevenly distributed, thereby leading to instability and increasing inequality. 
In fact, evidence shows that poverty and inequality remain persistently high in sub-Saharan 
Africa amidst financial development. There are more poor people in Africa today than in 1990, 
and seven of the ten most unequal countries in the world are in Africa (Beegle et al., 2016). 
Barely has any progress been made in addressing a most obstinate infrastructure gap unsettling 
the continent. In addition, Africa’s recent average growth of 1.5 per cent is at its lowest in two 
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decades. Even the supposed success story of microfinance in Africa is not what its proponents 
have claimed it to be (Kaboski and Townsend, 2011; Chang and Bateman, 2012; Bateman, 
2014a; Banerjee et al., 2015). Similar caution has been expressed about the celebrated rise of 
electronic payment systems (Dos Santos and Kvangraven, 2016), prominent in Kenya, Nigeria, 
Uganda and growing in other parts of Africa. And many studies express some reservation 
around the regulatory environment. As such, the excessive belief in financial development as 
a driver of growth and development is problematic, given the lack of progress in addressing 
the immediate needs of the people on the continent. 
Yet, more than just caution is needed to ensure that the proliferation of finance does not halt 
economic development in African countries. Therefore, this chapter analyses the far-reaching 
impact of financial development on the broader development of Africa. It draws from the 
financialisation literature to understand the structure and processes of financial development 
and the basis for ascertaining its impact on economic growth. It takes a critical view of the 
existing literature that analyse the relationship between finance and growth solely on the basis 
of econometric techniques, by pinpointing the lapses in understanding of the context and the 
limitations of measures chosen to analyse the impact of finance on development. Financial 
development concepts such as access and inclusion, as used by the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) and mainstream literature, are seen to be ascribed meanings that are 
estranged from the context of African countries and, as such, illusionary and rhetorical. 
Therefore, their use confirms the push for financial development at all cost, and as the main 
driver of development 
A review of development in Africa shows that financial development is forced on the region 
through capital inflow, mostly short-term, seeking financial arrangements, not least institutions 
to accommodate it. This has led to the rise of all manner of institutions serving as agents of 
finance. Another driver of Africa’s financial development is the conditionality requirements 
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that come with aid, loans and other transfers, causing countries to pursue so-called robust 
financial policies to secure them and in some cases service repayments. Despite private capital 
inflow recently superseding donor aid, the impact on African economies is worse, as the former 
seeks to extract short-term profit. Interestingly, Beck et al. (2009) observe that this increased 
capital inflow is concentrated in certain resource rich African countries. This stirs suspicion 
around the kind and direction of flows that drive financial development in Africa. 
The role of the Washington Consensus (WC) is considered here on the basis that the trajectory 
of financial development in Africa has been driven by the policies advanced by the World 
Bank, delineated in the WC. Despite its purported aim of macroeconomic stability and 
development, it continues to promote financial liberalisation as necessary means for achieving 
these. This is evident in its consistent policy conclusions of financial development for growth, 
despite evidence to the contrary. Notwithstanding the revision of the finance-growth nexus to 
a threshold analysis in light of the GFC, the role ascribed to the state, particularly development 
finance, remains unchanged. It maintains the conclusions of an inherently dysfunctional state 
and efficient market (Global Financial Development Report, 2013). By so doing, it downplays 
the impact of the crisis, upholding the body of (unfounded) evidence around the relationship 
between finance and development in spite of the crisis. It also ignores the persistent 
underdevelopment, poverty and rising inequality in regions such as Africa, despite increasing 
financial penetration. Thus, more than anything else, a market ideology lies behind the financial 
development narrative, without considering the implications this may have for developing 
countries. 
The case of financial development in Nigeria is investigated to broaden the understanding of 
the structure and processes of financial development in Africa and the literature on 
financialisation – which such critical analyses have been more recently located. The need for 
locating this discussion resonates with Bayliss et al. (2017; see also Finlayson 2009, Bryan and 
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Rafferty 2014, Montgomerie and Budenbender 2015), who note the importance to understand 
the flow of finance from high-income countries to developing countries on the basis of the 
broader dynamics of financialisation. Thus, Nigeria reveals an interesting process of 
financialisation, specifically the location of financialisation around development plans among 
other factors. The misplacement of financial development policies for national development 
plans and the disproportionate advancement of the former over the latter re-emphasises the 
argument of the potential of finance to undermine development. As such, it is referred to as the 
financialisation of development. 
The rest of the chapter provides an overview of development in Africa in the following section 
4.2 to understand the drivers of financial development and the processes undergirding this. This 
is followed by a review of financial development in Africa in section 4.3. It touches on the 
debates in the literature, tracing the developments in Africa’s financial sectors. It discusses the 
role of economic theory advanced by the WC and PWC and the implications of these for 
development in Africa. The misunderstanding of the narratives associated with the theory of 
financial development in Africa, namely financial access and inclusion, are discussed in section 
4.4. This is done alongside a critical analysis of the main expression of these narratives, which 
is microfinance. A case study of financial development in Africa with respect to banking sector 
and capital market developments and the foray into microfinance in Nigeria follows in section 
4.5. From the foregoing, a theory of the financialisation of development is put forward in 
section 4.6 by combining the features of financial development that have been identified. 






4.2 Overview of Development in Africa 
An overview of the macroeconomic environment in sub-Saharan Africa shows that the 
continent has experienced very strong economic growth in the last 30 years, although highly 
driven by export and concentrated in commodities. Data from the WDI show that since 2010, 
60 per cent of Africa’s GDP has been generated from trade. But trade has concentrated around 
a few low-priced commodities. Kvangraven (2016) use the Herfindahl Hirschmann Index,19 
which measures export concentration for a country or group of countries, to demonstrate that 
African countries mostly export a narrow range of commodities in fewer sectors than other 
regions of the global economy. The paper which reviewed the changing nature of the economic 
environment in Africa also shows that there is decline in value-added in sectors such as 
agriculture, industry and manufacturing, while value-added for wholesale/retail, mining, 
transportation and services is rising. 
The result of a concentration of economic activities on trade is weak and undeveloped markets 
that are prone to vulnerability from external markets deficiencies and attendant fluctuations. 
The fall in the continent’s export share to GDP from 2008 to 2009 arising from a weakened 
global demand in the wake of the financial crisis is a case in point (WTO, 2010). There is also 
the 2015 crash in commodity prices in Africa due to reduced demand from a weakening 
Chinese economy. Lui and Drummond (2014) show that a 1% decline in China’s investment 
growth reduces average export growth rate in sub-Saharan Africa by 0.6%, and up to 0.8% for 
the top five resource-rich countries, weighted by export to China as a share of GDP — Angola, 
South Africa, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and the Democratic Republic of the 
                                                          
19 Herfindahl–Hirschmann index measures the degree to which a country’s exports are concentrated around 
certain sectors. It uses a range of 0 to 1, where values closer to 1 show exports are concentrated in a few sectors 
and values closer to 0 show that a country’s exports are less concentrated. 
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Congo. The overarching result of the commodity price crash is a sharp decline in the average 
growth rate in Africa, which stands at 1.5 per cent, the lowest in two decades. 
Kvangraven (2016) shows that international private capital flows20 and remittances to Africa 
has increased from $20billion in 1990 to a record $120billion in 2012 – despite the 2008 
financial crisis. This increase in private financial flows to Africa over the last decade is 
associated with an apparent shift in form from public to private financial flows, characterised 
by a decline in aid and non-concessional lending and increase in foreign direct investment and 
portfolio investment. The changing forms of finance in sub-Saharan Africa are noteworthy as 
detrimental for development, a discussion taken up more broadly in the following section 4.3.  
Nevertheless, foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased. FDI to Africa has risen from 0.4% 
of total GDP in 1990 to 2.4% in 2013, most of which goes to resource-rich countries and 
extractive industries (p. 236). South Africa ranked one of the highest recipients of portfolio 
investment, only behind China, Mexico and Brazil (Chang and Grabel, 2014). What is often 
ignored is the direction of flow of capital. Significantly, the direction of flow shapes the core 
structures of the economies receiving these investment, and in some cases, the nature of the 
relationship between the investor and recipient countries. The type of sector being invested in 
determines whether such capital will be long-term or not. The high rate of market fluctuations 
in African economies reveals the high rate of repatriation of capital and the short-term nature 
                                                          
20 International capital flows consists of public and private capital flows. Public flows are capital transfers 
between governments or lending from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank/IMF. Private capital 
flows comprise foreign bank lending (loans extended by commercial banks or multilateral bank), portfolio 
investment (investments in stocks, bonds derivatives and other financial instruments in countries other than that 
of the investor) and foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the Balance of Payments Manual of the 
World Bank, FDI is taken to be net inflow of investment used to acquire at least 10% long-term management 
interest (determined by voting rights) in another economy other than that of the investor. This is measured by 
net inflow of capital into a country 
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of flows to Africa. Fluctuations arising from these sectors are transferred to other sectors of the 
economy, underpinning the instability inherent in African economies. 
Kvangraven further shows that there has also been a rise in short-term domestic bond markets 
issuance and treasury bills in Africa, as these have become the preferred investment option for 
foreign investors seeking high yields. Despite foreign debt being less expensive for developing 
countries, they have been argued to increase the level of market volatility in these countries as 
they are susceptible to reversals. Repayment in foreign currency end up making them more 
expensive. The paper also pointed out that there has been a drive for international reserve 
accumulation in sub-Saharan Africa to mitigate external costs and boost investor confidence. 
External reserves grew from around a total of 17 percent of total external debt in 2000 to 74 
percent in 2008. Although this has reduced since the crisis, it still stands at a relatively high 45 
percent of total debt compared to other regions of the world. In most cases, the boost to external 
reserves is driven by the conditionality for borrowing from IFIs. This undermines development, 
as it poses a challenge for fiscal expansion. 
Griffith-Jones and Karwowski (2013) argues that the impact of global financial crises on 
African countries has been through trade, remittances and ODAs. They put some of the impact 
of the 2008 financial crisis on African countries at 0.7 percentage fall in GDP growth in the 
two years that followed the crisis, and a fall in taxes collected in sub-Saharan Africa by 1.7 
percent of GDP in comparison to pre-crisis levels. This led to an average 1 percent budget 
deficit across the continent. They also show a 1.5 percentage fall in gross capital formation as 
a share of GDP in the year after the crisis. 
Amidst these developments, the macroeconomic landscape in Africa is largely unstable, in 
addition to the already noted high rate of poverty and inequality. The continent is also faced 
with an obstinate infrastructure gap that continues to undermine its development. Therefore, 
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the existing market structure that promotes financial development and capital markets in 
particular, has been unable to deliver development to the continent. Instead, financial 
development is continuously advanced as the main channel for achieving development in 
Africa. The expansion of finance is discussed in the section that follows. 
 
4.3 Review of Financial Development in Africa 
Financial development is the term used to describe the general expansion and diversification 
in the range of financial products, institutions and regulation of the financial sector. Roe (2006) 
notes that the literature hinges this expansion and diversification in the financial sector around 
size, depth/diversity, access/inclusion, efficiency and soundness/regulation. He refers to size 
as the sheer expansion in volume of savings, credits and payments channelled through the 
financial sector. And depth is the level of diversification of specialised and innovative financial 
products. Access/inclusion is seen as the level of penetration of financial services to different 
levels of businesses and groups defined by geography, gender and age. Efficiency is said to be 
the productivity of delivering financial services at a lower per unit cost. This is usually made 
possible by innovations as mobile payments and other profit maximising systems. Regulation 
is referred to as a developed and competent supervisory role of institutions that enhances trust 
between providers of financial services and users, as such bringing stability to the market. 
The inclusion of developing countries in the financial development literature may be traced 
back to McKinnon and Shaw (1973) who argued in their financial repression hypothesis that 
repressed interest rates were causal for low growth and savings rate in developing countries. 
The real rate of interest, it was proposed, will adjust to an equilibrium level that enhances 
efficiency. Increase in the real rate of interest would cause increase in savings and the total real 
supply of credit, this then induces a higher volume of investment. Growth, therefore, is 
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supposed to be impacted through increased investment, due to an increase in the average 
productivity of capital. As such, interest rate liberalisation was proposed to spur savings and 
growth. 
However, the ability of interest rates to generate savings and spur growth has been criticised in 
the financial development literature. For example, savings was found to be non-responsive to 
interest rates in developing countries (Giovanni, 1985) and particularly for poor households 
(Ostry and Reinhard, 1992). Despite these counter-arguments financial liberalisation has been 
alleged to cause growth in developing countries. This has been accompanied by the call for the 
development of capital markets (Levine, 1993; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2013) and integration 
with the global economy. Many IMF papers have put forward the argument that developing 
African countries’ domestic debt markets will strengthen the economy and in particular, the 
financial sector (Abbas and Christensen, 2007; IMF, 2013). This has led to a build-up of both 
domestic and foreign debt around the continent. In particular, the combination of the following 
factors underpinned financial development in development; financial liberalisation agenda in 
developing countries, the role of IFIs in advancing this agenda and, the increasing difficulty of 
debt management in developing countries which culminated in the international debt crisis of 
the early 1980s (Williamson and Mahar, 1998; Bonizzi 2016). 
Early studies of the impact of financial development on development include the work of 
Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2002) which found that besides increase in growth, income 
distribution was necessary for a positive impact of financial development on poverty. In fact, 
Beck et al., (2007b) claimed to have found evidence that as growth increases with financial 
development, it “disproportionately boosts the income of the poor” and reduces income 
inequality. On the contrary, the experience of African countries make this conclusion 
questionable. Nonetheless, these studies opened the literature to debates on the distributional 
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effect of financial development, which has been noted to underpin the financial access and 
inclusion literature that came later (Bonizzi, 2016), taken up below in section 4.4. 
The increase in financial flows to sub-Saharan Africa has been driven by an expensive focus 
on financial development in the region at the expense of the development of other sectors of 
the economy. This disproportionate focus can be said to be underpinned more by ideology. In 
fact, (Karwowski and Stockhammer, 2016) believe that financial activities in the advanced 
capitalist economies forces upon developing economies an imported and extraneous form of 
financial development, through the push for financial liberalisation and surge of capital flows 
to developing countries. This push is evident in the influential studies of Levine (1996) which 
put forward that foreign banks possess superior expertise for financial intermediation, and that 
they will efficiently stimulate existing domestic financial institutions (Levine, 1997). It was 
even found that foreign banks entry to developing countries’ financial markets will increase 
efficiency by reducing high cost of transaction, non-interest income and profit (Claessens et 
al., 2001). 
Financial development in Africa has deepened following the combination of the above-
mentioned factors. Despite many attempts at financial reforms African countries’ financial 
sectors remain relatively underdeveloped. So, many African countries have set financial 
development targets as they navigate their visions of becoming middle-income countries. 
Financial development indicators such as liquid liabilities to GDP at 2007 was less than 30 
percent in many African countries compared with over 40 percent in other parts of the world. 
And the ratio of private credit to GDP was an average 17 percent in comparison to almost 40 
percent in other developing countries (Allen et al., 2012). The financial systems landscape in 
Africa is also very diverse, ranging from well-developed systems in middle-income countries 
such as South Africa, Mauritius, Nigeria, to underdeveloped financial systems in countries such 
as Sudan and Central Africa Republic (Beck and Cull, 2014b). At firm and household levels, 
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most Africa countries have small, shallow and costly financial systems (Beck and Cull, 2014a). 
Banking penetration at 2009, measured by access to checking accounts, stood at an average of 
less than 20 percent in Africa, with the exception of South Africa which recorded over 40 
percent banking penetration. This is far from other regions of the developing world which 
recorded between 30-50 percent penetrations (Beck et al., 2009). 
But there is the problem of inadequate representative measures of the forms and levels of 
financial development in the literature. Despite this problem, most studies of financial 
development in Africa use the same measures used in advanced economies in analysing the 
relationship between finance and growth, especially in econometric analysis. The reasons for 
this range from data unavailability to research sloppiness. For example, the time series data 
analyses of Odedokun’s (1989), Lyon and Murinde (1994) and Agu and Chukwu (2009) 
investigate causality using the ratio of domestic credit to income. Odedokun argues that this 
variable represents the domestic assets of the financial sector, given that it can easily be 
accessed from the asset side of the consolidated balance sheet of banks and the financial 
corporations. The variable is also anticipated to be responsive to price, not least changes in real 
interest rates. But it may not be representative of financial markets in developing countries due 
to the underdeveloped credit markets, and the presence of thriving informal markets which are 
usually outside the control of monetary authorities. The inadequacy of the use of credit to the 
private sector in measuring financial development has also been noted by Levine (2005), 
Arcand et al. (2012) and Beck et al. (2014) in its inadequacy to capture social impact. But this 
measure continues to be used as representative of financial development in developing 
countries, including research on financialisation by heterodox economists, as in Karwowski 
and Stockhammer (2016). 
Research is as inconclusive for the finance-growth nexus in Africa as in other regions. 
However, most studies find a positive long-run relationship is found in the studies of Lee and 
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Chang (2009), Hassan et al. (2011) and Bangake and Eggoh (2011). While Murinde (2012) 
leans in favour of a positive nexus in his survey of the nexus literature in Africa, he 
acknowledges that the evidence is unclear and results inconsistent for same methods of 
analyses. Atindehou et al. (2005) investigate the relationship between financial development 
and economic growth for West African countries, and find an insignificant relationship. Their 
causality test showed that economic development led financial development in most West 
African countries, with some showing financial development causes growth. Credit by banks 
and other financial institutions was seen to have no positive impact on growth. 
The obsession with causality tests in the nexus literature in Africa is notable, despite its 
conflicting results. Ghirmay (2004) finds evidence that finance causes growth in twelve African 
countries. Likewise, Gries et al. (2009) and Akinlo and Egbetunde (2010) find a unidirectional 
relationship in which finance causes growth. On the other hand, Odhiambo (2008a) and Hassan 
et al. (2011) find the direction of causality to be from growth to finance. Lee and Change 
(2009), Ahmed (2010), Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2008), Odhiambo (2008b) find a bi-
directional causality. These studies used mostly the traditional VAR vector error correction 
(VECM) models and Granger Causality tests21. 
Following findings of a predominantly positive nexus, there has been a surge in private credit 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Griffith-Jones and Karwowski (2013) show the sharp increase in the 
percentage of credit to GDP advanced by banks and other financial institutions in Benin, Mali, 
Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Sudan, Tanzania, 
and Uganda. The percentage of credit to GDP even exceeds the 0.7 IMF threshold for a negative 
relationship between finance and growth in Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa and 
Tunisia. Interestingly, the credit is mostly comprised of household consumption and mortgage. 
                                                          
21 See chapter 2 for a discussion on the limitations of these methods. 
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For example, the housing boom in South Africa – with one of the highest real price gains in 
housing market globally, and where the ratio of household to business credit is approximately 
1:1 – between 2000 and 2010, has been driven by over 500 percent rise in real price of housing 
loans. They show that a similar case obtains in Mauritius, where according to a 2012 survey, 
one third of private credit is allocated to households, of which 60 percent is towards mortgage 
finance and 40 percent towards consumption. Even in low-income sub-Saharan countries such 
as Mozambique, private credit increased from 15 to 23 percent of GDP between 2000 and 2010. 
This reality of increasing credit and its disconnection from real investment in these African 
countries makes them vulnerable to financial instabilities. In general, credit to GDP has 
doubled in Benin Republic and Swaziland, increased by between 300 and 1000 percent in 
Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania and 
Uganda, and by 1500 percent in Angola (p. 22). 
Yet, the cost of delivering financial services in sub-Saharan Africa remains relatively high. The 
documentation required for eligibility to access financial services are stringent, consisting of 
formal identification for opening an account, especially in predominantly informal 
environments. Also, it is characterised by high interest rates spreads between savers and 
borrowers, with very low interest rates earned for the former and, on other hand, very high rates 
of borrowing for the latter (p. 24). Interest on loans in these markets is relatively higher than 
obtain in other advanced economies, and there is a higher margin between savers and borrowers 
in sometimes relatively fewer (but more profitable) transactions. Flamini et al. (2009) show the 
relatively higher cost of premiums charged by banks in sub-Saharan Africa. This cost is 
generally attributed to underdeveloped credit markets considered to be riskier, with higher 
overhead costs of financial intermediation. 
Ncube (2007, p. 23) provides an explanation for the high cost of financial intermediation in 
African countries using a macro model that shows that “interest rate spread depends negatively 
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on the rate of growth of the economy and capital depreciation and inversely on the marginal 
productivity of capital and the savings rate.” He used a micro-model of bank behaviour to 
further explain that interest rate spread is dependent on a “banks’ attitude to risk, interest rate 
risk, market power, administrative cost of loans, interbank rate, credit risk and size of a bank’s 
equity capital, on interest rate margins.” These factors determine the bank’s optimal interest 
margin. This margin can then be set equal to the inter-bank rate for a risk-neutral bank or higher 
for a risk-averse bank, with the notion that African banks are risk-averse. Despite this extensive 
explanation, banks in sub-Saharan Africa are the most profitable in the world (Beck et al., 
2009). Also, Hesse and Poghosyan (2016) show that the return on assets of banks in Middle 
East and North African countries is relatively higher than those of their Western countries. That 
means, the business of financial intermediation remains profitable, as cost is shifted to the 
consumers, serving as disincentive to savers and borrowers. 
However, the literature inaccurately recommends more financial development to address the 
problem of cost without addressing the source of relatively high cost. Some of the obvious 
drivers of cost include the lack of infrastructure as electricity, transportation, communication, 
etc., and the failure of regulatory institutions to keep the reckless lending and other activities 
of financial institutions in check. High cost also derives from the pressure of external finance 
seeking to make profit, and exerting upward pressure on interest rates. However, it is of much 
concern that despite this high cost, banks in Africa are more profitable than their counterparts 
in other parts of the world, and continue to attract foreign short-term capital seeking to profit 
from higher returns. 
Despite penetration, finance is inaccessible to SMEs which make up a significant proportion 
of firms in African countries. Beck et al. (2006) identifies financial constraints, specifically the 
lack of appropriate financial services designed to fit the needs of SMEs. In Beck et al.’s (2009) 
extensive review of the achievements and challenges of financial development in Africa, 
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emphasis is placed on improvements in resource allocation and productivity growth. They 
argue that financial deepening has a transformative impact on industrial structure, firm size 
distribution and organisational structures, with cross-country studies showing a pro-poor effect. 
In a more recent study using World Bank Group Enterprise Surveys, which captures firms’ 
perception of their most binding constraints in around 100 countries, Beck and Cull (2014b) 
show that banks disburse less loans in sub-Saharan Africa than any other region of the world, 
although with a large variation across countries on the continent, ranging from 3% of firms in 
Guinea-Bissau to 53% in Mauritius. Other heterogeneity exists around the size of firms and 
level of financial development. 
Yet, African firms have as much access to savings and checking accounts as other regions. 
They, however, noted that older firms with more than fifteen years of operation are more likely 
to have access to loans than younger firms. They argue that the reluctance of African businesses 
to borrow could be due to low return on investment in Africa. But this is hardly the case, as 
many sub-Saharan African countries have the highest return on investment in the world. But 
they also point out that less firms in Africa relative to the advanced economies allude to lack 
of demand as reason for not using bank loans in their operations, suggesting a paucity of loans 
for SMEs. 
Beck and Cull (2014b) make some recommendations on how to drive lending. First, they 
maintain the view on more foreign bank penetration, those with foreign ownership structures, 
in order to mitigate the slow and bureaucratic corporate management structures in Africa. They 
call for transaction- and asset-based lending techniques, such as leasing facilities, which are 
not asset-backed and therefore require no collateral. They also recommend other related 
lending techniques such as factoring, which is the discounting of sales receivables, and equity 
financing. These lending modes rely less on a country’s contractual framework and more on 
the legal framework governing the transaction itself. In addition, they call for financial 
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innovations such as the “psychometric assessment” of entrepreneurs in order to identify high-
risk ventures, not least more microfinance innovations. But these recommendations do not 
acknowledge that the so-called impediments to financial development in Africa derive from 
inadequate economic structures, which require a different development approach.  
 
Table 4.1 Differences in Financial Development Variables for Africa, Other Middle 
and Low Income Economies (East Europe and Central Asia). 














Liquid liabilities/GDP 31.8 16.8 55.4 32.7 
Private credit/GDP 19.4 16.9 40.0 24.7 
Account at formal financial 
institution 
21.0 16.3 35.2 21.5 
Loan from a financial 
institution 
5.2 3.2 10.1 6.1 
Mobile phone used to send 
money 
8.8 13.2 2.3 4.1 
Mobile phone used to receive 
money 
11.9 15.3 3.5 6.1 
Mobile phone used to pay bills 3.3 5.1 2.5 4.4 
 




The table above compares the level of financial development in Africa with other middle-
income countries. It shows how African countries lag behind in measures such as liquid liability 
to GDP, private credit to GDP and the number of accounts in formal financial institutions. 
However, it has outperformed its counterparts in mobile financial penetration. A critical view 
to the underpinning structures for the success of mobile finance in Africa is taken up below in 
the discussion on the illusions of financial inclusion amidst the infrastructure gap that exists in 
the continent in section 4.3.3. Nonetheless, it is evident that despite financial expansion and 
penetration, access to finance by businesses remains challenging in Africa. But the drivers of 
affordable finance have been abandoned, in the declining role of state-owned development 
banks in the provision of financial intermediation, abandonment of targeted credit to certain 
sectors of the economy and regulation on capital flows and interest rates. However, the 
financial system continues to be dominated by the private sector, short-term capital inflows 
from international markets, as African banks now expand into regional banks. Capital markets 
across the continent have continued to grow astronomically. The financial environment is also 
characterised by the rise of financial innovations such as mobile finance in Kenya, Nigeria and 
Uganda. And regulation is purported to have improved in these markets with close compliance 
to the Basel regulations. 
Some analyses have been made on the extent to which the financial sector in Africa has 
experienced crises. Griffith-Jones and Karwowski (2013) take the position that the financial 
sector in most African countries are yet to be hit by crises, especially the kind originating within 
them, with Nigeria being an exception. On the contrary, Ikhide (2015) draws on series of 
surveys that show that African countries have had their fair share of financial crises. These 
include Nigeria 1991-1995, Kenya 1993-1995, Uganda 1990, Cameroon 1987-1993, Cote 
d’Ivoire 1988-1991, Ghana 1982-1989 and Senegal 1988-1991. He linked the severity of the 
crises in each of these countries to their share of non-performing loans to total bank loans. 
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Given the more recent threshold analysis of the relationship between finance and growth, which 
concludes that finance starts to exert a negative influence on growth after a certain point, 
financial development is held to contribute positively to growth in most African counties, as 
they are categorised as underdeveloped. This has been tested for African countries. Ikhide 
(2015) uses the conventionally-embraced dynamic panel data methodology for a cross-country 
analysis of 21 sub-Saharan African countries between the period 1970 and 2013, controlling 
for country-specific effects and endogeneity, and arrive at a threshold by using a multiple 
equilibria model. The wide-ranging implications of these conclusions have been discussed in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis which covers the threshold analysis in detail. Nonetheless, the impact 
of increase in foreign capital flows to Africa is notably domestic price bubbles, exchange rate 
volatility and other markers of financialisation. The role of institutions in advancing financial 
development in Africa is taken up in the section that follows. 
 
4.3.1 Financial Development in the Washington and Post-Washington Consensus 
The Washington Consensus and its subsequent change in economic policy is seen here as one 
of the instruments for advancing financial development in Africa, and for development in 
general. Arestis (2005, p. 254) notes that the liberalisation agenda of the Washington 
Consensus, especially of finance, was highly underpinned by the McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973) argument of letting the market determine the allocation of credit without any 
intervention. In line with this, the policy recommendations of the Washington Consensus – 
referred to as its Ten Commandments – as summarised by Williamson (2003) are as follows: 
(1) fiscal discipline, (2) re-ordering public expenditure priorities, (3) tax reform, (4) 
liberalisation of interest rate, (5) financial liberalisation by way of capital inflow and foreign 
direct investment, (6) trade liberalisation, (7) competitive exchange rate, (8) privatisation, (9) 
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deregulation, and (10) property rights. It is however necessary that empirical evidence from 
countries/regions which have implemented these policies at different periods should form the 
valid basis on which to judge the policy approach of the Washington Consensus. 
Despite unfounded evidence, the IMF is relentless in pursuing the combination of these policies 
as conditionality for its loans for developing countries. This is echoed by The Wall Street 
Journal (2003), which rightly observes that the IMF has been consistent in tying its loans to 
conditions that favoured high taxes and the devaluation of currencies, which has resulted in 
austerity borne by the poor. This is besides meddling in local governance without 
understanding the intricacies of the political environments in these countries. This is found to 
further deepen the dependency of such countries on the IMF. Bayliss and Fine (2007) echo this 
in their argument that the policy of the Washington Consensus was to privatise as much of the 
public services as possible, especially in developing countries, without any attention to the 
complexities underpinning the provision of these services. 
Fine (2001) illustrates extensively the inconsistency of the World Bank, in its scholarship, 
ideology and rhetoric and, policy in practice, more especially for development. He further 
points out the impact of this inconsistency on the development literature by arguing that “the 
developmental thinking deriving from the World Bank […] has always distanced itself from” 
the issues of development which it seeks to address. Rather, through its “commitment to the 
Washington Consensus […] it set the analytical, ideological and policy agenda of market 
versus the state in which the developmental state situated itself on the opposite to the pro-
market side” (Fine, 2007a, p. 2). 
Thus, the financial liberalisation thesis advanced by the World Bank/IMF, despite its attendant 
criticisms, has largely shaped development policy in particular and the economics discipline in 
general. The insistence on liberalisation as expected, was followed by the development of all 
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manner of domestic financial institutions and instruments. This further enhanced the role of 
finance and private capital in economic activities. But the heightened role given to finance in 
development in the WC could not be justified, as evidence from countries revealed increase in 
macroeconomic instability and financial market inefficiency. Arestis (2005, p. 255) observes 
that the policy recommendation of the WC created the conditions conducive for excessive risk-
taking, and ended in bank failures. And the overarching impact on countries has been low 
growth, alarming rates of inequality and increasing poverty levels. Many African countries 
attest to this reality. 
The failures of the WC experience led to its revision, with the World Bank and IMF introducing 
institutional preconditions which should be in place before financial development is 
implemented. These include: adequate banking supervision which ensured that banks 
maintained the required reserves and have a well-diversified loan portfolio; macroeconomic 
stability, measured by low and stable inflation rates and a sustainable fiscal deficit; and the 
break-down of financial reforms into stages. Rodrik (2002) calls this the Augmented 
Washington Consensus, inferring that the former and latter may be more of the same. 
But Kuczynsky and Williamson (2003) are sceptical and argue that the movement from the 
WC to what became known as the post-Washington Consensus (PWC) will be rhetorical if 
reforms do not meet the following conditions: fiscal discipline must not be crisis-prone by 
being adopted alongside inflation-targeting; liberalisation policies should be gradual and 
phased; institutional reforms, financial reforms and banking supervision and enabling business 
environment determined by the government before the matured stage of liberalisation; and 
income distribution reform through extended property rights to informal sector, land reforms, 
SME credit and progressive taxation. In short, these accounts go far in demonstrating that the 
manner in which both the Washington- and post Washington -Consensus of the World Bank 
pursued a finance-growth nexus agenda was without regard for the negative impact of finance. 
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Nevertheless, Fine (2007a) is even more sceptical of the shift from the WC to the PWC. He 
points out that “between scholarship, advocacy and policy in practice, there are extreme 
limitations on the capacity of the post Washington Consensus” (p. 13). Because it “entrenches 
new modes of corporate governance and assessment of performance, privatisation and state 
support to it rather than public provision, lack of coherent and systematic industrial and 
agricultural policy, pressure for user charges for health, education and welfare, and priority to 
macroeconomic austerity to allow for liberalisation of financial capital” (p. 13). As such, he 
argues that “in practice, what the Bank proposed was less a rethink than a demand upon the 
state to use its own resources and capacities to facilitate further privatisation” (Fine, 2009 p. 
6). For example, the World Bank and IMF at this stage embarked on a massive shifting of 
infrastructural aid to “its private sector branches in order to leverage the participation of the 
private sector in public sector provision” (p. 6). This shift from public to private, he notes, is 
also evident in domestic pension reforms in 26 countries across Eastern Europe and Latin 
America, between 1992 and 2004. Thus, the shift from the WC to the PWC reveals an 
“increasingly sophisticated approach to teasing out as much private sector financial 
participation as possible whilst managing contentious demands for state support for social 
reproduction” (p. 7). In short, the movement from Washington- to post Washington -Consensus 
has been underpinned by a deliberate agenda that contains the role of the state in development 
while promoting private and international capital. 
In addition, Fine (2010, p. 24) observes that the trajectory of the shift has been characteristic 
of seeking greater relevance in mainstream economics, expanding the scope of interest of the 
World Bank across the economy and from the economy to the social, (mis)understanding the 
nature of development in its reliance on the market or its correction. Greater relevance is sought 
in its projection as a knowledge bank as it seeks relevance in developmental thinking, policy 
and ideology. But it does so in a variegated nature, as observed in the inconsistency across time 
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and space in the relationship between the Bank’s ideology, scholarship and policy in practice. 
For example, the shift from the ideology of discarding intervention in the markets in the WC, 
to more market intervention on the basis of correcting the market in the PWC, is undermined 
by the policy in practice of promoting private capital. As such, both the Washington and post-
Washington Consensuses have only offered a piecemeal understanding and often estranged 
from the issues of development (p. 24). 
Another area of inconsistency is the conditionality for borrowing from the Bank by advanced 
and developing countries, which command different sets of requirements. Such inconsistency 
is even more reflected across different sectors of the economy. This resonates with Van 
Waeyenberge, (2009) who found that the Washington and post-Washington Consensus 
command different sets of conditionality for investment, with relatively more stringent 
conditionality for welfare sectors such as education and health care. In fact, report shows that 
more than 50 percent of those eligible for social safeguards in developing countries, on the 
basis of their income, are excluded due to the proxy means test poverty targeting mechanism 
promoted by the IFIs (see Kidd et al., 2017). Given these lapses, the shift from the WC to the 
PWC is not to be seen only as mandated by the need to address the flaws of the former, but as 
being influenced also by the need to strengthen the role of finance and indeed, private capital 
in development. And this was without serious consideration of the immediate needs of 
developing countries, nor the best path for achieving development. 
 
4.3.2 Exclusion of Development Finance 
While the implementation of the WC and PWC meant advancing the role of finance in 
development and the exclusion or containment of the state from the development space, it had 
other consequences for the finance-growth nexus, for developing countries and, more generally 
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for the discipline of economics. It meant that development finance, as a form of financial 
intermediation, became excluded from the nexus literature and invariably neglected by policy 
makers as necessary for development. This was despite revisions made to the economic theory 
of development. As Fine (2007, p. 2) puts it, “development finance [ ] did not emerge 
triumphant from the demise of the Washington Consensus. Instead, it was ignored or 
outflanked by the past Washington Consensus, not least through a remarkable rewriting of 
intellectual history although one that is far from rare in the practices of the World Bank as it 
partially incorporates longstanding ideas in opposition to it and claims them as due to its own 
originality.” The issue then became whether the state has the required capacity and efficiency 
to adopt policies that will be beneficial for development and not drawn towards corruption, 
special interests and an agenda that promotes poverty and inequality. This debate on state 
inefficiency is long-standing. 
Thus, the literature of financial development was persistently removed from the domain of state 
involvement. While there has been some comparison of capital market versus bank-based 
finance, there is barely any such comparative analysis of development banking against other 
forms of finance, even in the much-needed context of developing countries. Initial arguments 
on forms of finance in the nexus were located around channelling finance through either capital 
market or commercial (and retail) banks. This became insufficient for analysing the 
relationship between finance and growth in different countries and regions. As such 
development finance was brought in to sustain the nexus argument. Barth, et al. (2004) and 
Demirguc-Kunt, et al. (2008) concluded that, although development banking leads to 
concentrated lending, it is also associated with lower growth and systemic fragility. They 
maintain that both the financial system and regulatory framework need to be managed by the 
market. The role of the state is thus seen to be only complementary, creating an environment 
for the private sector to thrive, by reducing transaction costs and information asymmetries. 
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These studies take the position that different forms of government intervention, not least 
directed credit, have the potential to encourage moral hazard, and as such could serve as 
disincentive for investment. 
But such views simply tow the argument of efficient markets versus inefficient states set by 
the WC and PWC without any country or regional evidence to support them other than 
econometric analyses. While the Global Financial Development Report (2013, p. 2) of the 
World Bank, acknowledges there are sound economic reasons such as social welfare for more 
active state involvement in the financial sector, it upholds that in practice the state does not 
intervene successfully. It outlines in detail the role of the state to include three main points: (i) 
Regulation and supervision through timely and anticipatory supervisory actions, 
complemented with market discipline (ii) Ensuring healthy competition through aligning 
“private incentives with public interests without taxing or subsidising private risk-taking” and 
“through healthy entry of well-capitalised institutions and timely exit of insolvent ones.” This 
includes the promotion of transparency of information in order to reduce counterparty risk. (iii) 
Strengthening financial infrastructure through lending by state-owned banks in downturns in 
order to stabilise aggregate credit. However, they caution that lending by state-owned banks 
leads to resource misallocation and deterioration of the quality of intermediation. But the 
Report ignores the simple fact that the market has also been even more inefficient, evidenced, 
not least by the GFC. 
On the contrary, Cull and Peria (2010) find empirical evidence that state-owned banks increase 
access to credit, which is necessary for targeting infrastructural development, sectorial 
development and boosting aggregate consumption in developing countries. Panizza (2013, p. 
16) argues that despite the economic profession’s consensus of the negative impact of state-
owned banks, we “actually know less than what we think we know [about] the relationship 
between state-ownership of banks and economic development”. He calls for the need to 
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ascertain the channels through which state-owned banks may affect economic and financial 
development. He points out the inconsistency in the profession’s approach by emphasising that 
the negative view of state-owned banks does not have a solid empirical justification, and that 
whatever criticisms have been raised of state-owned banks – like political and selective funding 
– also apply to multilateral development banks such as the World Bank and its affiliates. 
The discussion on state involvement in banking raises the question of how to best address the 
infrastructure gap that is a bane of the African continent. It stands out as a most pressing 
obstacle, without which development will not be realised. Thus, an implication of the shifting 
attention from development banks to commercial banks is the tendency to exclude the state 
from the development space and leave it to the private sector. To imply, therefore, through 
abandoning development banking, that the infrastructure gap in Africa can be filled primarily 
by the private sector is problematic, since the main objective of the private sector is profit-
making. The profit motive of commercial banks, and the private sector in general, means that 
many development objectives cannot be realised, because they are not necessarily profitable 
(especially in the short term), except where the burden of cost is transferred to consumers. 
The view that there is the need for financial development in low income countries to contribute 
to addressing the existing infrastructure gap is shared by Griffith-Jones and Karwowski (2013, 
p.5). They recognise “the need of a financial system in LICs that assures enough access to 
sustainable finance for the different sectors of the economy, including long term finance to 
fund structural change, as well as different segments, such as small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure.” 
But the abandonment of development banking has relegated the state to a decreasing role of 
maintenance of a regulatory environment for the private sector to thrive. Consequently, 
developmental state policies that are driven by infrastructure development are hindered. 
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Evidence of development in other places shows that the state played an important constructive 
role (in some cases, engaging the private sector in a multi-stakeholder approach) in the 
development experiences of countries in Europe, America and Asia (Chang and Grabel, 2014) 
with context-specific development plans. It is unsettling that such convincing historical 
“collective capabilities” and forms of state agencies, through which certain forms of finance 
have eliminated poverty in advanced nations of today, have been abandoned (Chang, 2002). 
Successful cases of state intervention also abound in developing countries, in the areas of 
subsidies provisions and development banking (see Bateman 2014a)  
Accordingly, since the early 2000s, there has been a decline in aid flows and Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa, targeted at development finance, and a 
corresponding rise in private capital in the name of Public Private Partnerships (PPP). Van 
Waeyenberge (2016) shows that this trend is underpinned by amendments from the IFIs and 
other multilateral organisations, of financing development through private capital instead of 
public finance. Despite the presumed allocation of finance through the private sector as 
potentially causal for development, what obtains in practice is the flow of finance into 
developing countries’ capital markets and certain industries mainly the extractive sectors. Such 
finance is targeted at short-term profit or exploitation. The result is increasing levels of 
inequality, and little or no improvements in the poverty levels in developing countries. 
 
4.4 (Illusions of) Financial Access and Inclusion 
The long-standing underpinning argument is that access to finance is a binding constraint on 
growth. Initial research in the area was focused on how certain socio-economic groups were 
discriminated against by financial institutions, and how financial capital was a means for 
creating and advancing class relations that undermine the poor (Dymski and Veitsch 1992, 
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Leyshon and Thrift 1996). Following this, proposals were made to address the discrimination 
of the poor in the financial system. Instead of addressing the structural factors that drive 
exclusion, the discussion shifted on individual accessibility and inability to afford materially 
and psychologically, the cost of financial inclusion (Gabor and Brooks, 2017). 
Financial inclusion has also been driven by some acknowledgement of the destabilising 
potential of private finance. In which case, proponents of financial expansion maintain the 
narrative that improved regulation and access to finance in developing countries will correct 
the misallocation of finance (Ikhide, 2015). Beck et al. (2005) alleged that finance is even more 
binding than other factors, for small- and medium-scale enterprises in less developed financial 
markets. Beck (2005) identifies SME finance as the channel through which finance affects 
growth positively, and Beck et al. (2006) found that finance allows small firms to expand and 
achieve larger equilibrium size by exploiting investment opportunities. So, financial inclusion 
narrative became focused on the expansion of financial services, products and literacy 
programmes and campaigns to the excluded, which comprised the poor and SMEs. 
There has also been some recognition of social context, especially Africa’s informal sector as 
necessitating financial inclusion in order to be addressed (AfDB, 2013). However, this ignores 
the underpinning structural factors of informal societies and focuses on the protection of private 
property right and incentivising businesses through tax cuts, low wages, reduced regulation 
and barriers to entry, as corrective mechanisms for businesses to formalise their activities22.  
While, the above arguments may seem logical, supported by the necessity for businesses to 
have access to finance in order to achieve economic growth, the literature conveys a misplaced 
understanding of financial access and inclusion, not least how financial access plays out in 





practice. According to the World Bank, financial inclusion means that individuals and 
businesses have affordable financial products and services that meet their (development) needs, 
delivered in a responsible and sustainable way. Access refers to the distribution and diffusion 
of finance in such a way that it reduces inequality, empowers women, generates local 
employment opportunities and increases growth. The first step to inclusion is said to be access. 
But these concepts are inadequately captured in empirical studies. For example, Beck and Cull 
(2014) measure access using the number of bank branches or financial institutions per square 
kilometre. And the IFIs measure inclusion by the number of loans (supposedly) disbursed to 
SMEs or in rural areas. 
The financial inclusion narrative is used to justify the role of finance in development, and 
advocates continue to use the above narrow measures. But this view of inclusion and access 
conveys some degree of naivety in that it abstracts development from the context-specific 
complexity of the development needs of the areas or individuals being investigated. This point 
is confirmed by Dos Santos and Kvangraven (2016) in the recent expansion of mobile banking 
across Africa. In addition, the view completely ignores the actual social relations that (may) 
derive from specific contexts and subsequently underpin the nature of financial development 
therein. At best, reference to the social context is misconstrued. It is deficient to affirm 
unequivocally that proximity to financial institutions, in of itself, has the potential to elicit 
positive outcomes for the poor, or because loans have been disbursed in rural areas, they have 
certainly gone to the poor and are beneficial to improving those societies. In a recent global 
survey conducted by the World Bank, it was found that 59% of adults without bank accounts 
do not have the money to maintain one23. Even the high transaction costs of financial 
intermediation discussed above is seen to prevent financial inclusion. 
                                                          
23 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/overview 
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Some studies, such as Roe (2006), erroneously assume that the problem of access and inclusion 
in African countries has been resolved in the ease at which domestic financial institutions raise 
capital from international capital markets and the growing prominence of micro credit 
institutions, alongside purported growth and macroeconomic stability. Allen et al. (2012), 
argue that financial development and indeed recent innovations in financial access such as 
mobile banking have been developmental and even helped to overcome the infrastructure gap 
in Africa. Such arguments simply undermine the extent to which infrastructure is lacking in 
Africa, and development dependent on it. They also exaggerate the role of private finance in 
bridging this gap. The recent rise in the number of cash machines and the much celebrated 
mobile payments systems in Africa is also misconstrued as a bridge of the infrastructure gap, 
in order to deliver financial access and inclusion. But the question is whether access to finance, 
at the expense of road, rail and other transport networks, is the infrastructure badly needed in 
Africa? In fact, the success of mobile banking in Africa cannot be ascribed to any other factor 
other than the incidence of the lack of infrastructure around the continent. Therefore, another 
way to view this penetration of finance, is to recognise that despite the lack of adequate 
transport facilities and other basic amenities, banks and other financial institutions have 
resiliently found their way into the lives of the poor. It is troubling to think of the power and 
dominance in the proficiency with which finance forcefully penetrates barriers with the aim of 
only expanding the cycle of financial expropriation. 
In light of financial penetration, many have pointed out that the plight of the poor has become 
the avenue for profiteering and accumulation (Gabor and Brooks, 2017, see also Elyachar 2012, 
Soederberg 2013), particularly with financial inclusion via digital finance (Kear 2013). Gabor 
and Brooks, (2017) put this succinctly in discussing ‘financial government’, in which financial 
inclusion is seen as a means for production of financial subjectivities for control and exercise 
of political power (see also Bayliss et al., 2017). Surely the inclusion of Africa’s poor into the 
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cycle of financial expropriation through the drive for inclusion and access without addressing 
poverty itself is simply to strengthen the control over their lives through the expansion of global 
capital. Thus, “financial inclusion as a development paradigm, therefore, envisages no material 
change in the (changing) structures that generate marginality, but rather seeks to channel 
individual behaviour, through digital surveillance and education, to engage and identify with 
these structures” (p. 432). The way in which financial inclusion is achieved further supports 
this claim. According to (Kear, 2013) this is achieved through surveillance of individual’s 
repayment capability and profiling (World Bank, 2015), a set of information which is then 
exploited to strengthen the hold on the poor. 
But not everyone who accesses credit, including microfinance is able to repay. As such, 
inclusion and access is found to lead to crisis. Cihak et al. (2016) found empirically a negative 
correlation between financial inclusion and financial stability, and draws the conclusion that 
financial inclusion policy should be accompanied by policies that enhance credit information. 
However, their study inadequately uses Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) as a measure of 
financial inclusion. The study narrowly acknowledges that NPLs are the cause of crises but 
ignores the fundamental role of asset bubbles from speculation as their main driver.  
 
4.4.1 Microfinance Banking 
Financial inclusion and access also underpin the rise of microfinance banking. The financial 
inclusion and access literature puts forward the narrative that finance can be made available to 
the poor, mainly through microcredit to raise average income, empower women, generate local 
employment opportunities, reduce inequality and create a sustainable bottom-up local 
economic and social development. Thus, micro-credit and microfinance banking gained 
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prominence, underpinned by the Local Economic Development24 (LED) agenda that emanated 
from the World Bank and other international donors, and propped up by mainstream 
economics. 
The LED approach to development ensured a popular abandonment of funding for state banks, 
sealing the relegation of development banking to a historical epoch in finance. By the late 
1980s, the World Bank advocated a full commercialisation of microcredit by insisting on full 
cost recovery.25 So, microcredit institutions became more market-oriented by: pursuing a profit 
motive that ensured that poor individuals could access as many loans as possible even when 
they could not repay; charging market-based interest rates; paying large rewards and salaries 
to senior staff akin to Wall Street style bonuses for shareholders; and engaging in international 
borrowing through large volume funding from the global investment community (Bateman, 
2014b, p. 97). The mass privatisation of local public services, promoted in the LED (including 
health, education, water, electricity, transport, among others), which restructured these entities 
into private for-profit businesses, further gave finance a new impetus in development. Local 
governments were encouraged and in many cases bullied into investing scarce resources for 
the appropriation of profit. Notwithstanding, the abysmal track record and failures of such 
policies in advanced economies (Pigeon, et al., 2002). 
It was within the above context that microfinance banking was embraced as soon as it was 
being introduced, modelled on Muhammad Yunus’ internationally-funded Grameen Bank in 
the late 1970s. Microfinance banking became known as a system of banking by specialised 
financial institutions which provide un-collaterised loans to groups of individuals, mostly 
                                                          
24 Bateman (2014a, p. 3) describes this as “the full panoply of local economic development units, business 
incubators, financial institutions for enterprise development, business support centres, SME Agencies, 
technology parks, industrial and agricultural extension services, Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), 
vocational education and training organisations, and so on.” 
25 A concept that dogmatically specifies that no entity functions in the market as anything other than a 
financially self-sustaining one. See Bateman (2014b, p. 96). 
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comprising the poor. These groups of individuals are not required to commit the same levels 
of asset required by commercial banks before loans are granted. Thus, the strength of this form 
of banking was supposed to be that the poor and SMEs could access finance, a daunting task 
for commercial banks. The argument for microfinance is that the poor and SMEs usually lack 
the required collateral to gain access to finance in the same way that they lack access to 
information in the market. 
However, Bateman notes that the microfinance model was embraced without vetting its claims 
of success nor any supporting empirical evidence. He argues that there is no evidence to suggest 
that microcredit has met its original objectives of generating significant local employment 
opportunities, increasing income and reducing inequality nor so far created any bottom-up 
development (Bateman, 2014b, p. 93). Instead, using South Africa as a case study for 
microcredit implementation, the level and experience of finance in these local environments is 
described as de-industrialising, informal, disconnected (from the poor) and primitive and 
funding further indebtedness consumption or emergency payments as opposed to SME activity 
(p. 94). 
The microfinance objective of addressing poverty is in question on the basis of what looks 
more like a drive for profit. Cull et al. (2009) and Buera et al. (2012) point out that most of the 
funding required to service the borrowing engaged in by these microfinance institutions are 
either from commercial banks seeking high returns on short-term capital, private for profit 
institutions or NGOs. Funding from the former will still be profit-driven and jeopardise the 
purpose of microfinance banking. For the latter, there is usually insufficient funding for the 
many poor and SMEs as they are reliant on subsidies. According to Aitken (2010), 
microfinance funds has become a way of diversifying portfolio by investors and financial 
institutions, as such, an avenue for financialisation. It is therefore susceptible to interest-bearing 
characteristics facing short-term finance, as providers of microfinance misallocate resources in 
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search for investment with the highest returns. The implications of interest-bearing capital for 
development is taken up below in section 4.6. 
Kaboski and Townsend (2011) show evidence for the above position in the high cost of 
securing funding for microfinance banking, with some repayments rates for these funds going 
as high as 97 per cent for several years. They caution that microfinance banking is only found 
to increase actual business investment for very few borrowers, given that most of their 
participants use the loans for consumption. The level of poverty and initial income of a 
household was a main determinant of whether they were able to start a business with a 
microfinance loan or not. Bateman and Chang (2012, p. 16) also found high interest of up to 
195 percent in microfinance borrowing, and argue that this can be a source of 
deindustrialisation as no robust business operation can survive such high interests other than 
unsophisticated businesses like trade. These high interest rates show the level of financial 
expropriation in the microfinance industry. 
Nevertheless, the number of borrowers from microfinance institutions in Africa rose from 1.6 
million people in 2003 to 8.5 million in 2009 (Roe, 2016). Buera et al. (2012) note that there 
was up to 29 percent growth in access to microfinance between 1997 and 2006, with about 
3,552 institutions serving 155 million borrowers globally by 2010. They estimated that this 
would have a positive impact on around 533 million people. They use a model of 
entrepreneurship that factors in a priori the positive impact of financial development. This 
model assumes that microfinance is a form of “financial intermediation technology that 
guarantees access to—and full repayment of—productive capital up to a limit, regardless of 
their collateral or entrepreneurial talent” (p. 3). They find significant positive aggregate and 
distributional impact of microfinance. In general equilibrium, it leads to low savings and capital 
accumulation, causing exit of low productivity entrepreneur due to higher wages and, increase 
in TFP. This proposes that microfinance is a redistributive policy that benefits the poor, 
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consisting of small-scale entrepreneurs and low-income earners, through higher wages, but 
potentially increases the factor costs of large-scale entrepreneurs. In partial equilibrium, they 
find a positive impact of microfinance on capital, demand for labour and output, but negative 
impact on TFP. Overall, microfinance is said to have a positive impact on consumption and 
output. 
However, the study ignores the abstracted assumptions underpinning partial and general 
equilibrium theory and includes another far-reaching assumption that financial intermediaries 
will make zero profit. In practice, these will not hold in the case of microfinance banking in 
light of profit motivation. Also, the decrease in the number of entrepreneurs in their general 
equilibrium result is attributed to higher wages that serve as a barrier to entry of unproductive 
entrepreneurs. Again, this can only be an assumption, as it is difficult to ascertain the actual 
causal factors for reduction in the number of successful entrepreneurs, notwithstanding 
increased cost through wages.  
Buera et al. (2012) are right to note that theories in the microfinance literature have comprised 
‘joint liability testing’, ‘high frequency repayment’ and the so-called ‘dynamic incentives’ 
which are conditional loans linked to meeting other requirement, such as keeping children in 
school. They note that neither of these empirical approaches has produced a definitive answer 
on the factors that ensure repayments of loans are made. A lot of the empirical studies on 
microfinance banking are based on randomised interventions. These form the basis upon which 
conclusions are drawn. The main technique used is Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs), as 
in Banerjee et al. (2015), which found that small business investments and profits of pre-
existing businesses increased while consumption did not, neither did education, health or 
women’s empowerment. Notwithstanding the partial negative results in the above study, the 
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method has been shown to produce different results in uncontrolled contexts (Deaton and 
Cartwright, 2016) 
Admittedly, in a World Bank report by Demirguc-Kunt, et al. (2008), it became obvious that 
the impact of microfinance on the poor does not solve the issues identified with finance, namely 
access, inclusion and efficiency of allocation, let alone financial under-development. What was 
evident in the microfinance setting was that the funding given to the poor was used to finance 
daily needs instead of funding credit. In practice most microcredit borrowers redirect their 
loans to healthcare, education, food and other subsistence (Beck and Ogden, 2007). As such, 
Chang and Bateman, (2012, p. 18) argue, that it is excessively overambitious to ignore the 
reality of the survivalist level of subsistence in Africa, and the hostile political structures that 
confront development initiatives. The belief in a direct positive impact of microfinance on 
development also assumes that supply elastically creates its demand in these societies, ignoring 
the demand constraint that exists. This speaks to the need to rethink the microfinance agenda, 
since extreme levels of subsistence in African countries implies that households cannot scale 
the obstacle of infrastructural and systemic divide that prevents them from being entrepreneurs 
from small loans. 
 
4.5 A Case Study: Financial Development in Nigeria. 
Financial liberalisation in Nigeria dates back to the structural adjustment programme of the 
1980s, characterised by interest rate liberalisation, increase in credit allocation through a 
market-based financial system, and the emphasis on competition, efficiency and (constrained) 
regulation (Ikhide, 1997). Some research has investigated the impact of financial liberalisation 
on growth in Nigeria. More often than not, these studies arrive at positive results. These include 
the work of Odedokun (1989) who employs the Granger-causality test on quarterly data of 50 
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observations from 1970 to 1983 to investigate the relationship between financial aggregates 
and economic activities in Nigeria. He found different degrees of responsiveness of economic 
variables to financial development. Agu and Chukwu (2009) extend the analysis on financial 
depth and economic growth in Nigeria by investigating the years 1971 to 2008. They use the 
multivariate VECM to analyse causality through loan deposit ratio and bank deposit liabilities 
and show a stable long-run relationship. 
An analysis of the deregulation of the banking sector in Nigeria in the period 1993-2008 was 
carried out by Zhao and Murinde (2011). They find that deregulation together with prudential 
regulation increases risk taking among banks, making them more productive. They also showed 
that excessive risk taking would decrease and efficiency increases as competition increases. 
The ever-increasing inefficiency in the Nigerian banking sector despite increased competition 
shows that in practice, their conclusion hardly obtains. These and many other studies focus 
mostly on the use of econometric techniques to analyse the finance-growth nexus, with little 
acknowledgement of the limitations of this approach. However, Ikhide (1997) does a 
qualitative study, citing reliability of data points in Nigeria as limitations of econometric 
studies – and as the only reason for a qualitative study. 
It is tempting to continue the tradition of econometric studies with more recent data (on 
Nigeria), following previous methods to show whether banking activities, and finance in 
particular, contribute to growth, as mostly obtains in the literature. However, a more robust 
analysis of the drivers of the expansion in the financial sector in Nigeria and the corresponding 
impact on development is needed to corroborate existing econometric investigations. While 
there is some acknowledgement of the disconnection between financial development and 
economic growth, with this being mainly ascribed to insufficient regulation, there is no work 
on the detrimental effects of fast expanding finance in Nigeria. In general, there is paucity of 
research that discusses financialisation in the emerging and small open economies, particularly 
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in Africa. A few studies find heterogeneous characteristics of financialisation in different 
countries, with distinct forms between advanced and developing economies. Lapavitsas 
(2009a) associates financialisation in developing countries with the shift from bank- to market-
based financial systems, which derives from the pursuit of capital market development in the 
WC. 
In the case of African countries, South Africa has often been the centre of focus, understandably 
due to its relatively larger financial market. For example, Karwowski and Stockhammer (2016) 
investigate the nature of financialisation in South Africa. Their research focuses on changes 
over time around the financial regulation landscape of the country, capital flows, asset price 
and market volatility, changes in forms from bank- to market-based finance, debt levels of 
financial and non-financial corporations and household indebtedness. They note that previous 
critical analysis of financial development, “stress the destabilising effects of financial activity, 
highlighting pervasive unemployment, endogenous business cycles and financial instability as 
features of capitalist economies” (p. 8). 
As seen from the literature, most of these studies on financial development in Nigeria still focus 
arduously on issues such as the measure used, causality, and relegated to complex econometric 
techniques. Despite a place for these, recent issues of finance such as the financial crisis in high 
income countries, the rise of vested interest and corresponding increase in inequality in 
developing countries, shows that the debate must advance beyond the choice of existing 
variables for financial development to actually ascertaining the welfare impact of finance on 
growth, and fundamentally rethinking existing measures of financial development. It is also 
vital to understand the nature of financial development and the processes involved. A political 
economy study of the financialisation of the Nigerian economy is therefore necessary for 
understanding why financial expansion has not delivered economic development in Nigeria. 
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As such, this analysis contributes to the financialisation literature by focusing on Nigeria. This 
is necessary owing to the importance of the Nigerian economy as the largest economy by GDP 
in sub-Saharan Africa. It reviews the literature on financial development in Nigeria, showing 
the impressive use of dominant econometric techniques in the literature. It discusses the 
evolution of the financial system in Nigeria, not least banking sector recapitalisation, and 
argues that desired economic development has been increasing removed despite financial 
development in the country. 
 
4.5.1 History of Financial Development in Nigeria – The Banking Sector 
The establishment of the African Banking Corporation in 1892, among other foreign banks, 
was the advent of banking in Nigeria (Beck et al., 2005). A number of domestic banks were 
established in the 1930s and this led to a surge of banking activities. The Banking Ordinance 
came into effect in 1952 to regulate and boost banking activities. Following this, the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) was created in July 1959 to regulate the banking industry, as the 
country prepared for its independence from the colonial government. The indigenisation policy 
of the government that followed in 1972 was an attempt, amongst others, to reduce the 
dominance of foreign banks in the Nigerian banking sector and transfer ownership to its 
citizens. However, many have alleged that alongside the indigenisation policy, the banking 
sector was also characterised by interest rate setting and other forms of financial repression. 
This is said to have contributed to the economic crisis that necessitated the adoption of the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) by the mid-1980s. However, this argument ignores 
the slump in global oil price at the time, and its impact on the Nigerian economy, which had 
become an oil exporter. The argument also ignores the reality of weak states and 
underdeveloped institutions in African countries at the time, a legacy of colonialism. 
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According to the Central Bank of Nigeria (2004), the weak macroeconomic environment in the 
country at the time meant that the adoption of the SAP, as fully delineated by the international 
financial institutions, could not be avoided. Thus, it is alleged that it was necessary for the 
banks to be fully liberalised in order to promote savings and allocate such efficiently to the 
most productive investments. Nonetheless, the foregoing liberalisation of the banking sector 
saw an increase in the number of banks in the country by 1987, as the conditions for licensing 
were relaxed to allow easier registration. Interest rates were also deregulated in August of the 
same year. The combination of these factors caused a sharp growth in credit in the economy. 
Therefore, what seemed like an economic development strategy in the SAP created the 
conditions for the explosion of private finance. In line with the SAP, the government continued 
its privatisation exercise by selling its equities in eight commercial banks and six merchant 
banks by 1992. The surge in banking activities within this period led to the establishment of 
the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), which was tasked with the objective of 
insuring depositors and boosting public confidence in the banking sector. 
The financial boom in the Nigerian banking industry following privatisation, saw a rise in rent-
seeking and arbitrage activities, as opposed to traditional banking, which prompted the 
government to re-nationalise the banks in a bid to clean up the industry. A failed bank decree 
was then established for prosecuting banking misconduct (Beck et al., 2005). After the 
country’s transition to a democratic rule in 1999, many of its bureaucrats and politicians, 
comprising free market enthusiasts from the private sector and IFIs, alleged that the failure of 






Figure 4.1: Bank Credit Growth in Nigeria (1960-2016) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
 
As such, another banking consolidation process was embarked upon between July 2004 and 
December 2005, with the objective of strengthening domestic banks to be able to finance large 
long-term capital projects. This directive for recapitalisation of all Deposit Money Banks 
(DMBs) in Nigerian saw a 1250 per cent rise in paid up capital. It was underpinned by the four-
year (2003-2007) medium term development plan, the National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy (NEEDS). It laid down the strategy for linking development to the 
grassroots with its complementary State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy 
(SEEDS) and Local Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (LEEDS). The 
banking consolidation process in this period required each bank, through a combination of 
mergers, acquisitions and offers to recapitalise to the tune of N25 billion (approximately $200 
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But domestic credit as a percentage of GDP advanced by banks rose sharply in the period 
leading up to the GFC in 2008, as shown in figure 4.1, due largely to the recapitalisation 
exercise in the Nigerian banking sector, and remains high. Consequently, there has been a rise 
in non-performing loans (NPLs) as percentage of GDP evidenced by figure 4.2. This saw a 
corresponding spike in the period leading up to and preceding the GFC. Also, non-performing 
loans as percentage of gross loans also rose significantly in the same period, from 9.5% in 2007 
to about 30% in 2009. Although the percentage of non-performing loans to gross loans 
decreased in the period 2011-2015, due largely to the recent economic recession in the country, 
it has shown an upward trajectory since 2015. 
Griffith and Karwowski. (2013, p.22-23) show that the capitalisation achieved following the 
2004-2005 banking recapitalisation exercise in Nigeria was high even by advanced economy 
standards. The availability of capital alongside rising oil prices led to excessive credit creation 
at alarming speed to different sectors of the Nigerian economy, but with little impact on growth. 
Private credit tripled from 12 percent to 36 percent between 2006 and 2009, with domestic 
credit to the private sector growing by almost five times in real terms. This private credit was 
channelled towards consumer loans, credit cards and purchase of shares. The sharp rise in credit 
is said to contribute significantly to the systemic banking crisis experienced in 2009, in which 
nine banks were bailed out by the CBN at the cost of $4 billion. Today many Nigerian banks 
have grown into regional banks dominating the African banking system, and expanding their 
branches across Europe and the USA. Some are listed (raising capital) on stock exchanges 






Figure 4.2: Bank Loan Performance in Nigeria (20017-2017) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
The presence of Nigerian banks in foreign capital markets and their expansion into the rest of 
Africa, Europe and America, an undertaking that was hitherto the preserve of Western financial 
institutions and a few South African banks but now increasingly dominated by Nigerian banks, 
may be a significant process of the international financialisation of its economy. The extent to 
which this internationalisation of Nigerian banks has contributed to the financialisation of its 
economy needs to be ascertained, including the financial instruments with which this process 
has been made possible. And how this bank internationalisation has been affected by existing 
hierarchical structure of the financial system, as highlighted by Powell (2013) and 






















4.5.1.2 Microfinance Banking in Nigeria 
The history of microcredit schemes in Nigeria dates back to the mid-1970s, when the CBN 
encouraged commercial banks to direct credit to certain sectors like agriculture – backed by 
Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS) of 1977. With the shift towards private finance, 
these schemes were soon left to the private sector. Many informal lending schemes developed, 
such as savings clubs/pools, Esusu, Ajo and other money lenders (CBN, 2017). There was also 
a rise in financial scams like pyramid schemes promising quick and ambitious return on 
investments. By the early 2000s, the Muhammed Yunus type microfinance banking story had 
spread across Nigeria, proclaimed successful by analysts, mainstream media and the IFIs. With 
only about 35 percent served by formal financial institutions and the need for a grassroots 
development plan, the government was set to adopt microfinance banking. In 2005, the 
Microfinance Policy, Regulatory and Supervisory Framework for Nigeria was adopted. This 
led to an expansion of microfinance banking. The recapitalisation exercise of the banking 
sector also required microfinance banks to have a minimum paid up capital of about $2million 
and 10 percent reserve ration with the CBN. 
This saw massive inflow of capital from domestic and foreign commercial and investment 
banks and NGOs. Microfinance banking spread across all nooks and crannies of Nigeria as 
private capital found an avenue into households and small businesses. Interestingly, many 
commercial bank managers who could not meet the required paid up capital for commercial 
banks, or had lost their positions through mergers and acquisitions in the commercial banks, 
found an avenue to return to banking. They brought with them the practices and profit motive 
of commercial banking, earning the same salary scales and allowances while in the business of 
microfinance. The same goes for the way in which interest rates were set by these microfinance 
banks, same or just short of commercial banks rates. In the ultimate pursuit of profit, as opposed 
to enabling development through SME finance, many of these institutions went to the stock 
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market to raise extra funds as they sought to expand their branches into other states and regions 
of the country. 
By 2007, many of the microfinance banks experienced high rates of defaults from their 
customers as they were unable to repay loans given to them due to high interest rates. There 
was only a marginal increase in the percentage of those serviced by financial institutions, from 
35 percent in 2005 to 36.3 percent in 2010 (CBN, 2017), despite proliferation of microfinance 
banking. What followed were many bank failures. This caused the CBN to clamp down on the 
practices of microfinance banking. It was discovered that many of the banks did not pay the 
full capital requirement before being granted licences. Others had taken up mortgages and car 
financing collaterised by their microfinance businesses and were soon unable to service these 
facilities. The failure of microfinance banking in Nigeria caused a revision through the 
Microfinance Policy, Regulatory and Supervisory Framework in 2011. The revised regulatory 
framework extended the monitoring of microcredit to cover informal schemes and tightening 
reporting requirements for microfinance institutions. Still, the number of microfinance banks 
in Nigeria stands at about 600 and is set to increase, as the country continues dogmatically to 
pursue financial development in this form. 
 
4.5.2 History of Financial Development in Nigeria – The Capital Market 
Nigeria’s financial development has evolved from early domination by the banking sector at 
inception to one complemented by a thriving capital market. The process surrounding this 
evolution is not less than dramatic. The history of the Nigerian capital market goes back to the 
establishment of the Lagos Stock Exchange in 1960, now known as the Nigeria Stock Exchange 
(NSE). It is licensed under the Investment and Securities Act (ISA) and regulated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (The Nigerian Stock Exchange, 2016). Ikhide 
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(1997) points out that the Nigerian capital market is made up of the securities and non-securities 
markets. The securities market is said to comprise debentures, government bonds and is 
dominated by shares of private enterprises. The non-securities market is made up of savings, 
mortgage and development banks and insurance companies, trading in term loans, mortgages 
and leases. Ikhide gives a detailed overview of the history of the Nigerian capital market, 
discussing widely the impact of interest rate deregulation, privatisation, debt conversion 
programmes and efficiency of the capital market, in one of the early assessments of the impact 
of capital market liberalisation on economic growth in Nigeria. He concludes that it is unclear 
whether the improvements in the institutional and asset pricing characteristics can be attributed 
to financial liberalisation. 
He notes that some early legislations gave rise to capital market development in Nigeria. These 
include the Income Tax Management Act of 1961 which guaranteed tax exemptions for pension 
and provident funds that held a third, and subsequently 50 percent, of their total investment in 
government securities. The Trustee Investment Act of 1962 also ensured that Trustees invested 
in government securities listed on the stock exchange. Also, among these was the Insurance 
(Miscellaneous Provision) Act 1964 which required insurance companies to invest a minimum 
of 40 percent of their funds in Nigerian securities, of which 25 percent should be in government 
securities (p.6). The Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree (NEPD) of 1972 (and revised in 
1997), also referred to as the indigenisation policy, has also been noted by many, to be causal 
to the boost in the capital market in the period leading up to the structural adjustment 
programme. It opened up the market to local participants, which led to a capital market growth 
of about 45 percent in the value of securities traded between 1972 and 1977. 
According to Ikhide (1997, p.13) the privatisation programme in the SAP, heralded by the 
report of the Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation (TCPC), now 
known as the Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE), impacted the growth of the Nigerian capital 
185 
 
market immensely. The report of the committee led to the enactment of the Privatisation and 
Commercialisation Decree 25 of 1988. What followed was full and part privatisation of 67 and 
25 companies, respectively – comprising finance, petroleum, construction, agriculture, 
tourism, manufacturing, and services – and full and part commercialisation of fourteen and 
eleven federal government enterprises, respectively. 
These factors boosted activities in the Nigerian capital market. The number of listed companies 
grew from 93 to 153 between 1972 and 1992, and the number of securities grew from 163 to 
251 between 1981 and 1992, amidst more involvement and speculation by the private sector. 
In fact, new equity share issues as a percentage of gross national savings rose from 6.2 percent 
to about 17.5 percent in the same period. The ratio of market capitalisation to GDP also 
increased from about 1.8 percent between 1972 and 1975 to 7.8 between 1986 and 1990 
(Ikhide, 1997). 
 
Figure 4.3: Market capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies in Nigeria (US$) 
 














Following the above developments, trading in the Nigerian stock market was decentralised and 
expanded throughout the country in 1997, as new trading floors were opened in the other 
regions of the country – Kaduna in the north and Port Harcourt in the East, in addition to the 
western region of Lagos. The market was said to be poised to deliver development and reduce 
national inequality through efficient resource allocation. But this developmental objective was 
soon relegated, if not lost, to a different set of objectives, market speculation and profiteering. 
The banking recapitalisation exercise of 2004-2005 also saw market capitalisation in the NSE 
rise sharply (figure 4.3) as all banks were listed on the stock exchange. There are currently 254 
securities listed on the NSE, comprising equities, bonds and Exchange Traded Products 
(ETFs),26 with a total market capitalisation of about $54billion and about 50 percent average 
value daily trade. It is dominated by the financial services sector. Foreign flows by March 2017 
into the NSE stands at 46.4 percent, up from an average 46.2 percent in 2015. Foreign Portfolio 
Investment (FPI) inflow27 currently grows at about 2.5 times FPI outflow. The NSE is a 
member of many international and regional securities commissions, exchanges and financial 
regulatory organisations. 
 
4.5.3 Financialisation through Bank Credit Allocation in Nigeria 
Financialisation in Nigeria can be traced back to the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
of the late 1980s, put forward as a development policy, advanced by the World Bank and the 
IMF. This development agenda was accompanied by banking liberalisation, which was the 
                                                          
26 These are derivatively priced securities or actively managed funds on a stock exchange, benchmarked to 
indices, stocks, commodities or interest rates, and traded intraday. 
27 The FPI outflow includes sales transactions or liquidation of portfolio investments through the stock market, 
whilst the FPI inflow includes purchase transactions on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (Equities only) (Nigerian 
Stock Exchange, 2017). 
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major basis for financial development and the expansion of credit in the country. Credit became 
easily accessible with the banking sector and capital market providing the platform for ease of 
penetration mainly for pursuing higher returns, but such credit was not targeted at the real 
sector of the economy but directed at certain high-yield sectors and financial assets for short-
term profit. One implication of this development was that the Nigerian economy experienced 
enormous growth, especially in the 2000s, but also increasing fluctuations, driven by financial 
expansion. This is depicted below in figure 4.4, which shows annual growth rates in Nigeria, 
with sharp rise between 2004-2005 due to the impact of the banking recapitalisation exercise. 
 
Figure 4.4: Annual growth rates in Nigeria (1960-2017) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
The expansion of finance after the 2004 banking consolidation in Nigeria increased the 
penetration of finance into households and other non-financial corporations (NFCs). There was 
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private and corporate purchase of assets from the NSE by households. Similar explosion of 
household credit in other regions have been considered markers of financialisation (Lapavitsas, 
2009b; Gabor, 2013). Asset management companies emerged in droves to broker mortgage 
refinancing, oil and gas-related speculation and other instruments, bundling together all manner 
of short-term financial assets. Commercial banks provided loans of up to 300 per cent equity 
contribution to customers buying shares from the primary and secondary capital markets. 
Banking halls became platforms for trading all kinds of financial and non-financial instruments 
as commercial banks engaged in forex trading (both in physical locations and online), mobile 
phone top up cards, lottery cards, and other short-term assets. This shows the far-reaching 
extent to which financial profit was pursued in the Nigerian banking sector. The sale of mobile 
phone top-up and lottery cards in banking halls was later stopped by the CBN, but trade on 
financial instruments of all sorts continued. Figure 4.5 shows the consistent increase in private 
credit in Nigeria. This tripled from 12 percent to 36 percent between 2006 and 2009. Despite a 
dip between 2014 and 2015, due to economic recession in the country, credit to the private 










Figure 4.5: Credit Growth in Nigeria 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria. 
 
Therefore, financial accumulation, emanating from international and domestic capital and 
development banks, including deposit money banks, fuelled the economy through 
microfinance banks, mobile money systems and other hybrid forms, supposedly targeting the 
poor with the aim of delivering development. But this is mostly diverted away from productive 
activities and development in general through the capital market and speculative activities of 
commercial and investment banks in pursuit of high yield. This can broadly be descried as the 
one way of viewing the process of financial accumulation in Nigeria. Figure 4.6 below presents 







































































Source: Author’s arrangement. 
 
One implication of this process of financial accumulation in Nigeria is that targeted 
development objectives are not met, despite increase in financial investments. For example, the 
growth in capital mobilisation in Nigeria, measured by capital formation between the periods 
1970-75 and 1986-90 was only a meagre 1.1 to 1.6 percent. Also, divergence between stock 
market capitalisation and gross fixed capital formation grew sharply from 41.1 percent in 1980 
to around 119.6 percent in 1985 (Ikhide, 1997, p.25-26). Figure 4.7 traces the divergence 
between stock market capitalisation and capital mobilisation percentages of GDP in the 


























Figure 4.7: Divergence between Stock Market capitalisation and capital mobilisation 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
There has also been an increasing divergence between finance contribution to GDP relative to 
real output as finance value added in output continues to grow disproportionately from value 
added in manufacturing. This is shown in figure 4.8, with the rate of change in finance value 
added higher than manufacturing value added. Finance value added also shows more volatility 
relative to manufacturing value added. This is particularly problematic and has been a marker 
of financialisation in many countries, as pointed out by Stockhammer (2004) who points out 
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Figure 4.8: Divergence Between Finance and Manufacturing Value Added 
 
Source: National Accounts Official Country Data, United Nations Statistics Division. 
 
In terms of value addition to GDP and besides the decline in accumulation of real investment, 
a corresponding disproportionate accumulation is seen to occur between manufacturing and the 
services sector, considered the non-real sectors of the economy. This is depicted in figure 4.9, 
which shows a divergence between value added of manufacturing and services. These trends 
show that value added in services relative to manufacturing has not only diverged but the 
proportion of this divergence has been on the increase since the post-crisis period of 2009. 
This is telling of the nature of financialisaton by accumulation in the Nigerian economy. The 
non-material productivity in the services industry (except for construction and tourism 
services) makes it unable to absorb the residual low-wage labour that arises from a decline in 
the manufacturing sector (Hallward-Driemeier and Nayyar (2017). The impact of declining 
manufacturing value added in output in Nigeria is that its unemployment rate has been on the 
rise and is seen to have increased steadily from 6.4 per cent in January 2015 to 18.8 per cent at 
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financialisation phenomenon around the link between decline in productive investments and 
negative impact on employment and wages can be seen in the studies of Demir (2007) and 
Araujo, et al., (2012) in a regulationist approach for the case of Brazil.  
 
Figure 4.9: Divergence Between Manufacturing and Services 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
It is necessary to note that the disproportionate growth in services in Nigeria can be linked, at 
least in part, to a corresponding disproportionate allocation of bank credit to the private sector 
as a percentage of GDP. Figure 4.10 is a graphical representation of bank credit allocation. 
From 2015Q1-2017Q328, allocation to services is in the range of five times that of 
manufacturing, at about 60 per cent of total credit by banks. Services is followed by the oil and 
gas sector as highest recipient. These reflect the contribution of different industries to Nigeria’s 
                                                          
28 Quarterly data for the period 2015-2017 is used in this analysis due to the unavailability of annual data 
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GDP. Bank credit to these two sectors is evidence of the financial sector’s preference for high 
yield, non-productive investment. Therefore, financialisation in Nigeria may be defined by this 
disproportionate allocation of bank credit between the real sector and other sectors, essentially 
services. Therefore, the banking sector has been a main driver of financialisaton in the case of 
Nigeria. 
 
Figure 4.10 Sectoral Allocation of Credit in Nigeria  
 
Source: Author’s Compilation from National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) 
Note: ‘Services’ in Bank credit to the private sector as categorised by the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 
comprises construction, trade/general commerce, government services, real estate, finance, insurance and 
capital market, education services, oil and gas, power and energy services, information and communication, 
transportation and storage, general services and others. 
 
Furthermore, within the allocation of bank credit to services, FIRE attract the largest proportion 
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credit to the private sector (see appendix 4 and 5). This disproportionate allocation of bank 
credit to the FIRE sectors reflects the growing influence of finance in the economy and another 
area of departure for analysing financialisaton in the Nigerian economy. 
 
4.5.4 Wither Nigeria’s Finance-Growth Nexus? 
But the role of finance as undermining the country’s economic structure in its deficient 
allocation has hardly been a subject for consideration. As the country considers its path into 
the future, it is evident that it retains a financial inclusion strategy that is in line with the 
mainstream rhetoric of promoting finance without considering its impact on broader 
development. According to the CBN (2017) the importance of microfinance banking derives 
from its potential for economic development, particularly in promoting poverty reduction, 
employment generation, wealth creation and improving the welfare and general standard of 
living of the poor. As at 2008, about 53 percent of the adult population in Nigeria were excluded 
from financial services. Such simplistic measures of development make inclusion erroneously 
reduced to access to forms of payment and availability of financial services such as insurance, 
mobile payment services, and bank branches. This objective of financial inclusion has been 
stipulated in a National Financial Inclusion Strategy, launched on the 23rd of October 2012, 
with a target of increasing the percentage of adult Nigerians with access to financial services 
from 21.6 to 70 percent by 2020. It also includes targets of 24 to 60 percent for access to 
savings, 2 to 40 percent for access to credit, 1 to 40 percent for insurance services and 5 to 40 
percent for pension in the same period. These targets are said to reduce the exclusion rate by 
20 percent. 
The achievement of this objective by 2020 is said to be dependent on a collaboration with 
deposit money banks and microfinance banks and mobile money operators, within a framework 
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comprising telecommunication providers and the Ministry of Agriculture. Targets have been 
set for DMBs to increase the number of bank branches from 6.8 to 7.6 per 100,000 adults and 
microfinance banks to increase the number of branches from 2.9 to 5.5 per 100,000 adults, with 
the aim of mainly locating these branches in the rural and under-served areas. ATMs are to 
increase from 11.8 to 203.6 units per 100,000 adults and POS terminals from 13.3 to 850 units 
per 100,000. For this to be achieved, the number of mobile agents would also have to increase 
from zero to 62 units per 100,000 adults by 2020. 
However, the way in which inclusion continuous to be measured remains inadequate, with the 
assumption that nearness or access guarantees income. Therefore, such financial inclusion 
policy aimed at poverty reduction through increasing the penetration of finance into households 
and SMEs is again misplaced for a development plan, and over-ambitious. Although the policy 
recognises the infrastructure gap for accomplishing the set targets, underscored by lack of 
power and telecommunication facilities, it is silent on the provision of these infrastructures or 
how they can best be provided. 
Despite financial development in Nigeria, growth in real output and wages have declined. Even 
the rise in GDP in Nigeria analysed against other measures of development, such as poverty 
and inequality, show a very weak and underdeveloped economy. Nigeria still ranks very low 
on many development indices, and it is among the poorest countries in the world according to 
the World Bank, with about 60 percent of the population living on less than $1 a day as at 2012 
according to the country’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Unemployment rate in 2017 is 
14.2 percent, with youth unemployment at 47.40 percent. This state of development in the 
country is despite findings of a positive relationship between financial development and 
growth, said to be evidenced-based through fanciful econometrics. 
197 
 
It suffices to say that the financialisation of the Nigerian economy has not caused development. 
The combination of financial reforms misplaced as development plans and the ensuing 
expansion of financial markets point not just to the financialisation of the Nigerian economy, 
but in fact the financialisation of Nigeria’s development. This is because of the tendency to 
divert much needed development finance into commercial banks for short-term investments 
and equities for speculation in pursuit of high yield. And the high cost of financial 
intermediation characteristic of developing countries, and evident in Nigeria, means that SMEs 
and the poor are unable to access credit. There is also polarisation and discrimination on cost 
of financial intermediation in Nigerian banks, where different accounts are assigned different 
interest rates and charges on transactions depending on the account balance. This ensures that 
the poor end up paying proportionately more than the rich subsidising them. 
What is obvious, is that there is no substantial improvement in the standard of living in the 
communities experiencing so-called innovations in financial development and extreme poverty 
perseveres. So, despite so-called inclusion and access, the poor continue to be alienated from 
the gains of financial development. Only a few people who control finance are enriched. The 
pertinent point then needs to be made: financial inclusion and access without a re-distributive 
element is rhetorical. Countries continue to be further removed from development as they 
pursue financial development policies. It is therefore necessary to rethink mainstream financial 
development narrative and change the approach, as the financialisation of Africa’s 
development is unlikely to deliver desirable outcomes even in the future. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the relationship between finance and growth in Africa by first 
presenting an overview of the development space in the continent and then tracing the link 
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from this environment to the factors underpinning the expansion of finance in Africa. Clearly, 
the literature is not focused on fixing the problems that may have caused instabilities in 
advanced economies or uneven development. Instead it is focused on recommendations of 
financial expansion for low- and middle-income countries. The role of the IFIs and the World 
Bank is seen as advancing a positive finance-growth nexus and the shifts in economic theory 
from the WC to the PWC. The limitations of this revisionism come to the fore in the dissenting 
voices around this shift. But more importantly, the incoherence between scholarship, policy 
and ideology in practice speaks to the ideological and policy insistence on private finance for 
development.  
Measures of financial development in the literature are seen to be inadequate in capturing the 
real forms of finance in Africa. And the concepts, not least financial inclusion and access, used 
to advance financial development is more rhetorical as supposed to a genuine and concise 
agenda of delivering development. The experience of microfinance banking as the main 
channel of achieving inclusion and access provides evidence of the ineffectiveness of the 
mainstream approach to financial development. Closely associated with the drive for financial 
inclusion in Africa is a misplacement of financial policies for development policies. The impact 
of this misplacement is the redirection of efforts and resources away from actual development 
into the financial system, which is then used for speculation and expropriation.  
The form and processes underpinning financial development in Africa is further investigated 
through the case of Nigeria. Investigation into financial development in Nigeria, not least 
microfinance banks has been met with data availability challenge. Nonetheless, the impact of 
this process is evident in the expropriation and uneven allocation of finance in Nigeria. Based 
on this, the conclusion is drawn that the expansion of finance in Africa has been located around 
national development plans with an expanding role for the private sector, in what is referred to 
the financialisation of development. The defining characteristics of the financialisation of 
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development are further expanded upon by drawing on the overarching processes for the 
expansion of finance. 
There is no doubt around the logical argument on the possibility of finance to spur investment 
and create growth for economies. But this has not been the case. What is obvious is that finance 
continues to proliferate beyond the boundaries of production or productive activities, even in 
developing countries. Nevertheless, the processes through which financial intermediation can 
be successful remains unclear in the argument for finance. Honohan (2004) makes the point 
that it remains unclear how the process of financial intermediation causes growth. He alluded 
to the fact that this may usually be intertwined with other factors, not least regulatory and 
institutional environment of a country. It is also not enough to continue to emphasise the need 
for regulation and so-called efficiency as necessary for a well-functioning financial sector, as 
obtains in most mainstream studies. No doubt, these are relevant. But despite increasing 
regulation of financial systems globally, crises, instabilities and uneven distribution of finance 
are prevalent, even rising to worsening levels. In short, more regulation strikingly seems like 
no regulation at all. 
So, what is needed is a better approach and understanding of the structures of finance, markets 
and the social interactions that underpin financial transactions that will enable finance to grow 
the real economy. The processes involved for advancing such understanding of finance lies 
within the realm of the financialisation discussion. Understanding financialisation in country-
specific contexts helps shed light on the political determinants of financial policy, not least the 
beneficiaries and losers from these policies. The issue is not so much about modelling historical 
data to analyse the relationship between finance and growth, but about understanding why 
increasing financial development has not contributed to growth and development and how this 
can be addressed. This is necessary given the more recent growth in credit and of finance in 
Africa amidst very little development. 
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Chapter 5.0 - The Finance-Growth Nexus and Non-Productiveness of Finance 
“The method of computing national income has been “overwhelmingly important, in 
[…] setting [the] boundary and the formal adjudication of what ‘is’ productive and what 
is not. This is the domain of national accounting: the formulation and publication of 
statistics designed to capture the overall level and composition of the economic activity 
of a nation state. Foremost among these statistical measures are the headline numbers 
for national income and output, including most recognisably gross domestic product 
(GDP) and gross national product (GNP)” (Christophers, 2011, p. 115). 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The construction of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in general is acknowledged to be subject 
to dispute, change and some degree of arbitrariness. In part, this depends upon teasing out the 
distinction between what causes growth (and so increases in GDP) and what contributes to it 
(and should be part of GDP or not). For example, consumption and investment are both 
potentially viewed as causing growth (consumption-led or investment-led growth) and both are 
seen as components of (contributing to) growth in the expenditure approach of computing 
GDP. But the same cannot be so readily said of finance. Its contribution is not obvious and its 
causal role for growth has been long debated. However, finance features prominently in the 
production (value-added) approach of calculating GDP. Its contribution to output has been 
questioned, not least in the arbitrary way in which it is alleged to achieve this (Christophers, 
2011; Basu and Foley, 2012; Mazzucato and Shipman, 2014; Assa, 2015). Besides this 
arbitrariness in determining the contribution of finance, other issues in the computation of GDP 
are the long-standing academic debate on the productiveness of certain sectors, the difficulty 
in measuring output in many sectors such as the service industries, and the omission altogether 
of certain productive activities (See for example Sangolt, 1999, for a discussion on productivity 
of household labour). It is also contentious whether certain services and sectors contribute to 
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growth as much as the output recorded as measured by the aggregate of the net value earned. 
The latter point no less applies to finance than any other sector. 
In the past, finance was primarily excluded from contributing to output (treated as transfers) 
even if potentially causing growth as debated in the nexus literature, reviewed in chapter 2. So, 
two different debates exist around the relationship between finance and growth. On the one 
hand, whether finance causes growth. And, on the other, whether finance contributes to growth. 
Not only have both subjects been widely debated, they have been so through processes of 
revision. The debate on the causal role of finance for growth has undergone revisions from the 
initial treatment of finance as homogenous, through the disaggregation of the forms and 
channels by which finance causes growth, to a more recent revision into thresholds as a 
response to the financial crisis. Likewise, the debate on the productiveness or not, of finance, 
is seen to have undergone revisions in the historical amendments associated with the shifting 
definition of financial services from non-productive to productive in the Systems of National 
Accounts (SNA). This is also seen in the adoption of these revisions, sometimes hesitantly, in 
different countries’ approaches to computing their national income. 
A starting point of the analysis here is to note that no such controversy exists for the 
consumption-growth or investment-growth nexuses. Therefore, an analysis of the shifting 
relationship between the debates on the facilitating role of finance, and so causal for growth 
(nexus), and the productiveness of finance or not is the subject of this chapter. Both debates 
may appear to have proceeded in parallel, with their developments barely analysed together. 
This is an original contribution as such, since, to the best of our knowledge, no detailed 
analytical study of the relationship between finance and growth has been located around both 
debates. We argue that it is necessary for both debates to constitute the discussion on the (real) 
relationship between finance and growth for better understanding that includes a political 
economy of the argument. 
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This chapter interrogates the relationship between finance and growth, not in the conventional 
manner of statistically proving or disproving the relationship. We draw closely from the work 
of Brett Christophers, who is of the position that, a keener consideration of the political 
conundrums surrounding the productiveness of finance is critical to understanding and 
resolving the question of whether finance is productive. He argues that the “hegemonic 
discourse of ‘productive finance’ is untrue because it is partial - so, while an element of truth 
may reside in the representation specifically of finance’s economic benefits, the facts that the 
costs are ignored makes the overall representation a false one” (Christophers, 2011, p. 114). 
He notes that the SNA has, since the mid-twentieth century, been “overwhelmingly important, 
in the Western world, in the setting of this boundary and the formal adjudication of what ‘is’ 
productive and what is not”, as in the quote above. He argues that instead of debating the 
productiveness of finance, it may be worthwhile turning to the politically potent perception of 
productiveness of finance, to understand how finance has come to enjoy its current hegemony. 
In short, this chapter mainly explores the other, relegated, strand of the literature on the 
relationship between finance and growth, the political economy of the nexus. 
 
Interestingly, the mid-twentieth century was the period in which the positive relationship 
between finance and growth was critically debated. However, the debate was abandoned in the 
1990s, despite evidence to support financial markets inefficiency. Correspondingly, an 
abandonment of the theoretical debate on the productiveness of finance – comprising the 
difficulty in measurement, inclusion of certain sectors or not, the unavailability of data and 
unreliability of sources, variety of questionable assumptions to arrive at headline numbers, 
discrepancies on production boundaries, double counting, and so on and so forth – is observed 
in the same period. This is due in part to the triumph and ascendancy of global finance and 
neoliberalism in general. 
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The rest of this chapter discusses the history of the computation of financial services in the 
SNA in section 5.2. It follows the different revisions of the SNA and pinpoints the changes 
made in the treatment of the finance sector’s contribution to output, with an emphasis on the 
impetus to recognise finance as productive, following its expansion in the economy. The 
differences in approaches used in the national accounts of different countries, coupled with 
different times of adopting the recommendations of the SNA, points to the non-consensus on 
the proposed productiveness of finance. The reluctance to embrace in entirety the touted 
productiveness of finance will be located in ideological inclinations and (national) vested 
interests. The case for unproductiveness of finance is analysed in section 5.3 in line with the 
literature. This is followed by analysis of the shifting debates of the nexus and the 
productiveness of finance in section 5.4. Section 5.5 locates these debates in the evolving 
definition and understanding of the financialisation literature. Conclusions are drawn in section 
5.6. 
 
5.2 The History of Financial Services Computation in GDP 
Various accounting methods have been used by different countries and at different points in 
time in computing national income, not least, in the treatment of financial services in output. 
One of the earliest of these systems of determining the productiveness of an activity was the 
Material Product National (MPN) accounting system. It was initiated by the planning and 
statistical offices of the USSR in the early 1920s (Rangelova, 2007). In this approach, value 
was based solely on tangible material production. This approach continued to be in use in many 
countries (mostly emerging economies) after most Western countries had abandoned it, amidst 
the debate on the inclusion of financial services in output. In fact, as at 1970, the MPN and 
GDP had equal status in the UN Systems of National Accounts. 
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However, the limitation of the MPN is that there is no absoluteness to the composition of value 
in the production chain. Thus, it encounters a problem, referred to as the ‘productive factor’ 
problem. This productive factor problem, the inability to directly determine whether value has 
been created is seen to apply even more prominently to financial services. It underpins what 
has been termed the ‘banking problem’29. According to Christophers (2011) this is a problem 
that arises when the banking sector records a negative output which makes it seen as 
unproductive. This will be the case if costs are simply deducted from fee-based revenue (Assa, 
2015) with no other output. It arises in the output/product method30 of computing GDP. 
A look at the historical developments of national accounts in countries is thought-provoking. 
The USA up until 1947 in its GDP computation treated financial sector’s output as equal to the 
sum of its profits and wages paid. It also used this method for other intermediation services 
(Arndt, 1996). It then continued not only to push this method for all its sectors but for other 
countries as well. This was evident in the 1953 recommendation to treat intermediation services 
as productive, and as such, de jure part of GDP computation. This was implemented in SNA 
1968. While other countries quickly recognised the flaws in this approach and thought it 
imprecise and manipulative, the USA continued to use it until 1993 (Christophers 2011). 
The computation of financial services in output around Europe is even more revealing of these 
flaws. France, until 1975, omitted revenues derived from financial intermediation in the 
computation of its GDP, because it considered these essentially unproductive (Vanoli, 2005). 
                                                          
29 The potential of recording a negative output in the financial sector, since its so-called financial intermediation 
service, creates no material output.  
30 The product/output approach is one of the three methods of calculating GDP. It sums up all economic 
activities across industries that are considered productive in an economy. It can be estimated with the equation 
GDP = ∑ (𝑌𝑌𝑏𝑏 − 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏) + 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1 , where Y represents output in sector i, IC is corresponding intermediate 
consumption and NT is net taxes (i.e. taxes minus subsidies). The others methods for computing GDP are the 
expenditure and income approaches. The expenditure approach is a sum of all final expenditures in an economy, 
summed up by the following equation: GDP = C + I + G + X-M. C is consumption by households, I is 
investment by firms, G is final consumption/spending by government and X-M is net exports. The income 
approach sums up all compensation (i.e. wages and salaries) of employees, net taxes and gross operating surplus 
(profits). It can be denoted by the equation: GDP = CE + NT + GOS. A ‘statistical discrepancy’ amount is 
usually imputed to reconcile differences in the three methods in national income statistics (Assa, 2015). 
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Later on, it alleged that the revenue from financial intermediation derives from its role in the 
allocation of resources. From then on, financial intermediation was considered productive in 
France. In the UK, financial sector intermediation (comprising net interest receipts by financial 
institutions) was considered to be unproductive until 1980. Afterwards, it was treated as both 
input and output of the financial sector, instead of being treated as intermediate consumption. 
Here, interest payments to banks by third parties were deducted from banks’ income, but at the 
same time added to output as financial sector contribution (Christophers, 2011). These bizarre 
modifications show the extent of machination in the accounting systems, in the move to make 
the financial sector appear productive. 
Australia, prior to 1948 treated all banking sector interests as transfer earnings, just as in other 
sectors of the economy, because a significant amount of the income generated in the banking 
sector is from the difference in interests between lenders and savers. This approach resulted in 
negative output for the financial sector (Arndt, 1996). But as we will see, this changed in the 
SNA approaches that followed. 
In the USSR, the MPN was used from the early 1920s when it was designed, until 1990 when 
it was abandoned. According to Rangelova (2007), it was not only used in the USSR, but also 
adopted by Central and Eastern European countries around 1948 and 1950. Notably, financial 
services was not considered in the national accounting framework of these countries before 
1990. The adoption of the MPN by such a large number of countries meant that a standardised 
basis for comparison with countries using other methods was sought by the UN. This proved 
to be difficult. 
We now turn to the arbitrariness of financial services in the historical development of the SNA. 
In SNA 1953, financial intermediation in the VA approach was treated as transfers like 
benefits, etc. thus unproductive (Assa, 2015). Net interest revenue from the financial sector 
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was treated as input of other sectors (based on deposits received from those sectors). This was 
apportioned as final demand for consumers and intermediate demand of other business sectors. 
It ensured that financial sector’s contribution to output was greater than other sectors 
contribution. This approach was criticised by Haig (1973) who argued that determining 
financial intermediation contributions based on deposit ownership from other sectors was a 
misconception of banking. 
Following this, SNA 1953 was replaced by SNA 1968. But even more desperate was the 
treatment of financial intermediation in the SNA 1968 with a renewed objective of making 
finance productive. In SNA 1968, the net interest from financial intermediation was treated, 
neither as an input of the finance sector nor as distributed input of the consumer and other 
business sectors accounts, “rather as the input of a new notional industry sector with no output” 
(Christophers, 2011, p. 130). This was quickly adopted in Finland, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, and used until 1996. The USA only abandoned the approach in 1993 and 
was the first to do so (OECD, 2001). 
In SNA 1993, Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly Measured (FISIM)31, as it became 
known, was said to be final demand for consumers and intermediate demand for businesses. 
This was based on an IMF recommendation to the United Nations Statistical Commission in 
1991 to allocate the output of financial intermediation in such a manner (Vanoli, 2005). In SNA 
1993, Assa (2015, p. 5) notes two approaches to the estimation of FISIM. One was the 
recommendation to allocate FISIM across sectors that benefit from financial services in order 
to be able to classify them as either intermediate consumption, final consumption expenditure, 
or exports. Here, FISIM was to be deducted industry by industry depending on where it is 
                                                          
31 This is interest-based financial intermediation. It is treated as input to other industries, and deducted from total 
value added to arrive at GDP. 
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consumed as intermediate consumption. But the information to do this “is not readily available” 
(OECD, 2001 p. 8). 
The other method was a much simpler approach that deducts all FISIM as intermediate 
consumption of a ‘nominal sector’, similar to SNA 1968. These approaches in SNA 1993 made 
financial intermediation appear explicitly productive. The supposed productivity was hinged 
on the claim that the financial sector incurs liability on its own account by acquiring financial 
assets from lenders, repackaging and channelling them in a suitable way to borrowers. This 
includes the issuance of bonds, treasury bills and other securities. It was concluded that 
considerable risk-taking was involved in these activities, as such labelled “risk management” 
and “liquidity transformation”. FISIM became the difference between the property income 
receivable and total income payable (Chakraborty and Das, 2007). 
Given the idea of a difference between income receivable and income payable, a notional 
‘reference’ rate of interest (as a proxy for the inter-bank lending rate or repo rate) was 
introduced as a productive base from which bank lending could be assessed. The difference 
between this reference and the interest generated by creditors and financial institutions is then 
taken as the productive output of financial intermediation in GDP (Christophers, 2011). FISIM 
was computed using the formula (𝑓𝑓𝑂𝑂 − 𝑓𝑓)𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂, where 𝑓𝑓𝑂𝑂 is the interest rate on loans by the 
financial institution, r is a reference rate that lies between (perhaps the average) interest rate on 
loans and interest rate on deposits. 𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂 is the nominal amount of total outstanding loans. But the 
notion of a reference point as an independent productive base in the SNA 1993, “returns us to 
the very genesis of the banking problem” (p. 134). This is because a large portion of banking 
profit is generated simply by setting a margin of lending, without any material production. 
The linking of this reference rate to so-called risk by the financial sector is to ignore the risk 
brought upon the real economy by extracting enormous profit from the financial sector without 
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backing this with commensurate productive output. A profit margin cannot simply be deemed 
productive in itself if no output is created. The putative risk allegedly borne by the financial 
sector also ignores completely the guarantee (insurance) of deposits provided by the state and 
tax payers, and not by financial institutions themselves. This means the state bears the risk and 
not the financial sector. It is therefore, a case of the state guaranteeing the cost created by the 
financial sector in the expropriation by finance. The alleged risk further ignores the 
disproportionate profit and bonus pay-out realised by financial institutions, their investors and 
shareholders. Although SNA 1993 recognised respective levels of lending, debt and banking 
activities, and excluded capital gains, a major failing is that it was silent about addressing this 
disproportion in the different channels of financial system revenue. It carried on legitimising 
the financial sector as a productive part of the economy. 
With the aim of further absorbing into the SNA all income generated in the financial sector, a 
revised international standard for the compilation of national accounts, SNA 2008, was 
approved by the United Nations Statistical Commission in 2009 to replace the SNA 1993. This 
was quickly adopted and made more detailed in the European equivalent, the European 
Systems of Accounts (ESA) 2010 (Van de Ven, 2015). While the main conceptual changes in 
the SNA 2008 was targeted at enlarging the capital base through the inclusion of R&D and 
military systems, there were changes affecting the computation of financial services in the 
national accounts, comprising pensions, capitalisation in holding companies and Special 
Purpose Entities (SPEs). Pension entitlements provided by governments via social security 
were to be treated as liabilities to households. The contribution is to be estimated through its 
net present value in SNA 2008, as opposed to actual contributions paid in SNA 1993. This was 
to factor in any appreciation in value and capital gains, given the heavy involvement of pension 
companies in the capital market. Investment income on pension assets “is now to be set equal 
to the winding down of the net present value of the entitlements. In the SNA 1993, this 
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investment income had to be set equal to the actually earned income (excluding holding gains 
and losses)” (p. 3). 
In the SNA 2008, financial services by banks have been expanded to include non-performing 
loans, insurance, mutual funds, pension funds, including output of central banks – with little 
consideration of what these services are and how income is generated from them (Chakraborty 
and Das, 2007). The activities of holding companies are now to be allocated to financial 
services, enlarging the sector, as opposed to their parent companies in the SNA 1993. This is 
despite the fact that holding companies invest heavily in shares, bonds and all manner of debt 
instruments. So, while capital gains from banks themselves are excluded from value added, 
income from the same activities by holding companies are now included in gross value added. 
Van de Ven (2015) points out that this will increase the debt levels of the economy. SNA 2008 
also recognises the activities of SPEs as productive. These are transactions of foreign 
companies whose main economic activities consists of group financing, or intermediation of 
funds between foreign companies (ISWGNA, 2014). 
In addition, SNA 2008 sets out to capture income from central banks activities and count these 
in national output. It recognises three categories of central bank activities: financial 
intermediation services, monetary policy services and, supervisory services. Output can be 
determined and measured for only two of these roles. Output for financial intermediation is to 
be determined by the difference between a reference rate and the actual rate of interest. This 
may sometimes result in a negative output, in which case, it is recommended that the total 
output for the central bank be valued at the negative difference incurred – by the difference in 
rates (SNA, 2008, Paragraph 6.151-156, 7.122-126). Output for monetary policy is considered 
a non-market output, but can be measured at the total costs of pursuing monetary policy 
changes. Output for supervisory services is to be based on whether fees are charged to cover 
the cost of these services. The recognition that central banks engage in activities that would 
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generate output for the financial sector and economy, beyond the traditional role of the central 
bank, can be viewed as the endorsement of monetary policies targeted at creating bailouts. 
These have now become the norm. The adoption of the role of the central bank as guaranteeing 
other bank deposits and the channel through which the government provides bailouts implies 
an acceptance of the reckless speculative behaviour of banks and other investors, the cost of 
which is to be incurred by the central bank. 
Like banking, the activities of the insurance sector were expanded through the introduction of 
an “adjusted claims” based on a long-term pricing average that captures unexpected future 
events, which may result in high claims (SNA, 2008). The use of unrealised future so-called 
“adjusted claims” was to change the possibility of negative output in the insurance sector, 
which may present it as unproductive. However, the use of this approach, as opposed to the 
simple difference between premiums received and claims paid, in SNA 1993, also means that 
output in this sector will expand substantially. 
SNA 2008 redefined financial activities to comprise the following: monitoring of risk, 
assumption of risk, provision of liquidity, underwriting, convenience services and trading. 
FISIM, which is excluded from total value added, was unexcitingly re-defined as comprising 
loan provision and deposit services, as opposed to the broader definition of property income 
receivables and interest payable by banks and other financial institutions, as previously defined 
in SNA 1993. In practice, the expansion of the financial sector to include central banks, 
insurance, holding companies, SPEs, etc. means that financial services value added will grow 
enormously. Given these changes in SNA 2008, a new method of calculating FISIM was 
introduced, under the recommendations of the Advisory Expert Group (AEG) for SNA 
revisions, “based on the difference between the property incomes receivable and total interest 
payable of the financial corporations” (Chakraborty and Das, 2007, p. 3765). FISIM in SNA 
2008 is computed as (𝑓𝑓𝑂𝑂 − 𝑓𝑓)𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂 - (𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷 −  𝑓𝑓)𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 . Where 𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷 and 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 are interest on deposit and total 
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deposit respectively. Other variables remain as previously defined in SNA 1993. This was 
simply to indicate that financial services income is now derived from difference in interest 
earned from loans and made on deposits. But Das and Jangili (2017, p. 518) show that the 
proposed change in computation is likely to raise the size of FISIM, as long as 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 > 𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂 and 𝑓𝑓 
is positive (i.e. total deposits greater than total loans and the reference rate is positive), which 
is usually the case in the banking sector. 
The table below gives an overview of the significant differences exist between the revisions 
made to the SNA and among countries in their adoption of the changes. While a few countries 
quickly embraced and implemented these changes to the treatment of finance in their national 
accounts, others were reluctant. This reluctance will be interpreted as resistance to the notion 
of a productive finance. What is also obvious about the SNA is that these revisions have been 
aimed increasingly at capturing unproductive new and innovative forms of financial 
development. The ambiguity involved in the productiveness of finance in the SNA is laid bare 
in its transitions from non-productive, though – as Christophers puts it – explicit 
unproductiveness, implicit productiveness, to explicit productiveness32. 
 
Table 5.1 Revisions, Dates, Changes and Country Adoptions of SNA Amendments 
Years/SNA 
Revisions 
Treatment of Finance and FISIM in particular Countries/Years of 
Adoption 
Before 1948 MPN: based on material production only. Value 
apportioned on a sector-by-sector basis. 
All centrally-planned 
countries where national 
accounts were computed in 
1920s-1970. Afterwards, 
                                                          
32 See categorisation in Christophers (2011) 
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former Soviet Union until 
the 1990s. 
SNA 1948 Finance is explicitly unproductive: excluded from 
national output, considered as transfers. 
Mainly the USA (1948) 
SNA 1968 Implicitly productive: output from financial sector 
treated as input to an imaginary industry with no 
output. 
Finland, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway. 
SNA 1993 Explicitly productive: Value-added of financial 
sector is based on net interest received by financial 
institutions. Financial Intermediation Indirectly 
Measured (FISIM) deducted individually from 
value-added of individual industries buying financial 
services. 
USA (1993); India (1994), 




Explicitly productive: treating all FISIM as 
intermediate consumption of a nominal sector 
UK and most European 
countries (1996). 
SNA 2008 Includes more exotic and so-called innovative 
financial products, constructing finance as ever more 
productive. 
-FISIM re-definition. 
-Capital gains in pensions now computed as 
productive. 
-Recognition of SPEs as productive. 
-Expansion of output of insurance activities to 
include future unexpected events. 
-Includes the possibility of productive output by 
central banks. 
Australia (2009), Canada 
(2012), Israel (2013), 
Mexico (2013), USA 
(2013), Korea (2014), 
Other OECD countries 
(2014), Turkey (2015), 
Chile (2016), Japan (2016) 
 




As shown in the table, the MPN approach remained in use in the former Soviet Union and 
China until 1993, when these countries transitioned more into market economies with a new 
emphasis on financial development. Many analysts believe that the exclusion of finance from 
national output before then, was precisely the main reason the MPN was used in China, the 
former Soviet Union and East European countries for such a long period. However, the MPN 
was unable to satisfy the statistical needs of the market economy (Rangelova, 2007), as such, 
it was abandoned as countries transitioned to the market. So also, was the initial debate on 
productiveness abandoned, as seen in the SNA revisions. In all these different approaches to 
treating financial intermediation by different countries at different periods, nothing resembling 
unanimity was reached on the productiveness of financial services until 1993. This corroborates 
the argument that the adoption of the productiveness of finance in national output was not due 
to a consensus, but for the purpose of strengthening the role of finance in the economy. 
Despite the pursuit of a more prominent place for finance through the SNA, the allegedly 
productive financial services value added misses the mark of even the least necessary 
requirement of the neoclassical theory of productivity, which is the need that both an input and 
output exist in the production process and, output must be worth more than input, before it can 
be deemed productive. Consequently, the growing proportion of financial services in national 
accounts reflects the widening gap between value-creation and value-added in output. This will 
be seen to be problematic for national income and other macroeconomic aggregates. We now 
turn to the debate on the exclusion of finance from GDP to expand on this point. 
 
5.3 The Case for Separating Finance from GDP 
Adam Smith (1804) stating his position on finance in general and banking in particular, noted 
that the objective of banks should be simply to provide the public utility of financial 
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intermediation and not necessarily to make profit. This can be interpreted as implying that 
banks have the traditional responsibility of allocating resources (to the most productive sectors 
of the economy), not least that this role should be a public good. His reference to financial 
intermediation as opposed to profit-making, hints on the dichotomy between, on the one hand, 
the contribution of finance to growth through re-allocating resources and on the other, the 
tendency to derive profit from finance without creating value. He was of the position that 
finance has the tendency to locate itself in the latter. Like Smith, Karl Marx did not agree that 
all banking profit was a normal consequence of banking intermediation procedure. He 
maintained that most of it derives from interest-bearing capital or financial rent-seeking. In line 
with Marx, it suffices to say that the bulk of finance’s contribution to output does not derive 
from economic activities that create new value. But it is mostly a re-circulation of existing 
value from one sector to the other, with the tendency to overestimate this value. For Marx, the 
process serves to preserve existing capital-labour relations and maintains the existing class 
structure. Though, he believed that this is socially necessary for capitalism, finance was never 
understood to be productive. 
In line with this argument, Christophers (2011) notes that the banking sector (and the rest of 
the financial sector) adds little or no value to the national economy when interest-related 
revenue is excluded from output. He differentiates between three banking services. First, banks 
provide services such as raising capital, facilitating mergers and acquisitions, fund management 
and currency transfers, for which they are paid fees. These fee-based financial services are 
usually included in the product/output method of estimating GDP, since they are clearly 
defined services, with recipients and providers of such. He notes that it is the only banking 
activity to register a positive output entry in the national accounts. Second, banks engage in 
trading and speculation of assets with proprietary funds, mostly over short periods, with the 
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aim of making profit. The interest, dividends or capital gains from such trade are excluded from 
GDP estimation as no service has been rendered and no production has occurred. 
Third, banks provide so-called financial intermediation services between depositors and 
borrowers. He points out that banks generate profit by setting a margin between the prices of 
assets bought and sold, different cash prices for the purchase and sale of shares, different 
interest rates for deposits and loans. This interest-based income is FISIM, defined above. It 
remains unconvincing what these services actually are, despite attempts to justify them. 
Christophers adds that in practice, no specific payments are made to the bank for these services, 
but banks make deductions for them. As such, they should be treated as transfer earnings, but 
this is not the case. FISIM is treated as input to other industries and deducted from total value-
added in the national accounts to get GDP. If this were to be excluded from financial sector 
output will record a negative contribution, since its cost is greater than income earned from the 
services offered (United Nations, 1947; Paul Studenski, 1958). This is the core of the much-
debated banking problem (Christophers, 20111; Carson and Honsa, 1990; Fixler and 
Zieschang, 1999; Vanoli, 2005). 
Notably, transfer earnings in other sectors, which are only a redistribution of existing incomes 
without any value addition to economic activity, are usually excluded from the computation of 
GDP (National Statistics, 2006). Such payments include unemployment benefits and state 
pensions, and the classic example of household labour which although contributory to output, 
remains unaccounted for in GDP on the basis that it might be a transfer of earnings. 
Christophers (2011) argues that financial transactions as corporation tax and other transfers as 
personal tax, national insurance and other levies should be considered as such and excluded 
from GDP as well, as there is no productive output created. Such payments are simply a 
redistribution of income. He points out that “just because payments have been received and tax 
paid thereon, [does not imply that] wealth has been produced” (p. 120). A scrutiny of most of 
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these payments will reveal that they have been made to facilitate non-productive speculative 
activities in the finance sector. Excluding such payments will reduce significantly, financial 
sector’s contribution to GDP. These calls have, however, been met with strong resistance. 
Chakraborty and Das (2007) make the case that the initial convention in the SNA was to treat 
interests as transfers in national accounts or as receipt of property income, since such payment 
is not made for use of a productive asset. However, the spread in interest between borrowers 
and savers is not treated as transfers but as financial sector’s net contribution to output. In 
treating the output of the financial sector in a ‘special’ way, there is clear rule-bending for 
finance. Obviously, because it does not meet the productivity benchmark of the SNA in which 
there must be an interaction between labour and capital and inputs transferred into outputs to 
generate factor income. In short, such special treatment has given finance a prominent role in 
national outputs.  
But this prominence of financial services in GDP has, however, been shown to cause 
inconsistencies in the economy. Basu and Foley (2011) investigate the theoretical traditions of 
Okun’s Law33 and the Kaldor-Verdoorn Effect,34 used to analyse the relationship between 
aggregate demand and employment. They question why movements in output before the 
recession and so-called recovery (after recession) have been incongruous with employment, 
especially as predicted by conventional business cycle models of output-employment 
dynamics. They anticipated a statistically significant disconnection between employment and 
real output growth in the USA economy from 1948 to 2010 both at the aggregate level and 
some major industry levels. They found this disconnection to be due to the expansion of 
                                                          
33 Okun’s Law, which found a statistically significant negative relationship between changes in unemployment 
and real GDP growth rates in the USA, is the traditional mainstream theory for analysing the relationship 
between employment and output. 
34 Based on the statistical study of the recovery of the European economies after WWII, the Verdoorn effect 
found that sectoral employment was often negatively correlated with sectoral output growth for a number of 
capitalist economies. The Kaldor-Verdoorn effect links this analysis to the relationship between demand-driven 
economic growth and change in labour productivity. 
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Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) services in GDP, where measure of output was 
imputed solely on the basis of income received in these sectors. Thus, “the growing weight of 
the financial sector [in particular] systematically leads to GDP overestimating real output at 
the aggregate level” (p. 28). 
They also found that a Narrow Measured Value Added (NMVA) which excluded the sectors 
FIRE, government, other services and rest of the world, all industries where output is not 
measured directly but based on imputed income, was more statistically and positively 
correlated with changes in employment over business cycles than real GDP.  As expected, the 
elasticity of employment with respect to output in industries that have independent measures 
of value-added output and income (i.e. non-service sectors) was found to be falling over recent 
business cycles. As such, their measure of output was judged to be a better predictor of the 
relationship between output and employment. In addition, they found that another alternative 
measure of GDP, which excludes income generated in the service sectors from the product side 
of output, was more correlated with employment. 
Similarly, Assa (2015, p. 11) queries why “fee-based financial services [are] treated as value-
added, while interest-based financial intermediation is [agreeably] netted out of GDP as 
intermediate consumption (of either a nominal sector or the total economy.”  He argues that 
fee-based financial revenues, which are included in GDP and show up as value-added on the 
output side of the account, should at best be treated as intermediate input to other sectors or 
costs.35 He insists that fee-based financial income is as problematic as interest-based income, 
because money has no use value, only exchange value. In addition, he points out that finance 
cannot be consumed directly either by firms or consumers, but can only be used for final or 
intermediate consumption. Therefore, “value-added in this case [is] nothing more than an 
                                                          
35 See Assa (2015; 2017) for a detailed argument, including cases studies.  
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imputation based on financial profits from fee-based services” (p. 11). Assa further emphasises 
that given the negative relationship with total output in many advanced economies, value-added 
from finance ought to be excluded from total value-added. “It is therefore more accurate to 
account for the financial sector as a cost of producing the rest of GDP, that is, a cost involved 
in generating all true value added” (p. 11). In line with Basu and Foley, he uses an alternative 
measure of economic output – Final Gross Domestic Product (FGDP) – which excludes fee-
based financial services from total value added, and then deducts it as cost to the rest of the 
economy. The resulting adjusted measure of output is found to be even more correlated with 
employment and median income than the measures in Basu and Foley. 
Some studies make the case for exclusion of financial intermediation from GDP on the basis 
of its measurement complications. Van de Ven (2015, p. 5) identifies such complications in the 
computation of the recently added pension entitlements in GDP. He notes that in many 
countries “actuarial estimates are not available and source information underlying the 
methodology for compiling such estimates is often lacking.” This is similar to Oulton (2013) 
who notes that the inclusion of pension entitlements in GDP is flawed because of the 
inconsistency in the discount rate for estimating entitlements. This is calculated based on either 
accrued benefits or projected benefit obligations. The use of the former tends to overstate the 
contribution of the financial sector, thereby understating the contribution of other sectors. 
Mazzucato and Shipman (2014, p. 1061) assess the controversies on the effectiveness of the 
national income of accounts to under- or overstate productive activities. They propose a 
framework for determining output in national accounts. Their framework is underpinned by the 
argument that “national income accounts should present the social valuation of production, 
which implies the inclusion of external benefits, subtraction of external costs, ascription of 
value to unpriced outputs (of state and non-profit enterprises), and omission of purely 
redistributive activity”. Clearly, fee-based financial services’ contribution to GVA fall short of 
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this benchmark given its clearly redistributive element. Particularly, the point on social 
valuation of production, applied to finance, reinforces in every sense the need for its exclusion 
from GVA. The endogenous36 creation of money when loans are given out also means that it 
is possible that the actual practice of banking is generally misunderstood, and the notion of 
interest-based FISIM misleading, albeit deducted from GVA. This reflects the long-standing 
fact that measurement constructs, GDP or finance contribution to GDP, etc. are themselves 
driven by erroneous theoretical presumptions of what banking does and what money is. 
 
5.4 Developments in the Two Debates on the Positive Impact of Finance on Growth 
In light of the threshold analysis of the nexus, some economists are starting to take a broader 
approach to the debate on the relationship between financial development and growth. What 
has emerged from these re-examinations is the admission by some that the relationship has 
hitherto been discussed from two closely related views. Beck (2013) identifies these broad 
views in the financial development literature. The first is the facilitating role of the finance 
sector. This consists of the mobilisation of funds for investment and the efficient allocation of 
financial capital to the most productive areas of the economy. A measure of financial 
development which reflects this view is the commonly used private credit to GDP ratio. He 
“defined [this] as the outstanding claims of financial institutions on the domestic non-financial 
private sector relative to economic activity” (p. 3). This is sometimes referred to as the 
“intermediation variable”. It is the view mostly subscribed to by academics. Moreover, the 
narrow measure, credit to the private sector as a share of GDP does not consider any 
redistributive element of finance to the productive sector for it to be judged efficient, especially 
                                                          
36 The view that bank lending is independent of savings. Thus, the creation of money in the economy is not 
exogenously determined by the central bank but endogenously by aggregate preferences of non-bank actors. 
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given existing inefficient allocation in the financial system. Levine (2005) admits that neither 
does it make a link with the theoretical channels through which finance affects growth. 
The second view of financial development, identified by Beck, is in fact, used to nuance the 
productiveness of finance, because it investigates whether the financial services sector, in of 
itself, is productive or not. But this reference to productiveness is anything other than 
productiveness, stripped down to a convenient measure for achieving a positive impact of 
financial development. The view contends that the financial sector is an export sector, with 
strong financial centres that boost a relatively large skill base and favourable regulatory 
policies. Thus, Beck refers to it as the ‘financial centres view’. Accordingly, the measures of 
financial development of this view, are the total financial sector’s percentage of GDP or the 
share of labour force employed in the financial sector. This is usually followed by the 
proclamation that either the financial sector employs a significant number of the workforce in 
the economy with expanding financial services, or that financial sectors employees “are among 
the most productive in the world” (cited in Christophers, 2011, p. 3). With these viewpoints, 
the financial sector is often alleged to be value-adding. Notably, this view resonates with the 
studies done by Philippon (2008), Philippon and Reshef (2013), and Cecchetti and Kharroubi 
(2012). However, the focus on this simplistic ratio to imply productiveness in the literature 
ignores the complexity surrounding value, from which productiveness derives. 
Figure 5.1 shows a diagrammatic representation of the movement from the initial approaches 
of analysing the relationship between financial development and growth. It shows the two 
strands of the debate and subsequent development in the literature, in which the relationship 
was reduced to the nexus. The distinguishing characteristics of the nexus have been discussed 
widely in chapters two and three, while finance productivity is discussed above. The literature 
is seen to reduce the whole debate by neglecting the productiveness argument on the right-
hand-side in order to give prominence to the nexus on the left. It further stripped the 
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productivity of finance argument down to the growth of cities with large financial institutions 
and labour force in cities with heavy financial activities. The purpose of this simplistic 
reduction is aimed at promoting financial development and financial gains. 
 
Figure 5.1: Diagram Showing Initial Approaches of Understanding Financial 










Source: Author’s Arrangement 
 
Despite the claim in the literature surrounding the financial sector’s productiveness and role in 
employment, Basu and Foley (2011) note that there has not been a corresponding increase in 
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sector. Employment on the other hand has long stagnated since the mid-1980s. Nonetheless, 
the FIRE sector in the USA overtook the manufacturing sector in its contribution to output by 
1980, just like the Professional and Business Services (PBS) sector also overtook 
manufacturing by the mid-2000s. 
The productiveness claims made of the financial sector are weak, especially when critically 
analysed. Nonetheless, it is deficient to reduce financial sector’s contribution to total output 
based on total revenues and profits and tax generated by the sector, and the percentage 
employed of total labour force. The reduction of the financial sector’s contribution to these 
factors is simply intended to imply a facilitating role for finance in the economy, as in a positive 
nexus. This is despite evidence to the contrary, as most financial transactions and growth that 
ensue from these factors are independent of real economic output. This view ignores the more 
pertinent question of its contribution or not, or whether it should be an actual component of 
GDP. What is rather obtainable is the increasing divergence between the volume of finance 
and the growth of other sectors, and between finance and output in general. 
Some studies claim to address the measurement gaps in the literature. But these are insufficient 
in that they still fail to account for productiveness. One of such studies is done by Beck et al 
(2012) who jointly use credit to the private sector and value added of the financial sector in 
GDP as measures of financial development. Both variables are positive and significant in 
individual regressions but, when used independently, value added is found to be insignificant. 
Intermediation is found to be significant for cross-sectional regression but value added is not. 
Neither of these is significant in panel regression. Intermediation and valued added were also 
found to be negatively and positively correlated with volatility, respectively. They argue that 
non-intermediation often increases risk, and conclude that there is no evidence to support the 
‘financial centres’ view, that finance can be a growth effect in itself. Already, there is ample 
evidence from the GFC that the financial centre approach “brings with it high contingent 
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taxpayer liabilities that in a crisis turn into real taxpayer costs and which turn a banking crisis 
more easily into a deep recession and potentially into a sovereign debt crisis” (p. 6). 
The adoption of productiveness of finance in most countries’ national accounts further opened 
the avenue for the standardisation of the computation of current accounts across countries. This 
made it easy for the flow of international capital across geographical boundaries, and allowed 
Western banks to dominate the global market space (Christophers, 2013). With the 
standardisation of national accounts across countries and the established belief in a positive 
nexus, finance assumed an unprecedented level of influence on a global scale. This 
strengthened the rigid penetration of finance into all areas of the economy. The following 
section discusses the expansion of finance into the macro and micro areas of the economy, also 
known as financialisation, and how this may enhance the understanding of the finance-
productivity debate. 
 
5.5 Productiveness and Financialisation. 
The term financialisation has many definitions, albeit with different emphases. The purpose of 
this section, however, is to locate financialisation within the context of the relationship between 
finance and growth discussed above, not least productiveness. This provides an alternative 
framework for understanding the productiveness argument, at the same time expand the 
understanding around financialisation. It views the relationship between finance and growth, 
in light of the features by which financialisation is defined. Therefore, this analysis serves to 
bridge the gap that exists between the literature on finance-growth nexus and financialisation, 
a piecing together of the literature which is necessary for a better understanding of the 
increasing complexity of finance. 
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Fine (2011) makes a robust and coherent case for locating financialisation in neoliberalism as 
a period of capitalism. The first phase is associated with shaping the conditions for market 
forces to thrive, not least deregulation and promotion of private capital accumulation and of 
finance in particular.37 The second phase, starting around the early 1990s, is characterised by 
the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the emergence of the USA as leading hegemonic power; the 
decline in strength and organisation of trade unionism and other progressive movements; 
national liberation and consolidation of decolonisation; the significant growth in the global 
labour force as a result of the transition to capitalism within China, and increased female labour 
participation; extraordinary developments in new technologies with the corresponding capacity 
for productivity increase; and the triumph of neo-liberal policymaking containing the growth 
of both economic and “social” wages. This phase of neoliberalism created the new ‘space’ for 
finance to expand across countries and domestically altering household consumption patterns. 
The increased prominence of finance was achieved through “a complex and shifting amalgam 
of scholarship, ideology, institutions and policy in practice” (p. 9, 8). He points out that the 
outcomes have been “variegated” across space and time. 
Interest-bearing capital, though present in both phases of neoliberalism, can be said to be more 
deeply rooted in its second phase through the interaction of the above characterising factors. 
So, financialisation becomes a fundamental feature of neoliberalism, through intensive and 
extensive application of interest-bearing capital in both economic and social reproduction 
(Fine, 2010). Certainly, the recent global environment defined by the second phase of 
neoliberalism has put finance on a different pedestal and unprecedented scale. In line with 
Fine’s location of financialisation as an epochal shift in finance, the first phase can be said to 
be in alignment with the pre-1993 SNA revisions. More significantly, in the second phase, it is 
                                                          
37 See Fine (2011), where he argues that neoliberalism has gone through delineated stages. Its first stage was 
imperialism, which amounted to the monopoly stage of capitalism. 
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necessary to recognise the major change to the treatment of finance in SNA 1993 – deemed 
explicitly productive by Christophers. This approach, together with its subsequent adoption by 
most countries, can be seen as another major definer of the second phase of neoliberalism. It 
allowed finance to expand disproportionately in output relative to other sectors.  
The revision of the SNA 1993 gave a redefinition to finance productivity, made possible by the 
ideological shift to neoliberalism. The approach further alienated the link between finance and 
productivity by adopting standards by which finance may expand without necessarily 
contributing to real output. And it has expanded in alarming rate and disproportionate to other 
sectors. The implications for this revision have been discussed above, not least, the expansion 
of financial activities, institutions and actors – what is now referred to as financialisation. This 
linkage of the finance and development literature with the adoption of explicit productiveness 
of finance in SNA 1993, therefore reinforces the belief in a defining phase of global capitalism, 
and for understanding financialisation as the distinct manifestation of the phase. The 
implication of this new environment is the waning relationship between finance and growth, 
now best described as a threshold analysis in the nexus literature. But this waning relationship 
between finance and growth needs to be understood as the outcome of unproductive finance on 
growth, and the ideological, theoretical and political machinations associated with this enforced 
productiveness – this is financialisation. 
Thus, financialisation in the context of value-added in GDP may be located first, as the 
abstraction of national output from real economic productivity and, second, as the growing 
influence of finance in GDP. This is what Assa (2017) calls the “financialisation of GDP”. This 
second characteristic of financialisation of the nexus is what underpins the prominence of 
finance at the expense of real economic activity in national accounts. Understanding 
financialisation in this manner is not far removed from the fundamental argument that it is 
underpinned by interest bearing capital, given that the abstraction of output from real 
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productivity is synonymous to the derivation of value from capital without any productive 
output. 
It was necessary for finance to be perceived productive in GDP following a dominant positive 
nexus, in order for it to enjoy its current hegemony. Because GDP remains the most prominent 
quantitative measure of countries’ economic performance, notwithstanding a misplacement of 
what it actually measures and the neglect of social wellbeing. Only recently were alternative 
development measures introduced. Yet, none of these commands the same level of influence 
as GDP. Notably, the proportion of finance in GDP continues to increase steadily as discussed 
above. Therefore, the prominence of GDP is in part, underpinned by the prominence of finance. 
Assa (2017) finds that the growing disconnect between GDP and other macroeconomic 
variables, is in fact, due to its financialisation. This position echoes other findings in the works 
of Porter (1995), Godley (2001), Ertuk et al. (2007) and Callon and Caliskan (2009) (as cited 
in Christophers, 2011) all of which link the increasing prominence of GDP in political, social 
and cultural discourses, to its financialisation and ‘economisation’. Moreover, Christophers 
(2011, p. 117) makes clear that the prominence of finance in GDP translates to social power. 
He notes that “when politicians, journalists, regulators and, of course, bankers themselves, 
appeal to flattering GDP figures to demonstrate the positive contribution of the financial 
services sector, they are drawing on a discourse of immense social power.” The same can be 
said of the financial centres approach to the nexus, since it exclusively alludes to dysfunctional 
GDP variables, presented as both the contribution of finance to GDP and the percentage of 







This analysis advances the call to revisit the financial sector’s net contribution to output, in line 
with the search for better understanding of the increasing complexity of finance. It argues for 
a broader understanding of the relationship between finance and growth, which reverts to a 
combination of the debate on the productiveness of finance in output and financial 
intermediation as a driver of real growth. It advances this understanding in light of the more 
recent financialisation literature. This chapter makes clear that there exists an ideological and 
political connection between revisions in the SNA and the finance-growth nexus literature. The 
periods in which these revisions occurred is telling of this relationship. This complex 
relationship can only be fully understood within the financialisation of GDP. 
To account for this problem in the nexus literature considering the non-productiveness of 
finance, the next chapter revisits the nexus literature by treating the financial services in value 
added as non-productive rather than productive, as has been previously approached in the nexus 
literature. This would mean deducting the total revenue of the financial sector from total value 
added in the economy, consistent with the way certain non-productive sectors have, and yet 









Chapter 6.0 - Empirical Analysis 
6.1 Introduction  
Given the gaps in the literature on financial development as critically analysed in previous 
chapters, especially in light of the 2008 financial crisis, the limitations of the threshold analysis 
that followed (Ductor and Grechnya, 2011; Yilmazkuday, 2011; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 
2012; Arcand et al. 2012; Law and Singh, 2014) and the uneven development of finance across 
countries, there is rationale for re-estimating the finance-growth nexus empirically. This 
undertaking has become even more necessary on the back of calls from both mainstream and 
heterodox scholars for more innovative, rigorous and drastic review of the relationship between 
finance and economic development and for containment of the role of finance in general 
(Arestis and Demetriades, 1999; Beck and Ogden, 2007;  IMF, 2015) and better measuring of 
risk-taking (Turner, 2010; Haldane et al., 2010). This is especially so, given frequent 
macroeconomic instabilities associated with financial development. 
As such, this chapter re-assesses empirically the relationship between finance and growth, 
following on from the study carried out by Arcand et al (2012; 2015), which is one of the most 
prominent and rigorous studies in the threshold analysis of the finance-growth nexus. We are 
very grateful to Enrico Berkes, Jean-Louis Arcand and Ugo Panizza for making their extensive 
dataset and STATA codes for the empirical investigation available to us. Notably, Arcand et 
al. ascertain the non-linear, and specifically quadratic, relationship between finance and 
growth, and find a threshold of between 80-100 percent of GDP at which the marginal effect 
of financial depth becomes negative on output growth. They use both simple cross-sectional 
and panel regressions, and country- and firm-level data to target consistent and robust results. 
We investigate their results using the same methodology as in their paper, but for an important 
transformation in the GDP figures that underpin the dependent variable, economic growth (see 
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below for details). Our GDP data factor in the potential non-productiveness of finance, as 
implicit consequence of the threshold analysis itself. As in their contribution, we incorporate a 
quadratic term of the variable representing financial depth, credit to the private sector, but do 
not obtain statistically significant effects. This could be an indication of a different fundamental 
basis in the finance-growth relationship, as soon as the non-productiveness of finance is 
incorporated, rather than simply a different functional form. Nonetheless, the marginal effect 
analysis confirms a similar threshold (of between 80 and 100%), which may however be harder 
to interpret given the insignificance of our estimation results. Also, it is possible that our 
insignificant results may be due to the smaller sample size used in our estimations. This point 
needs to be factored in when interpreting our results. 
The threshold analysis of the nexus and the debate on the productiveness or not of finance are 
taken as critical points of departure in this empirical analysis. Basu and Foley, (2011), 
Christophers, (2011), and Assa, (2015) interrogate the productiveness of finance, making a 
case for the exclusion of finance, in different computations, from gross value-added. Basu and 
Foley (2011) exclude non-value-adding finance from GDP in their Non-financial Value-added 
measure (NFVA), and Assa (2015) deducts finance from GDP as an intermediate input in his 
new GDP (FGDP). They then re-estimate the predictive power of their measures of gross value-
added on macroeconomic variables, and found these to be more correlated with employment, 
income, etc., than conventional GDP. We extend this discussion to the finance-growth nexus 
by exploring the non-productiveness of finance embedded in these two studies. For us, financial 
intermediation value-added, that is, the contribution of finance to gross value added in the SNA, 
is excluded from GDP, and the nexus re-estimated with this new GDP value to ascertain the 
validity of the results found in the threshold analyses. Our main argument is that, if there is no 
established absolute positive relationship between finance and growth, then finance ought to 
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be separated from growth. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explore this angle 
of productiveness in analysing the relationship between financial development and growth. 
However, separating the totality of what constitutes dysfunctional finance from GDP 
computation is not an easy task, given that the accounting and statistical processes involved 
may be unable to capture all areas of output with varying degrees of financial penetration. And 
when they do, the statistical manipulations discussed below (and in chapter 5) make this 
exercise daunting. As such, measuring financial penetration in output using financial services 
value added is only for estimation purposes. This difficulty in separating (unproductive) 
finance from GDP is corroborated by the long-lasting controversy around the dichotomy of 
actual financial intermediation and financial services. Problems for our cross-country analysis 
is further compounded by issues around heterogeneity of forms of financial services, statistical 
institutions, currencies and periods of computation. Data heterogeneity is also evident in the 
multiplicity of approaches and unavailability of data underpinned by many exogenous factors. 
Even data on financial services value-added are seen to be profoundly ambiguous around 
revisions in the SNA and subsequent adoption of these by countries, with little information on 
the exact years in which countries implemented such changes in their national accounts. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 draws on the two groups of literature 
upon which this chapter draws, bringing these together as the basis for re-assessing the 
relationship between finance and growth. Section 6.3 provides a discussion of the challenges 
faced in collecting the data used for this empirical analysis, including data transformations 
undertaken. Section 6.4 discusses the empirical modelling, and section 6.5 analyses the results 





6.2 Theoretical Underpinnings 
The threshold at which Arcand et al (2012; 2015) find that finance starts to have a negative 
relationship with growth is noted to resonate with other similar studies, including Ductor and 
Grechyna (2011), Yu et al. (2012), Yilmazkuday (2011), Barajas et al. (2012), Cecchetti and 
Kharroubi (2012; 2015), and Law and Singh (2014). Ductor and Grechyna (2011) use panel 
estimation of an updated dataset of 33 OECD countries to investigate the relationship between 
finance and growth of real output for the period 1970-2005. They also use averaged data of 63 
countries from 1970-2010 for cross-sectional estimations. In measuring the excessive growth 
of finance over output, they use difference in growth of industry and the financial sector, 
difference between private credit to GDP ratio and industry output to GDP, difference between 
growth in financial and industrial unit labour costs, and difference between productivity growth 
in financial and industrial unit labour. They find that, when financial sector growth exceeds 
productivity growth by 4.5 percent, the economy reaches the threshold at which financial 
development starts to have a negative relationship on growth. 
Yilmazkuday’s (2011) threshold analysis use a rolling-window two-stage least square 
regression for five-year averages of 84 countries in the period 1965-2004. He finds a negative 
relationship between high inflation and financial depth in the long run, a negative relationship 
between government size and growth, an inverted U-shaped relationship between trade 
openness and growth. On the back of these studies, Cecchitti and Kharroubi (2012) use a 
dynamic panel model and find a threshold of 90 per cent, for which finance starts to have a 
negative effect on growth. They also find a threshold of 3.9 percent of employment in finance 
to total employment, for a negative effect of finance on economic growth. Law and Singh 
(2014) reject the imposition of monotonicity on growth, with the standard use of a quadratic 
term of finance, in their investigation of the non-linear relationship between finance and 
growth. They use dynamic panel data that extends static setup to endogenous regressors for 87 
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countries, and arrive at a significant positive relationship for the nexus, with a threshold of 88 
percent beyond which financial development starts to exert a negative impact on economic 
growth.  
Although not a threshold investigation, but in response to this emergent literature, Beck et al. 
(2014) use measures of both intermediation and size of the financial sector to analyse the 
impact of finance on growth and volatility. In the traditional manner, private credit to GDP is 
used to proxy intermediation – despite its limitations, already discussed in chapter 2 – and the 
size of the financial sector contribution to GDP as their measure of its value added. They 
acknowledge Basu and Foley’s (2011) position on value-addition of the financial sector and 
the problematic margin between interest on bank loans and bank rates, but maintain that 
measuring value-added in the financial sector is challenging, as such, do not proceed in the 
same manner or measure of finance as Basu and Foley. For the size of the financial sector 
value-added, they use employment share and compensation share of the financial sector in total 
GDP. Nonetheless, Beck et al is seen to question the contribution of finance to growth, thus 
nuancing the idea of non-productiveness of finance, albeit in the mainstream tradition. They 
do not explore productiveness of finance along the original classical debate of value addition 
in the production process but as a reduced mainstream form of the percentage of financial sector 
contribution to GDP and the percentage of total labour force employed in the financial sector. 
Even Arcand et al (2012; 2015) are seen to discuss the so-called true nature of the relationship 
between finance and growth as inherently non-monotonic, having accounted for output 
volatility, banking crises, low institutional quality or differences in regulation and even 
endogeneity in the empirical relationship. We discussed in chapter three the ambiguity in their 
so-called true nature of the relationship between finance and growth, made more thought-
provoking by the exclusion of the possibility of being derived from crises, regulatory 
inefficiencies or other exogenous factors. We believe however, that enquiries into the so-called 
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true nature of the relationship between finance and growth like this one, further question the 
role of finance and demonstrate the existing gaps in the literature on the finance-growth nexus. 
Such limitations in the literature are taken as our point of departure, with a view to expand the 
empirical investigations of the nexus. 
As such, we follow the technique of deducting financial intermediation services (FS 
henceforth) value-added from conventional GDP, to ascertain the nature of the relationship 
between finance and growth. This is the positive measurable contribution of financial services 
to GVA that is recognised by the SNA. Assa (2017, p.52) calls this output of finance “the 
ultimate and ubiquitous intermediate input to all industries producing a use-value output”. This 
variable comprises income of financial institutions, especially banks, which is realised from 
so-called intermediation services between sellers and buyers of financial assets. These involves 
setting different interest rates between depositors and borrowers of cash and margins from 
which banks purchase and sell assets. (Christophers, 2011, p. 122). The exclusion of this 
variable is underpinned by the belief that financial services are not productive, having no use-
value, and should not be part of GDP. In the SNA, this variable has been bundled up with 
insurance, real estate and business activities for some countries (United Nations Statistics 
Division, 2017). 
The focus on FS value added allows us to locate our analysis within the finance-growth nexus 
debate, this having been our critical point of departure. Financial services’ value added has 
been contested to be unproductive (Basu and Foley, 2011; Christophers 2011), and further 
argued to be a cost with no use value, imposed by the financial sector on the rest of the economy 
(Assa 2015). Given the suggestion in these studies of a stronger specification of output growth 
as a dependent variable with the exclusion of finance, it is worth re-estimating the relationship 
between finance and growth on this premise, to understand the relationship. 
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We depart from the above studies in a number of ways. First, we apply the idea of FS value 
added to the relationship between finance and growth, in light of the threshold analysis in the 
literature. Second, we extend the analysis on excluding FS from gross value-added beyond one 
country. Notably, our analysis is applied to a set of 150 countries, in cross-sectional and panel 
data sets, enabling us to observe the relationship between finance and growth across a dynamic 
range of countries. 
Our analysis includes the traditional set of explanatory variables in the finance-growth nexus 
literature. These variables are inflation, trade openness, government spending and initial stock 
of human capital. There is not much controversy around the impact of the latter on growth. 
Likewise, most studies find a negative impact of inflation on growth (Barro, 1996; Bruno and 
Easterly, 1998; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2002, Yilmazkuday, 2011). Bruno and Easterly (1998) 
find a threshold of 40 percent per annum for which inflation causes a negative impact on GDP. 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) show that inflation exerts a negative effect on the finance-growth 
nexus when it is between 6.5 and 13.4 percent a year, depending on the measure used for 
financial development. Yilmazkuday (2011) finds that an 8 percent threshold of inflation 
crowds out the positive effect of financial development on long-term growth, through 
information asymmetry between intermediaries. 
Government expenditure is agreed to foster growth and development in the finance-growth 
nexus. However, the evidence is mixed and dependent on other factors. Early empirical studies 
alleged that the impact of government size on growth was mostly negative. More recent studies 
such as Ram (1986) find a positive impact of government size on growth. Levine and Renelt 
(1992) show that the statistical evidence of government size and growth is almost insignificant. 
In relation to finance and development, Demetriades and Rousseau (2010) provide evidence 
that government expenditure has low impact on low income countries, but positive impact on 
middle-income countries and even stronger positive impact on high-income countries. Karras 
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(1996) and Yilmazkuday (2011) show optimal government size of 23, and between 11 and 19 
percentage points of GDP, respectively, for which government size starts to have a negative 
impact on growth.  
The literature is much more divided in terms of the impact of trade openness on growth. This 
is because while trade openness provides access to large external markets, it can also cause 
instabilities in domestic markets through shocks. Some studies show a positive impact of trade 
openness on economic growth (Dollar, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995). The effect on the 
finance-growth nexus could be different for low- and high-income countries, as Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2000) show a positive and negative impact for the former and latter, respectively. 
 
6.3 Data Transformation 
We use the original dataset in Arcand et al. (2011) in our analysis, which covers 189 countries 
over the period 1961-2010. This comprise GDP per capita in constant 2000 US prices from 
World Bank Development Indicators (WDI); private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions as a percentage GDP; private credit by deposit money banks as percentage 
of GDP; general government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP); trade (% of GDP); 
inflation GDP deflator and when GDP deflator not available, CPI; stock market turnover ratio, 
stock turnover from old Beck et al. (1997) dataset; bank credit to the private sector from old 
Beck et al (1997) dataset; total credit to the private sector from old Beck et al. (1997) dataset; 
years of schooling as proxy for education; and other datasets as proxies and indices 
standardising their data. The sources and details of their data are described in their appendix 
(Arcand et al. 2012, p. 142). 
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However, their panel data are unbalanced, with missing values for many countries and years, 
depending on the variable. This problem applies to countries at all levels of development, high, 
medium and low income. For example, there is no data available on credit to the private sector 
over GDP for China before 1996, missing data for Argentina in the period before 1988, and 
only available much later around the 1990s for countries in Eastern Europe. Data unavailability 
is even worse for many developing countries, especially in Africa. We now turn to issues 
encountered in the use of FS data in our analyses. 
 
6.3.1 Data Challenges 
Our data on value-added by financial intermediation initially comprised 207 countries, sourced 
from United Nations Main Aggregates and Detailed Tables (MADT) database, which uses the 
International Standards Industrial Classification (ISIC) methodology for all economic 
activities. 
From the MADT database, we use ISIC Revision 3, Tables 2.2 and 2.1 for constant and nominal 
values. These tables were found to have varying degrees of gaps in their time series data. Tables 
2.1 and 2.2 were selected as they separate FS value added from insurance, real estate, renting 
and business activities. This enables us to concentrate our analysis on the relationship between 
finance and growth. Despite our intended focus, FS data are still entangled with Finance, 
insurance and Real Estate (FIRE), renting and business activities in a few countries. In this 
case, FS could not be separated from FIRE, renting and business activities. According to the 
UN database metadata information, financial intermediation services in ISIC Rev. 3 (as with 
most of their database) is said to be collected from individual country national statistics offices 
and has been standardised with data at the World Bank, IMF, OECD, etc. 
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Notably, most research in this line of isolating FS data has focused on a wider combination of 
financial variables. For example, Basu and Foley (2011) exclude FIRE and other service 
industries where value added is not based on material product but income. Assa (2014) 
excludes both FISIM and fee-based FS from value added for different measures. While our 
selected measure, financial intermediation services, may be small in some countries with low 
financial development, we believe that its exclusion from GDP for a cross-country analysis 
would be a worthwhile first step, in re-estimating the relationship between finance and growth. 
This is necessary considering the argument (from chapter 5) that FS is non-productive and 
should be excluded from GDP. We focus on FS value added, and not the broader non-
productive variables, namely, insurance, real estate and business services because the 
theoretical basis of the finance-growth nexus does not necessarily consider these other 
variables. 
We utilise both constant and nominal values of financial intermediation data in order to 
maximise our sample size, both in terms of countries and time. For many countries, more FS 
data is available in nominal than constant values. The biggest problem regards the 
unavailability of data on FS for most countries, only covering short periods. While this problem 
may be more apparent amongst developing countries, the UN MADT database also suffers 
from data availability for many advanced countries. For example, in Rev 3, Table 2.2 with the 
largest set of countries (207), FS data for Belgium only covers the period 1995-2008, Spain 
1995-2008, Sweden 1993-2008, Portugal 1988-2006, Malaysia 2000-2010, Germany 1991-
2008, the USA 1987-2010, UK 1970-2005. Only two countries, China and Singapore, have 
financial services data covering the full period being investigated, 1961-2010. These are 
closely followed by Honduras 1961- 2010, but with a break in series in 2000 due to change in 
methodology of computation, Denmark 1966-2008, Netherlands 1969-2008, Canada 1970-
2009, Italy 1970-2008, Japan 1970-2005 and Australia 1974-2010. 
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Besides time span issues, FS data series may cover different SNA versions (particularly 
movements from SNA 1968, to SNA 1993 and, most recently, SNA 2008), as well as different 
calculations or methodological breaks within the same SNA version. The above changes are 
identified with a different series code, comprising 10, 20, 30, 100, 200, 300, 1000 and 1100. 
Such changes pose questions over whether the data for a country can be coherently analysed 
as a single time series. This problem is not unique to FS data, for calculations for GDP per se 
have been going through the same revisions and methodological changes but, unlike the latter, 
FS are less readily available, more covertly calculated and more unclean. Given the lack of 
information and primary source for such a big range of countries, a combination of different 
series codes in a country’s data will be merely treated as a structural break. According to source 
information for UN Official Country Data, United Nations Statistics Division (2017)38, 
“numbers with two digits (10, 20) refer to data compiled using the 1968 SNA methodology for 
FS, while series numbers with three digits (100, 200, 300, etc.) refer to data compiled using the 
1993 SNA methodology. Series with four digits (1000, 1100, etc.) refer to data compiled using 
the 2008 SNA methodology. In addition to different methodologies, different series numbers 
are used when data are reported in different currencies, fiscal years, or by different sources. 
Furthermore, data are stored under a new series number whenever there are significant changes 
in compilation practices which make the time series no longer comparable.”  
Where more than one data option exists for the same number of digits in the series code (i.e. 
within the same SNA), e.g. same SNA 1968 as in 10/20/30 or SNA 1993 as in 100/110/200/300, 
we proceeded by selecting the FS series with the longest coverage, with a preference towards 
the series with a higher figure (for instance selecting series code 300, instead of 100). This was 
not only for consistency reasons, but also as the latest FS series may represent a change or 
                                                          
38 National Accounts Official Country Data | United Nations Statistics Division (2017). 
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correction in methodology that most probably matched revisions in GDP data. At times, 
preference was given to those constant price series with base year 2000 (discussed in detail in 
the following subsection). 
In terms of choice of SNA, selection was undertaken while balancing consistency of the FS 
series, on the one hand, and ensuring that the more reliable and representative figures are picked 
up. SNA 1993 was used as the preferred option, given that most countries had FS value added 
in SNA 1993 for their longest period of data available. Most countries have recomputed FS 
value added data using SNA 1993 in backwards revisions. This is most probably how GDP 
data are also revised and made comparable over time.  
We exclude FS data computed with the SNA 2008 methodology. This is so, because almost no 
country had adopted SNA 2008 by 2010, which is the cut-off period for the data collected by 
Arcand et al. Therefore, the GDP data, from which we will be subtracting FS, could not have 
incorporated the revisions of SNA 2008. SNA 2008 adoption are still under way and some 
countries commenced implementation around 2014. As an illustrative example, the table below 
shows the available FS data for Argentina. 
 
Table 6.1: The Case of Financial Services Data for Argentina 
 
FS Series SNA Base year Coverage 
Series 20 SNA68 1993 1994-1999 
Series 100 SNA93 1993 1993-2012 
Series 1000 SNA08 2004 2004-2014 




We have no information regarding the implementation date, and backwards revision, for SNA 
1993 (series 100). It may have been implemented at some point between 1993-1999, with 1999 
as the most probable date and backwards revision of FS (and GDP) from 1993 onwards. Thus, 
we exclude the data on SNA 1968 (series 20) which in any case exhibit negligible differences 
from series 100. SNA 2008 was introduced by Argentine national statistics office in 2014, with 
backwards revision for the period 2004-2014. However, given that the GDP data from Arcand 
et al could not have incorporated the 2008 revised system, we abstain from including series 
1000/1100 and select series 100 for the whole period, 1993-2010.  
Overall, it is not generally obvious when countries adopted different SNAs in their computation 
of FS data, what manner of adjustments have been made with different modifications, including 
which changes are minor and which are major in their data. Nonetheless, given GDP data and 
other variables to be analysed in our regression, it is best to use SNA 1993. 
 
6.3.2 Base Year Conversion 
Data for FS from MADT) database series 2.2 and 2.1 are only available in Local Currency 
Units (LCU) of individual countries and needed to be converted to USD base year 2000, since 
the GDP data from Arcand et al. are expressed in 2000 constant USD prices. We do so 
following the methodology proposed by the World Bank for attaining constant US dollars 
series.39 It entails three steps. First, we get exchange rate in USD per national currency value 
for year 2000 for each country40. Then we transform the nominal FS values in local currency 
units (LCU) into USD for year 2000. Second, we transform real (constant price of 2000) 
financial services values into an index, by dividing the constant price FS series for each country 
                                                          
39 See https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/114943-what-is-your-constant-u-s-dollar-
methodology 
40 Available at Dataset: International Financial Statistics (April 2017) 
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by the value of that same series in year 2000. Third, we multiply the real FS index by the value 
of nominal FS in USD of year 2000 (i.e. multiply the new series created in step 2 by the value 
of step 1). This methodology converts our real FS values in LCU for all countries to USD, 
while preserving the growth rates exhibited in the constant local price series. 
We rebase all data on FS value added to year 2000 and then transform them to USD, as 
described above. There are about 30 countries whose FS data are available in base year 2000 
on our original dataset, which is about 20 percent of our sample. We take these as given and 
rebase the other 80 percent, utilising both the constant prices and the nominal FS data, in order 
not to drop too many observations for our regressions. In general, we used base year 2000+/-1 
where they are available and base year 2000 are not. Otherwise, we re-based our data for the 
other countries. 
There are a number of challenges in obtaining 2000 constant prices FS series for our set of 
countries. First, it appears that constant prices FS is not simply a deflated nominal series, using 
a price index, etc. By looking at the SNA methodology, constant prices of FS also entail a base 
year interest margin and perhaps other calculations and imputations. Second, most probably 
the deflator involved need not be the GDP deflator or the CPI index, but rather an imputed 
price deflator for the financial sector. Therefore, the base conversion for FS data undertaken 
here need not always be as precise as one would have hoped, but this is the only way to proceed 
given unavailability of information and data. In principle, the following methods of rebasing a 
real series should be equivalent yielding identical results – but this is not the case for FS data 
for reasons that range from SNA changes and the factors from the above discussion. We use 
the following two approaches for rebasing: 
Let Xt represent the nominal financial intermediation series and X0t the constant-price (real) 
financial services data series with base year 0. And let 0 denote the old base year and 0' the 
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new one (in our case year 2000). Assume 𝑃𝑃0𝑡𝑡 is the GDP deflator with base 0. We first rebase 





Then we can rebase X0t (old base year) to 𝑋𝑋0′𝑡𝑡 (base year 2000 base 0'), with the GDP deflator 








× 𝑃𝑃00′/100 = 𝑋𝑋0𝑡𝑡 × 𝑃𝑃00′/100 
 
𝑋𝑋0′𝑡𝑡 = 𝑋𝑋0𝑡𝑡 × 𝑃𝑃00′/100                    (1)   
Alternatively, and suppose we did not have GDP deflator (or any price index) data, we could 
use the nominal and the real series to get the implicit GDP deflator. Then, multiply the FS 




                  (2) 
 
These approaches to rebasing are identical as long as the usual relation between a nominal, a 
real and a price series holds. This is not the case with FS data. Whenever needed (for method 






6.3.3 Adjusting Data for Population 
Given that our GDP is in per capita values, each country’s national output having been adjusted 
for total population, we convert our FS data to per capita values as well. We use population 
data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. To do this adjustment, 
we divide our FS data for each year in a given country by the annual population of that country 
for all the periods available in our data. This conversion ensures our FS data is in per capita 
values and can be directly subtracted from GDP per capita. 
Having gone through data clean up, SNA series consistency, base year and currency 
conversions and adjusting for population and reconciliation with the Arcand et al. data, we end 
up with a total of 150 countries for our estimations. These countries are shown below in the 
appendix 1. 
 
6.4 Empirical Methodology 
We construct our dependent variable to be the growth rate of GDP per capita minus FS per 
capita, in order to exclude the directly known (unproductive) finance from GDP. This resonates 
with Basu and Foley’s (2011) Measurable Value Added (MVA) which comprises only sectors 
which are considered “value-adding”. These are sectors in the SNA “where a tangible output 
(product) is sold in the market for a price and hence the value added figure is measurable 
without imputations” (p. 10). They refer to MVA as the value of gross output, stressing that 
were it a constant proportion of GDP, its exclusion would not make much difference. But, 
given that the rate of the value of gross output deflated by price indexes such as GDP deflator 
has been growing more rapidly than real GDP, its exclusion should be significant. Surely, the 
financial sector falls under the industries where imputed revenue has no tangible output and 
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ought to be excluded. So they exclude finance in another measure which they term Non-
financial Value Added (NFVA), in the following manner: VAT = ⅀(Yi – ICi). Where VAT is 
value-added in total economy, Y is output, i represents each industry in the economy, IC is 
intermediate consumption. We extend these models to reconstruct our new GDP variable which 
excludes FS from GDP in the manner: NGDP = GDP - VAf.  Where NGDP is our new GDP 
variable, GDP is as given, and VAf represents VA in financial services.   
NFVA is related to our reconstructed GDP variable, and underpins our re-estimation. Here we 
depart from Assa (2014) in some ways, who goes further to deduct FS from GDP to derive 
Final GDP (FGDP), having already excluded it from GVA.41 We agree with his argument that 
it is not only that money has no use-value and is simply non-productive, and as such should be 
excluded from the economy, it also represents an opportunity cost to the rest of the value-
adding industries in the economy and ought to be deducted from GDP as well (2017, p. 52). 
However, we insist on our approach because of the restriction on our study based on readily 
available GDP data from Arcand et al (2012). For our study, VA in financial services cannot 
be easily excluded from GVA, because we use GDP values as given from the study of Arcand 
et al., and the task of computing final use-value added (required for FGDP) for our long set of 
countries makes this even more daunting. 
Basu and Foley (2011) allow dynamics into the model through two channels: lagged 
independent variable and lagged dependent variable (to address serial correlation). However, 
introducing lagged values of the dependent variable has the disadvantage of further reducing 
the sample size of already small period of data. It also violates the exogeneity assumption of 
variables in the regressions, making estimates of the parameters inconsistent. They include only 
                                                          
41 In the SNA, output from all industries considered to be value-adding are totalled to arrive at Gross Value 
Added in basic prices. From GVA in basic prices, subsidies on products and Financial Intermediation Services 
Indirectly Measured (FISIM) are subtracted, and the following are added: taxes less subsidies, taxes on products 
and statistical discrepancy, to arrive at GDP. 
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two lags of the independent variables to capture dynamic (long-run) effects. They also note 
that lagged dependent variables for serial correlation is not necessary, given that 
“heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors can be used to deal 
with problems of serial correlation of errors without, at the same time, introducing the problems 
of inconsistent estimation that comes with lagged dependent variables” (p. 15). Arcand et al. 
(2012) also allow for an infinite lag, but this is only significant up to the fourth level. We use 
the same approach in our regressions below. 
It is important to highlight a further caveat, particularly in relation to our estimation results that 
will follow. The number of our observations is significantly smaller than those used by Arcand 
et al. This is mainly because of the unavailability of FS data for the period 1961-1980s for 
many of the countries in our data. Hence, the reason for our estimation for the 18-year period 
of 1990-2010 in our cross-sectional regressions. Also, the number of observations in our five-
year panels is small in size. This may be a contributing factor in statistically insignificant 
coefficients of our estimations42. However, the size of our dataset is similar to that of Ductor 
and Grechyna (2011). Yilmazkuday (2011) also reduce the sample size of their data from 1960-
2004 to cover 1965-2004 due to data unavailability, while Law and Singh (2014) even argue 
that their data, which covered only the period 1980-2010, were sufficient for drawing robust 
conclusions. Research in the tradition of excluding financial services value-added will, 
however, for some time into the future, be faced with the limitation of reduced sample size 
relative to other approaches, due to the unavailability of data on financial services for many 
countries. 
 
                                                          
42 Although the opposite is also true. Large enough samples do ensure statistical significance. See Gujarati and 
Porter (2009, p. 286-289) for a discussion on the desirable properties of sample sizes. 
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6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Below is summary statistics for our data. Lgdp is the log of GDP, lprivcr1 is the log of credit 
to the private sector, our second financial development variable, lprivcr2 is the log of credit to 
the private sector by banks and other financial institutions, our main financial development 
variable, lschool is the log of education attainment, our human capital development variable, 
lgovc is the log of government spending, linfl is the log of inflation, and lopen is the log of 
trade openness. Inflation, despite excluding values above 500 and below 0 percentage points, 
still exhibits a wide range of 5.3 and 6.9 percentage points. Yilmazkuday (2011, p. 284) notes 
that these wide ranges between variables warrants a threshold estimation, and that wide-ranging 
variables are expected to produce relatively higher thresholds effects. 
 
Table 6.2 Summary Statistics for Panel Regressions Data Averaged over 5-year 
Periods from 1960—2010 
Variable Observation Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Growth 3025 0.022 0.3629 -0.2741 0.2166 
LNGDP_PC 2850 7.9187 1.5595 4.2689 11.0837 
LPC1 5361 -1.3507 0.9793 -6.7754 0.9923 
LPC2 5774 -1.3967 0.9932 -6.7754 0.9923 
LEDUC 7050 2.1541 0.7452 0 3.2801 
LGC 7981 2.6825 0.4041 0.3186 4.4201 
LINFL 9325 2.4326 1.3105 -5.2983 6.9078 







6.4.2 Graphical Representation 
Diagram 6.1 depicts the original and transformed GDP data for a selection of countries in our 
sample. We observe that the gap between the two variables is wider for countries with greater 
proportion of financial services intermediation. This can be observed, especially in the case of 
the USA, and likewise for Canada and Australia. This is closely followed by the United 
Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan, which show a widening gap with time. The case of 
China is opposite from the USA and the other advanced economies, as there is only a very 
narrow gap between the two variables. A similar gap is seen in the case of Nigeria. This is 
telling of the nature of these economies. For most countries, however, there is slow but 
increasingly widening gap between GDP and financial services intermediation, especially from 
the 1990s. This is evidence of the growing proportion of financial services in GDP, and the 
increasing influence of finance in general. It is also necessary to note that this is happening on 
the back of the revisions in the SNA. 
 
Figure 6.1 Graphs of Financial Services for OECD and other Selected Countries. 
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6.5 Empirical Analysis 
After a brief analysis of our available data, we proceed to discuss the empirical methodology. 
In the manner of King and Levine (1993), our baseline panel model is as follows: 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  =  𝑎𝑎0 +  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2𝛽𝛽 +  𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛾𝛾 +  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  (1) 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃 =  𝑎𝑎0 +  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2𝛽𝛽 +  𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛾𝛾 +  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡.   (2). 
Where 𝑦𝑦1 is growth, FS is financial services, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is GDP as given and (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ) results in 
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constant, 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 is a set of control variables, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 is the error term, 𝛽𝛽, 𝛾𝛾, and 𝛼𝛼 are coefficients and i 
represent countries and t, time periods. We retain the use of the total credit to the private sector 
by banks and other financial institutions to GDP as proxy for financial development. Despite 
the limitations of using this variable as discussed above, not least its proliferation towards 
mostly non-productive use, it allows us to investigate the correlation of finance with growth as 
obtained in the existing literature, as it is the most used variable to measure financial 
development (Beck and Levine, 2004, Arcand et al. 2012). A quadratic term for non-
monotonicity is incorporated in line with the threshold literature. Although the quadratic term 
has been argued to be limiting, in that it imposes an a priori restriction on the effect of finance 
on growth to monotonically and symmetrically increase and decrease with the level of financial 
development (Law and Singh, 2014), again, we allow this variable to test the validity of the 
literature that uses the quadratic term of financial development in empirical analysis. 
We include the log value of initial reconstructed GDP per capita to control for reversal to the 
mean, and estimate the relationship between finance and growth using the traditional 
independent growth variables from the Arcand et al. dataset. These are the initial stock of 
human capital, trade openness, inflation and the ratio of government expenditure to GDP (see 
Demetriades and Rousseau, 2011; Yilmazkuday, 2012; Law and Singh, 2014; Arcand et al. 
2015) over our time period. These factors are control variables that may be causal for growth 
as discussed above. 
First, we run a pooled regression without differentiation across countries, using the log of GDP, 
our dependent variable, on our set of independent variables. We obtain a strong and statistically 





6.5.1 Cross-Sectional Estimation 
We estimate cross-sectional regressions for the period 1990-2010, with a total of 35 
observations. This number of observations is similar to that of Ductor and Grechyna (2011) 
who use 33 observations. In column 1 of table 6.3, we regress our new GDP per capita on our 
financial development variable, credit to the private sector. We find that the relationship 
between finance and growth is statistically insignificant when value added in financial services 
is excluded from growth. This is different from the results found in Beck and Levine (2004) 
and Arcand et al. (2012) who found statistically significant positive relationship between 
finance and growth using a much bigger sample. 
In column 2 of table 6.3, we add the quadratic term of credit to the private sector to allow for 
a non-monotonic relationship. Again, the result is statistically insignificant despite a slight 
increase in the correlation between finance and growth from 0.26 to 0.3. The coefficient on the 
linear term remains positive, while it is negative on the quadratic term, which confirms a 
concave relationship between finance and growth. Our results are similar to the finding in 
Arcand et al. for the same period (1990-2010). They find that the coefficient associated with 
credit to the private sector decreases by 50 percent and their result is no longer statistically 










Table 6.3 Table of Cross-sectional OLS Regressions for the period 1990-2010 
 
 (1) (2) 
 ngr ngr 




 (0.324) (0.334) 
LPC 0.113  
 (0.362)  
PC  1.936 
  (1.712) 
PC2  -1.147 
  (0.733) 
LEDUC 2.25 2.324 
 (1.461) (1.529) 
LINFL -0.0451 0.038 
 (0.269) (0.295) 
LOPEN 0.305 0.331 
 (0.263) (0.235) 
LGC -0.906* -0.937* 
 (0.471) (0.486) 
Const. 3.534 2.522 
 (2.526) (2.617) 
Obs. 35 35 
R-squared 0.266 0.3 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
ngr is the new per capita growth rate, derived by subtracting FS value-added from GDP;  LNGDP_pc is the log 
of new per capital lagged one period, LPC, PC and PC2 denote log of private credit, private credit and private 
credit squared. LEDUC, LGOVC, LOPEN, LINFL are the logarithms of education, government consumption, 
openness and inflation, as specified in Arcand et al. 
 
6.5.2 Panel Estimations  
The use of panel data allows us to examine the behaviour of the nexus across time and, as it 
were, allows us control for individual country heterogeneity. Panel data analysis have been 
noted by Law and Singh (2014) to reduce multicollinearity and heterogeneity. Following 
Arcand et al., we use the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) approach, introduced by 
Arellano-Bond (1991), with its two-step standard error correction approach added by Arellano 
and Bover (1995). It is also known as ‘difference GMM’. Here, lagged values of the dependent 
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variable are used as instruments. As in the literature, we use the Windmeijer (2005) finite 
sample correction to obtain robust standard errors. We use non-overlapping five-year growth 
spells for our panels covering the period 1961-2010. 
In the first four columns of Table 6.4, we estimate our model above with a monotonic 
relationship between finance and growth, using the log of the lagged value of credit to the 
private sector over GDP, in line with Beck and Levine (2004) and Arcand et al. (2012). All 
regressions include time-fixed effects and the lagged values of our control variables. Column 
(1) of Table 6.4 estimates our model for the period 1961-1995. This has a total of 95 
observations, which is quite a small sample for the GMM approach. We find a coefficient of 
2.0, very close to the 1.9 found in Arcand et al (2012) and 1.7 in Beck and Levine (2004). As 
expected, our coefficient for financial development variable decreases with more recent years, 
where credit to the private sector increases, as we see in column (2) (1961-2000), column (3) 
(1961-2005) and column (4) (1961-2010). The number of observations in our estimations in 
columns (2) - (4) are 183, 281 and 377, respectively. 
However, besides quantitative size, the results of all our estimations in columns (1) - (4) of 
Table 6.4 are not statistically significant with p-values ranging from 0.1 up to 1.0 for the 
variables included. This is so with the exception of lagged GDP per capita and for the education 
variable. This is slightly with the exception of our education variable in columns (3) and (4) 
(with p-values of 0.04 and 0.03, respectively). Most importantly, the log of private credit to 
GDP is found to be insignificant in all specifications, indicating a non-statistically significant 
relationship between financial development and per capital growth. In addition, none of our 
Arellano Bond tests AR1 and AR2 is significant. The Sargan test of over-identifying restriction 
is not robust, but also not weakened by many instruments. The Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions is robust but weakened by many instruments. As such, our estimations may not 
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reject the null of no first order correlation between financial development and growth. The 
Windmeijer standard errors (t-values) of the estimations are robust. 
From column (5) to (8) of Table 6.4, we repeat the estimations in column 1 to 4, respectively, 
but with the level, as opposed to the logarithm, of credit to the private sector over GDP as our 
financial development variable. The coefficient of the financial development is 1.9 for the 
period 1961-1995, and this decreases as more recent years are used. This decreasing 
relationship, sometimes referred to as vanishing effect of financial development on growth, 
resonates with the findings of De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) 
and Arcand et al. (2012). Most importantly, the impact of PC on growth is found to be 
insignificant throughout columns (5)-(8). Furthermore, our estimations for our models are not 
statistically significant for all variables, again, except education in the columns (7) and (8). The 
AR1 and AR2 are not significant. As in the first four columns the Sargan test of over-
identifying restriction is not robust, but also not weakened by many instruments, and the 
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions is robust but weakened by many instruments. The 










Table 6.4 Table of Panel Estimations  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Ngr ngr ngr ngr ngr ngr ngr ngr 
         
LNGDP_PC -3.183*** -1.368** -1.252** -1.029*** -2.439** -1.393** -1.125** -1.033** 
 (1.138) (0.616) (0.628) (0.351) (1.088) (0.702) (0.529) (0.414) 
LPC 2.006 1.206 0.306 -0.367     
 (1.520) (1.015) (0.735) 0.505)     
PC     1.964 1.884 -0.228 -0.586 
     (2.694) (1.773) (0.860) (0.766) 
LEDUC 5.422 2.680* 3.573*** 3.833*** 4.534 3.568** 3.743*** 3.988*** 
 (3.616) (1.628) (1.231) (0.813) (3.208) (1.740) (1.220) (0.945) 
LGOVC -1.936 -0.0853 -1.535 -1.778** -1.723 -1.390 -1.924* -1.839** 
 (2.368) (2.902) (0.989) (0.691) (1.543) (1.512) (1.017) (0.764) 
LOPEN -0.661 1.132 0.132 0.387 -0.930 1.193 -0.0517 0.130 
 (2.571) (1.656) (0.914) (0.729) (1.542) (2.721) (0.809) (0.511) 
LINFL 0.191 -0.0887 -0.219 -0.291 -0.0418 -0.00929 -0.338 -0.308 
 (0.655) (0.773) (0.276) (0.249) (0.671) (0.427) (0.251) (0.223) 
Const 37.44 8.103 7.671 3.442 21.87** 13.33 8.086** 5.067* 
 (47.19) (18.28) (5.578) (4.475) (10.19) (13.88) (3.897) (2.614) 
         
Obs. 95 183 281 377 95 183 281 377 

















Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
ngr is the new per capita growth rate, derived by subtracting FS value-added from GDP; LNGDP_pc is the log 
of new per capital GDP, LPC denotes the log of private credit, and LPC2 and PC its level.  LEDUC, LGOVC, 
LOPEN, LINFL are the logarithms of education, government consumption, openness and inflation, as specified 
in Arcand et al.  
 
In Table 6.5, we re-estimate the same regressions for different time periods in columns (1)-(4) 
of Table 6.4, with the inclusion of the square of credit to the private sector over GDP to allow 
for a non-monotonic relationship between finance and growth, as is now standard in the 
threshold literature. The square of our financial development variable is significant (with p-
value of 0.06) only for column (1), and shows a negative relationship with a coefficient of -7 
for the period 1961-1995. The negative coefficient confirms the non-linear findings of the 
threshold literature. However, both private credit and its square are insignificant in all 
subsequent specifications. Rather than a functional form misspecification, that is a non-
monotonic relationship among the two, as postulated by the threshold literature, our finding is 
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indicative of a non-robust and non-statistically significant relationship between per capita 
growth and financial development. The caveat of a small sample size still applies. 
 
Table 6.5 Table of Panel Estimations with a Quadratic Term 
     (1)   (2)   (3)     (4) 
 ngr ngr ngr ngr 
     
LNGDP_pc -2.764** -0.894 -1.034 -1.064*** 
 (1.134) (0.651) (2.285) (0.397) 
PC 13.52 4.720 3.666 1.479 
 (8.842) (4.621) (7.520) (2.314) 
PC2 -7.559* -2.098 -2.526 -1.112 
 (4.020) (2.230) (2.874) (1.040) 
LEDUC 5.446* 2.091 3.272     3.574*** 
 (3.273) (1.279) (3.640) (0.703) 
LGOVC -1.845 -0.357 -2.406 -1.418** 
 (2.098) (1.412) (4.204) (0.701) 
LOPEN -0.581 1.636 -0.380 0.210 
 (2.753) (1.331) (0.651) (0.435) 
LINFL 0.0270 0.148 -0.343 -0.235 
 (1.136) (0.443) (0.289) (0.192) 
Const 20.15* 1.588 10.45 4.241 
 (10.99) (7.295) (7.530) (2.580) 
     
Obs.  95 183 281 377 
No. countries 36 88 106 111 
Periods:  1961-1995 1961-2000 1961-2005 1961-2010 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
ngr is the new per capita growth rate, subtracting FS value-added;  LNGDP_pc is the log of new per capital 
GDP, PC denotes private credit and PC2 its square, and LEDUC, LGOVC, LOPEN, LINFL are the logarithms of 
education, government consumption, openness and inflation, as specified in Arcand et al.  
 
Figure 6.2 Graph of the Marginal Effect of Financial Development on Growth using 
Panel Regressions Obtained from Table 6.4 (1961-2010) 
Following the analysis of Arcand et al., diagram 6.3 below depicts the marginal effect of 
financial development on growth. Our graph shows that the marginal effect of financial 
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development on growth becomes negative when credit to the private sector reaches 
approximately 100 percent. This is similar to the threshold found in other studies (Ductor and 
Grechnya, 2011; Arcand et al. 2012; Law and Singh, 2014). However, our threshold can only 
be treated with caution, as in contrast to the threshold literature, since the results of our 




6.6 Summary of Findings  
Our cross-sectional and panel regressions show that the relationship between financial 
development and growth is no longer statistically significant when we exclude value added in 
financial services intermediation from growth. The result is consistent with Rousseau and 
Wachtel (2011) and Yilmazkuday (2011) who found statistically insignificant results between 
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It also confirms the findings of other studies in which there is no direct positive relationship 
between finance and growth (Lucas, 1988; Robinson, 1952; Arestis and Sawyer, 2005). One 
variable that exhibits significant positive relationship with growth in our regression is initial 
stock of human capital, measured by the level of educational attainment of a country. However, 
this relationship needs to be further investigated within the context of our new GDP variable 
in order for a conclusion to be drawn. 
There is a possibility that the insignificant relationship between finance and growth in our 
studies is due to the small sample size used in our regressions. The reason for our small sample 
size have been discussed above in the limitations faced with FS data. Nonetheless, the use of a 
small sample in a regression may also be of benefit since there is a tendency for a large sample 
size to force a relationship to be statistically significant. 
Notably, one of the explanations put forward by Arcand et al. (2012, p. 13) for a vanishing 
effect is that regressions which include few country periods with high levels of financial 
development should have a downward bias due to misspecification (See chapter 3). While this 
characteristic fits our estimations, in that we use far less country periods, yet our downward 
bias is not much less than theirs. As such, the vanishing effect of the relationship between 
finance and growth is not due to a downward bias per se, but is more likely to be explained by 
their alternative reason, which is that finance could have a fundamental dysfunction on growth 
as it expands, a relationship that may not necessarily be highlighted by econometric estimations 
traditionally deployed. 
Unlike Arcand et al. who find that the non-monotone threshold relationship between finance 
and growth is robust when controlled for crises and regulatory, we find that the relationship 
may not be fundamental and that finance cannot impact growth by itself. So any relationship 
may be dues to random chance. As such, economic development most likely results from other 
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factors, rather than financial development, or in more complex ways and interactions than the 
threshold analysis permits. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
We have examined the nature of the relationship between finance and growth having excluded 
financial services from the measure of growth, and re-estimated the nexus, following the 
standardised practices in the literature. Our findings show that the relationship between finance 
and growth is not statistically significant for all of our estimations. The introduction of a square 
term for a non-monotonic relationship shows a negative relationship between finance and 
growth where there may be ‘too much finance’, but the estimates are likewise not statistically 
significant. Our results are robust to using different methods, i.e. both cross-sectional and panel 
regressions. They are also robust to using different time periods, i.e. 1961 to 2010 for panel 
estimations and 1980 to 2010 for cross-sectional estimations. The results remain statistically 
insignificant in all regressions. 
The insignificant results obtained in theses estimations imply that the relationship between 
finance and growth no longer holds, as robustly as previously portrayed, when FS is excluded 
from GDP. As such there is a fundamental breakdown in the nexus when a more predictive 
variable of growth is used. It could be that financial depth is only correlated with the FS part 
of GDP, or better still, the non-productive part. Further research is required in this area. 
A huge work has gone into constructing data series in order to undertake similar and 
comparable exercise to the finance-growth nexus estimations in the literature. These include 
data cleaning and standardisation from different computation methods, base years and SNA, 
rebasing to constant year 2000 values, converting to US Dollars, adjusting country data for 
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population and so on. This painstaking effort has been expended in order to re-estimate the 
relationship between finance and growth in the same methods adopted in the threshold 
literature. These methods have been used not because they are thought to be appropriate as 
such, but in order to question the mainstream results on their own, marginally modified, terms. 
Therefore, results obtained in these re-estimations confirm the argument that the relationship 

















Chapter 7.0 – Conclusion 
“Once the bright and flashy promises of free markets are exposed as lies, it becomes 
possible to construct a capitalism fit for human life.” – Weeks (2014, p. xviii) 
 
7.1 Summary 
This thesis examines the threshold analysis of the finance-growth nexus literature. It does so 
by critically probing the arguments for a largely positive nexus and the methods used to draw 
such conclusions. A pluralist approach has been taken, which combines critique of the theories 
and narratives around financial development with empirical re-estimations of the nexus. A re-
estimation of the nexus is pursued, using the methods in the literature to show that, even in the 
terms of mainstream economic theories, empirical methods are insufficient to analyse the nexus 
(and economic phenomena in general) and that the relationship between finance and growth 
cannot be reduced exclusively to the corresponding statistical results. 
A major contribution of this thesis is that it links the mainstream finance-growth nexus to the 
classical political economy discussion of the productiveness or not of finance. In fact, it argues 
that the relationship between finance and growth ought to be discussed within a wider 
framework that combines both the deductive approach taken and mastered by the nexus 
literature with other inductive approaches within a political economy framework. This is 
inevitable given the failure of the literature, and its methods, to address the problems of finance 
which it has identified, and the inability to comprehend the social and historical aspects of the 
processes through which financial expansion occurs. Only through the proposed broader 
approach can a more robust understanding of finance be achieved and the processes for its 
proliferation and effects (and causes) be understood. This is the approach taken in this thesis. 
As such, it has allowed for a factoring in of the non-productiveness of finance - located within 
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the Marxist or classical political economy schools of thought – into the analysis of the threshold 
literature of the nexus.  
First, a review of the literature shows that the relationship between finance and growth was not 
always analysed in the nexus form (Schumpeter, 1911; Robinson, 1952; Minsky 1974). But 
this was eventually reduced, if not erased, through mainstream economic theory and empirical 
methods, from Goldsmith (1969) for a simplistic relationship, increasingly underpinned by the 
objective of a positive impact of finance on growth. Finance was also found in the literature to 
be causal for growth, in line with the narrow methods adopted. But what this putative positive 
nexus ignores is a robust causal analysis, in which other factors are causal for both finance and 
growth and directly or indirectly affect the relationship between them. As argued throughout 
this thesis, the pursuit of a positive nexus has also not been coincidental, but with the purpose 
of promoting private capital accumulation through markets that are alleged to be efficient in 
the mobilisation and allocation of resources.  
Such a simplistic understanding of finance in the nexus proved to be insufficient in explaining 
the crisis that ensured from historically-unprecedented proliferation of financial assets, and 
leading to the Global Financial Crisis and its aftermaths. Notably, the theories and methods put 
forward for analysing the relationship between finance and growth were, in fact, part of the 
(ideational) causal structure of the crisis. But not much has been done to modify these theories 
and methods. The revision in the nexus literature, in light of the GFC financial crisis, only 
modifies the conclusions of the nexus, in which a positive impact of finance is alleged for low- 
and middle-income countries and negative impact for high-income economies (Ductor and 
Grechnya, 2011; Yilmazkuday, 2011; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Arcand et al. 2012; Law 
and Singh, 2014). 
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Also the literature retains its narrow methods without much motivation to understand the nexus 
on a wider social and historical level, not least the broader factors that underpin financial 
proliferation and impact. The excesses of finance and consequent crises cannot simply be 
explained away as an inevitable part of the economic system. Indeed, some proponents of the 
nexus still allege that the same so-called financial innovations that led to the GFC can be 
developmental (Leaven et al., 2013). Studies in the nexus are seen to analyse the relationship 
between finance and growth only with the same empirical methods which were incapable of 
predicting the crisis, nor even explaining it once it emerged. One objective of this thesis has 
been to show that these methods are insufficient for drawing conclusions on the relationship 
between finance and growth. 
The conclusions which the threshold analysis draws for developing countries has been matched 
with African countries’ experience of financial development as a proposed driver of growth. 
This has been a critical secondary point of departure to tease out the relationship between 
financial development and growth. The drive for financial development in Africa is seen to be 
deficient within a coherent theoretical narrative. Also, finance continues to expand to the 
detriment of development in Africa. This undermining of development is set aside by the 
mainstream financial development literature, which continues to insist on the expansion of 
banks, capital markets and other financial institutions in Africa (Roe, 2006; Allen et al., 2012; 
African Development Bank, 2014; Central Bank of Nigeria, 2016). The case of Nigeria, with 
its unique experience of financial development, is used to buttress this point. It has been argued 
that it is necessary to locate the discussion within the financialisation literature in order to 
explore robustly the processes, extent and impact of financial development in Africa. As such, 
the expansion of finance and the associated regime of accumulation to the detriment of 
development in Africa has been termed the financialisation of development.  
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The linkage made between the empirical methods in the nexus literature and the debate on the 
productiveness of finance is not in itself unprecedented, since initial debates on the relationship 
between finance and growth drew from both areas of inquiry. It has been necessary to uniquely 
analyse these together in this thesis, given the inadequacy of existing methods. An enquiry into 
the political economy of the computation of financial services in the SNA, which draws largely 
from the work originating with Christophers (2011), is seen to convey similar developments as 
the nexus, with the objective of rendering finance productive. This has been situated within the 
features of financialisation in the periodisation of capitalism as delineated by Fine (2011). The 
case for the exclusion of finance from GDP has been pursued in line with the long-standing 
debate on productiveness as the main critical point of departure from which empirical re-
estimation of the nexus has been done. 
Cross-sectional and panel data estimations have been carried out in line with the methods in 
the threshold analysis of Arcand et al. (2012), with a full awareness of the limitations around 
such methods. As a result, this study does not investigate causality in the nexus, neither does it 
intend to imply causality from the empirical results obtained, as can otherwise be found all 
over the nexus literature. The econometric re-estimation has been necessary solely for 
investigating correlation or changes in the relationship between finance and growth, on the own 
terms (to emphasise) of the literature, using a new GDP variable that excludes putative value 
added in financial services. 
First, it is necessary to note that the relationship between finance and growth is not simplistic 
as the literature portrays it to be, in which high financial development is detrimental to high-
income economies and beneficial to low-income economies. Instead, this relationship is 
embedded within a complex amalgam of factors that cut across space, time and form, some of 
which cannot be captured in an empirical model, even if empirical theories assert that they have 
been controlled for. These complexities need to be teased out, analysed and addressed in their 
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contexts, and not assumed to have been taken care of in some hypothetical error term or other 
dubious means. 
In revisiting the relationship between finance and growth, therefore, this thesis argues that the 
components of both growth and finance matter, and inherently affect their relationship. As 
such, it has been necessary to tease out what constitutes growth and ascertain whether the 
components of growth (as in GDP), need to be part of it in the first place. A first step has been 
made in this thesis for growth, by examining the place of financial intermediation services in 
total value added. Having argued that this variable adds no value to productivity, and that there 
is no absolute positive impact of finance on growth, it is thus excluded from GDP and the nexus 
re-estimated. This is also in line with the mainstream literature that seeks better understanding 
of the finance-growth nexus (Arcand et al., 2012; Beck et al., 2014). 
The measure of financial development used in this study, which excluded value added in 
financial services from GDP, is believed to be a better estimator or predictor of the relationship 
between finance and growth. This has been demonstrated by Basu and Foley (2011) and Assa 
(2015) who find that a measure that excludes value added in financial services, among other 




A re-estimation of the relationship between finance and growth shows that the relationship is 
no longer statistically significant when value added in financial services is excluded from GDP. 
That is to say, movements in growth no longer correlate with movements in financial 
development when financial services is not part of the growth measure. This result is consistent 
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for both cross-sectional and panel estimations. The statistical insignificance shows that the 
thresholds found in the revised nexus literature may therefore be irrelevant, or not hold, for the 
relationship between finance and growth when a more predictive measure of growth is used in 
the estimation, as in this research. Also, it suffices to say more generally that there may be no 
(significant) positive relationship between financial development and economic growth as 
previous dissenters of a positive nexus have found (Arestis and Demetriades, 1999; Rousseau 
and Wachtel, 2002; Arestis and Sawyer, 2005; Philippon, 2008; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 
2015). 
However, it is necessary to point out that our finding of insignificant relationship between 
finance and growth could be driven by the smaller sample size used in our re-assessment. This 
may be a problem only to the extent that estimators from small sample sizes may not satisfy 
some desirable statistical properties. Nevertheless, this finding has implications for studies that 
seek to determine the optimal size of the financial sector, as may also be credited to the 
threshold literature (see also, Beck, 2014). Whilst the optimal size of the financial sector may 
seem important for a positive nexus, the finding of an insignificant relationship between 
finance and growth is independent of the size of the financial sector. Therefore, the problem 
may not be the size of the financial sector or what has been referred to as ‘too much finance’. 
In practice, the limitations of finance go beyond size, given that countries with low and 
intermediate levels of development are equally faced with the other “anomalies” of finance 
observed for high income countries. 
The insignificant results from re-estimations may also well imply the claim repeatedly made in 
this thesis, that empirical investigations are insufficient to analyse the relationship between 
finance and growth, and even worse for demonstrating whether one is causal for the other. 
Causation is to be understood only within recognition of a wider and more complex interaction 
between finance and growth, and other factors, which can be teased out across time and space. 
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As such, there is need to look beyond these simplistic appraisals of finance to the complexity 
of what constitutes its forms and how the financial system is structured for allocation. These 
include understanding the processes and agents of financial proliferation. The narrow analysis 
on forms in the literature, divided into bank- versus market-based financial systems, is 
insufficient for understanding the problems associated with the nexus, since the “innovative” 
proliferation of finance independent of productive activities happens across banks and markets, 
despite being deemed to be more prominent in one of these systems (which are mixed and not 
so readily, increasingly, distinguishable in practice). 
This study finds that what seems more like a simple disaggregating of financial markets and 
channels in the nexus literature was more of a wrangle of ideology – the neoclassical efficient 
market hypothesis against alternative views that seek to govern the activities of markets and 
socialise its gains. The subtle contention is somewhat more glaring since development banking 
– a financial system steered by government to check the free and competitive proliferation of 
finance for private gains – has more recently been omitted from the nexus literature. 
More than whether finance is causal for growth, a question which Levine (2005) agrees remains 
unanswered in the literature, I asked other fundamental questions at the beginning of this thesis. 
One is whether revisionism has addressed the problem of finance which it has itself identified. 
Two is whether finance has been developmental in Africa. Three is whether the impact of 
finance on growth is solely dependent on a country’s level of development. Four is whether the 
proposed estimations can help us better understand the nature of the nexus. While revisionism 
goes as far as pointing out that there is a fundamental dysfunction in the relationship between 
finance and growth, it fails to correct this or does not aim to do so. 
The answer to the second question is also not in the affirmative, given that underdevelopment 
persists in Africa, despite financial penetration. This has been located mainly in the role of 
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private capital amidst financial development. The rise in microfinance, mobile payment 
systems and other so-called innovative forms of access to finance have not led to a 
corresponding rise in employment, wages and general wellbeing of Africans. Instead, a few 
private capitalists use these channels to extract wealth from the rest of the economy. Capital 
market development has provided the breeding ground for trading short-term financial assets 
as opposed to raising capital for businesses, not least the neglect of SME finance in these 
markets (Beck et al., 2006). Suffice to say, therefore, that Africa’s development will not 
necessarily be achieved through its financial development. This conclusion is in line with the 
finding in this thesis, of an insignificant relationship between finance and economic growth. 
Third, results in this thesis further suggest that the relationship between finance and growth is 
independent of a country’s level of development. In short, the positive effect of this relationship 
depends on other factors not necessarily considered in statistical estimations. But more 
important is that growth and finance are themselves dependent on a slew of other factors, as 
discussed in chapter two. As to whether this thesis has provided better understanding to the 
nexus, the findings show that the traditional measures are unable to show the nature of the 
relationship between finance and growth – whether it be in the area of financial inclusion and 
access as wrongly measured, discussed in chapter four, or the use of credit to the private sector 
(for consumption) misconstrued to be targeted at investment. As such, these measures of 
financial development ought to be modified in any empirical analysis (as in this thesis) to 
reflect the social, experiential and historical aspects of both finance and growth.  
 
7.3 Limitations and Future Research 
Chief among the limitations faced in this study is that of data availability. Collecting cross-
country data for financial services value added has proven to be a challenge, limiting the sample 
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size in our transformed dataset. While this is due mainly to compatibility issues from 
heterogeneity of sources, these data can be better presented by the institutions from where they 
are sourced. The challenges around availability of long series of data may discourage studies 
that seek to research value-addition of sectors and industries across countries. As noted earlier, 
this will pose a challenge to future research in this area until much longer data series of financial 
services are publicly available. 
The difficulty with data availability proved even more challenging in the case of Nigeria, a 
problem alluded to by Beck and Jerome (2005) in their study of bank performance in Nigeria. 
As such it has been difficult to analyse microfinance banks performance in Nigeria. In short, 
there is hardly any information on microfinance banking and their activities, not even on the 
website of the Central Bank of Nigeria, despite a substantial and growing number of them in 
the country. Information on other micro-credit institutions is far harder to come by. Most of 
these informal credit institutions existed in the country long before microfinance banks. As 
such, it has been impossible to gather much information on these microcredit enterprises in 
seeking to enrich the study of financial development in Nigeria. This thesis has relied on the 
experience of the researcher’s stint at one of the microfinance banks in Nigeria. Further studies 
will require gathering primary data for a more comprehensive analysis. 
In terms of areas of future research, a good starting place going forward is to tease out some of 
the factors that the literature ignores, as earlier discussed. It is necessary to understand the 
relationship between growth and other variables, through which finance has been 
disaggregated, without including finance in the investigation. As argued, these variables may 
themselves be causal for growth. Similar questions are asked by Ndulu and O’Connell (2006, 
p. 29) in relation to the determinants of growth. They try to tease out the factors important for 
growth and the channels through which these variables are efficient. They also question why 
growth determinants evolve the way they do, particularly when subject to policy choice. Such 
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questions are in line with those investigated in this thesis, and have and can be taken even 
further. 
But much of the above questions remain to be explored. For finance, the type, form, 
composition and the direction of flows, each comes in line with the question of what constitutes 
financial development, even more so, when these factors are considered within a particular 
context of development. In terms of what kind of finance, there is need to further split financial 
development variables into different components and identify productive and non-productive 
components of finance. 
It is also worth exploring empirically sector by sector contribution to gross value added and 
exclude value added of finance altogether from output before estimations are done. While some 
elements of total output may actually be value-adding, it is worth separating the whole element 
given that the contribution of finance is in question. It is also necessary to extend this kind of 
research to using gross value added in financial services as independent variable, as in Beck et 
al. (2012), while excluding same from output in the re-estimations.  
Furthermore, it may be worthwhile to re-estimate the nexus having excluded all elements of 
finance in GDP for a more concrete relationship between finance and growth. We have been 
unable to do this, given the location of our thesis in the nexus’ threshold literature of Arcand 
et al. Bolder studies are required that both challenge existing nexus approaches while 
incorporating further complexities of the productiveness of finance argument. One suggestion 
may be to re-estimate the nexus on the basis of Assa’s (2015) combined exclusion and 
deduction of financial services from GDP, which will further decrease the size of national 
output. In addition, it is necessary to rid GDP completely of all non-value-adding industries, as 
in Basu and Foley (2011), if a more targeted relationship between finance and growth is to be 
established. The benefits of this will be enormous, for if it can be more correlated with 
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macroeconomic variables, and such variables better predicted, the economics discipline would 
have found some solution to the frequent mystery of instabilities and financial crises, which 
have become the bane of the profession. 
It should be noted however, that it is highly necessary that empirical methods are 
complemented with other approaches, including case studies before conclusions are drawn over 
the relations between economic phenomena. Empirical findings need to be validated by 
evidence, and when evidence proves otherwise, these results must be rejected, no matter how 
significantly estimated the parameters are alleged to be. As Qin et al. (2016, p. 31) suggest, 
“the end point of applied econometrics is “is to find parameters which are both interpretable 
and inferable beyond samples.” 
In terms of the way forward for future research with regard to the measures used for financial 
development, development finance comes to the fore here. It has been a neglected measure of 
financial development, despite being the most applicable to developing countries. The 
abandonment of this variable has been discussed in chapter four. There are hardly any studies 
that examine empirically the relationship between development finance and growth, and the 
role of development banking is increasingly less acknowledged amidst established suspicion 
of government and its institutions. In furthering the discussion on financial development in 
sub-Saharan Africa, it is necessary to investigate the role of development banks in delivering 
the much-needed progress in these countries. While challenging the claim of an alleged quasi-
consensus that state-owned banks have a negative impact on financial and economic 
development, Panizza (2013) acknowledges that there is still a lot to know about development 
banking in relation to the finance-growth nexus. Others have acknowledged that this could 
even be much less than purported (World Bank, 2001; La Porta et al, 2002). 
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Here is therefore a call to bring back development banking into the conversation of the nexus. 
This may not be too much to ask for, as the Bringing Back In phenomenon, captured by Fine 
(2010b) – discussed in chapter 2 – is a drill of mainstream economic theories, albeit with 
narrowness and as when convenient. Hopefully, this time, a broader approach to bringing back 
in and analysing development banking may be sought, given the insufficiency of the 
mainstream’s own methods as shown in this thesis. 
 
7.4 Concluding Remarks 
It is no longer difficult to see the inadequacy of mainstream economic theories and methods in 
finding solutions to today’s economic problems. This failure has been no less evident in the 
wake of the 2008 GFC. Yet these methods dominate the discipline. No one captures this better 
than Weeks (2014), in his book “Economics of the 1%”, which analyses how mainstream 
economics uses its narrow tools to “obscure reality and distort policy” with a clearly defined 
aim of benefitting a select powerful few. Surely, those economists who practise such methods 
may aim themselves to be part of the 1%. 
Therefore, in drawing upon the limitations of mainstream economics methods and theories, 
this thesis is aligned with a broader aim, which is the pursuit of a different kind of economics. 
As Basu and Foley (2011, p.1) note, investigations around sector contributions to the economy 
do not only attempt to differentiate between productive and non-productive sectors, but they 
“o ffer[s] insights              
decades in a context marked by the following three factors: (i) the service (especially the 
financial) sector has grown in importance, (ii) the economy has become more globalised, and 
(iii) the policy orientation has increasingly become neoliberal.” So, a much broader systemic 
arrangement – neoliberalism – is at the heart of the disproportionate expansion between finance 
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and growth. This has been noted throughout this thesis in the many references to 
financialisation and its corresponding regime of capital accumulation. 
But this underlying systemic support is the reason finance is so powerful and uncontrollable. It 
is also the reason why regulations, especially designed and implemented at country levels, are 
insufficient in addressing the dysfunction of finance. Norfield (2016, p. 10) explains the role 
of finance for major capitalist countries, their corporations and the elite class. He argues that 
this complex global arrangement “disguises the fact that the financial system works each and 
every day to the benefit of the major powers.” Oftentimes, a country’s level of financial 
development is thought to be solely a function of its level of development, and the factors that 
produce the state of financial development in countries are ignored. Even when some admit 
that the state of financial development is not random, this is often not acknowledged in 
investigations such as the nexus (as with other social-economic issues). This understanding of 
a broader web of factors on which finance sits, underpins the scepticism directed at the methods 
and theories that ignore these broader factors in their analyses of the impact of finance on the 
economy. 
Lastly, a lot of reference has also been made to the allocative efficiency and distribution 
mechanisms of finance. This can only be understood within analyses of social and class 
structures that exist in a place and how these undermine financial development. Understanding 
these factors allows policy to be better designed and no doubt enable finance to be more 
productive and efficiently allocated. It is therefore necessary to analyse the benefits of finance 
in view of its allocative efficiency. Given that the relationship between finance and growth may 
not hold when more reliable measures are used, as suggested in this thesis, it opens up the 
opportunity to genuinely reassess how finance can be made more beneficial for development. 
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As in the quotation at the beginning of this chapter, “it becomes possible to construct a 
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Appendix 1: Table of Countries used in Estimations with Financial Services 
Availability 
 Countries Ten-Year Periods Showing FS Availability 
Total No. of 
Years for 













1 Aruba    7 3 10 
2 Angola     8 8 
3 Albania    4 8 12 
4 United Arab Emirates     9 9 
5 Argentina    8 10 18 
6 Armenia    6 10 16 
7 Antigua and Barbuda    1 10 11 
8 Australia  7 10 10 8 35 
9 Austria  5 10 10 8 33 
10 Belgium    5 8 13 
11 Burkina Faso    6 10 16 
12 Bangladesh    9 10 19 
13 Bulgaria    2 10 12 
14 Bahrain    9 8 17 
15 Bahamas, The   2 10 10 22 
16 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina     10 10 
17 Belarus   1 10 10 21 
18 Belize   5 6 10 21 
19 Bermuda    5 9 14 
20 Bolivia    9 10 19 
21 Brazil    5 9 14 
22 Brunei Darussalam    6 9 15 
23 Bhutan   10 10 10 30 
24 Botswana    9 10 19 
25 Canada 1 10 10 10 9 40 
26 Switzerland   1 10 4 15 
27 China 10 10 10 10 10 50 
28 Cote d'Ivoire    9  9 
29 Cameroon    5 10 15 
30 Colombia    9 10 19 
31 Cape Verde    2 10 12 
32 Costa Rica    10 10 20 
33 Cyprus    6 9 15 
34 Czech Republic   1 10 8 19 
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35 Germany    10 8 18 
36 Dominica   1 10 8 19 
37 Denmark 5 10 10 10 8 43 
38 Algeria    9 10 18 
39 Ecuador    8 10 18 
40 Egypt, Arab Rep_    5 10 15 
41 Spain    6 8 14 
42 Estonia    7 9 16 
43 Ethiopia    4 10 14 
44 Finland  6 10 10 8 34 
45 Fiji    5 10 15 
46 France  3 10 10 9 32 
47 
Micronesia, Fed_ 
Sts_    6 10 16 
48 Gabon     9 9 
49 United Kingdom 1 10 10 10 5 36 
50 Georgia    5 10 15 
51 Guinea   1 10 10 21 
52 Gambia, The    6 10 16 
53 Guinea-Bissau     8 8 
54 Greece    5 9 14 
55 Grenada  4 10 10 10 34 
56 Guatemala     10 10 
57 Guyana   2 10 6 18 
58 
Hong Kong SAR, 
China  1 10 10 10 21 
59 Honduras 10 10 10 10 10 50 
60 Croatia    6 9 15 
61 Hungary    6 7 13 
62 Indonesia    1 9 10 
63 India    8 10 18 
64 Ireland   1 10 8 19 
65 Iran, Islamic Rep_    9 9 18 
66 Iraq    4 10 14 
67 Iceland   1 10 2 13 
68 Italy 1 10 10 10 8 39 
69 Jamaica   1 10 10 21 
70 Jordan    9 10 19 
71 Japan 1 10 10 10 5 36 
72 Kazakhstan    10 9 19 
73 Kenya    5 10 15 
74 Kyrgyz Republic   1 10 9 20 
75 Cambodia    5 10 15 
76 Kiribati    10 10 20 
77 St_ Kitts and Nevis  4 10 10 10 34 
78 Korea, Rep_ 1 10 10 10 7 38 
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79 Kuwait    5 6 11 
80 Lao PDR     9 9 
81 Libya     8 8 
82 St_ Lucia   1 10 10 21 
83 Sri Lanka     9 9 
84 Lesotho   9 10 10 29 
85 Lithuania   1 10 9 20 
86 Luxembourg   6 10 8 24 
87 Latvia   1 10 10 21 
88 Macao SAR, China    9 9 18 
89 Morocco    3 10 13 
90 Moldova    7 10 17 
91 Madagascar    6 10 16 
92 Maldives    6 10 16 
93 Mexico   3 10 10 23 
94 Marshall Islands    4 10 14 
95 Mali    5 10 15 
96 Malta    3 9 12 
97 Montenegro    1 10 11 
98 Mongolia    6 9 15 
99 Mozambique    10 10 20 
100 Mauritania    2 10 12 
101 Mauritius    9 10 19 
102 Malawi     9 9 
103 Malaysia    1 10 11 
104 Namibia    8 10 18 
105 Niger   6 10 10 26 
106 Nigeria   10 10 9 29 
107 Nicaragua    9 10 19 
108 Netherlands 2 10 10 10 8 40 
109 Norway 1 10 10 9 9 39 
110 New Zealand   4 10 6 20 
111 Oman   2 10 8 20 
112 Panama   2 10 10 22 
113 Peru 1 2  10 10 23 
114 Philippines    9 10 19 
115 Poland    9 8 17 
116 Portugal    6 6 12 
117 Paraguay    7 10 17 
118 Romania    5 10 15 
119 Russian Federation    5 10 15 
120 Rwanda   1 10 10 21 
121 Senegal    5 10 15 
122 Singapore 10 10 10 10 9 49 
123 Sierra Leone     10 10 
124 El Salvador   1 10 10 21 
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125 Serbia    4 9 13 
126 Suriname   1 10 7 18 
127 Slovenia    5 9 14 
128 Sweden    8 7 16 
129 Swaziland  1 10 10 10 31 
130 Seychelles    9 6 15 
131 Chad    9 7 16 
132 Togo    3 10 13 
133 Thailand   1 10 10 21 
134 Tajikistan    6 10 16 
135 Timor-Leste    1 10 11 
136 Tonga    7 10 17 
137 Trinidad and Tobago    3 7 10 
138 Turkey 1 10 10 10 6 37 
139 Tanzania    3 10 13 
140 Uganda    1 10 11 
141 Ukraine    5 10 15 
142 Uruguay    9 10 19 
143 United States   3 10 10 23 
144 
St_ Vincent and the 
Grenadines    7 10 17 
145 Venezuela, RB    4 10 14 
146 Vietnam    6 10 16 
147 Vanuatu    7 9 16 
148 Samoa     9 9 
149 Yemen, Rep_    9 9 18 






































1960 11.38 4.57 5.67    
1961 12.36 4.91 6.25    
1962 13.08 6.05 6.71    
1963 11.86 6.54 6.17    
1964 12.68 7.29 6.71    
1965 13.60 7.89 7.45    
1966 14.39 8.55 8.18    
1967 16.64 10.17 9.20    
1968 17.00 8.88 9.95    
1969 12.64 4.92 7.82    
1970 9.32 3.29 5.82    
1971 10.19 4.21 6.47    
1972 10.47 5.13 6.77    
1973 10.64 5.49 6.91    
1974 10.02 4.18 6.15    
1975 15.13 5.41 9.62    
1976 17.30 6.28 11.92    
1977 20.23 7.52 13.85    
1978 21.27 9.44 14.07    
1979 20.65 9.81 13.91    
1980 23.96 10.31 16.18    
1981 32.41 15.21 21.64    
1982 32.52 17.77 22.16    
1983 34.11 18.55 23.80    
1984 36.54 18.26 25.80    
1985 33.52 16.27 23.72    
1986 34.15 18.95 24.41    
1987 24.75 14.65 18.29    
1988 25.99 13.66 18.85  112.37  
1989 21.83 10.67 14.41 3.84 119.12  
1990 19.00 8.55 12.13 3.95 137.00  
1991 21.88 8.70 14.20 5.26 144.77  
1992 20.51 9.80 13.43 4.52 152.10  
1993 25.66 13.04 16.97 11.71 168.69  
1994 26.32 12.59 16.70 13.26 167.37  
1995 16.35 9.39 10.03 17.04 166.94  
1996 13.44 8.80 8.48 29.01 164.62 36.64 
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1997 14.55 10.19 9.55 35.84 159.68 35.70 
1998 17.78 12.58 11.83 34.80 159.16 22.28 
1999 19.54 12.96 13.68 18.16 161.90 26.49 
2000 19.05 11.33 13.75 7.47 158.70 27.45 
2001 25.82 15.25 18.70 10.89 153.96 23.52 
2002 21.35 12.97 15.80 3.92 150.90 23.32 
2003 19.55 12.47 14.80 10.71 150.89 23.41 
2004 16.77 11.77 13.01 16.97 151.43 36.11 
2005 17.00 12.45 13.31 17.76 154.00 58.96 
2006 17.05 12.20 13.52 19.55 140.25 71.09 
2007 22.85 18.41 19.32 35.47 143.39 67.76 
2008 30.58 27.77 27.18 34.60 140.29 54.90 
2009 39.69 36.01 34.66 20.86 137.88 60.32 
2010 20.52 16.64 17.52 11.14 134.86 48.53 
2011 19.59 13.05 16.91 10.84 119.68 42.21 
2012 19.94 11.54 17.41 10.33 112.34 38.58 
2013 20.20 11.57 17.95 13.24 108.79 39.42 
2014 19.75 12.89 17.91 12.73 105.93 44.97 
2015 19.44 14.04 17.69 10.56 100.44 45.65 

















Appendix 3: Bank Credit Sectoral Share (N’ Million) Q12015-Q3 
2017    
Quarter-Year\Sector Agriculture 
Mining & 
Quarrying Manufacturing Oil & Gas 
Power & 
Energy Services 
Q1 2015 466,381.34 222,303 1,878,091.98 2.153,166.81 282,697.75 8,354,461.31 
Q2 2015 484,947.80 17,937.35 1,909,491.64 2,058,656.54 353,910.83 8,608,481.37 
Q3 2015 469,924.38 12,142.76 1,958,451.18 2,241,331.26 359,567.76 7,972,463.73 
Q4 2015 449,307.29 11,714.18 1,736,192.99 2,272,812.29 340,308.57 8,275,869.60 
Q1 2016 485,639.22 11,336.49 1,862,589.07 2,237,712.11 357,587.99 8,252,739.06 
Q2 2016 480,639.22 16,328.38 2,058,036.94 3,366,153.62 447,228.40 9,169,067.19 
Q3 2016 491,282.18 27,282.41 2,130,441.30 3,647,251.14 428,448.59 9,460,398.61 
Q4 2016 525,945.19 21,283.46 2,215,741.07 3,587,904.75 432,293.83 9,334,117.20 
Q1 2017 556,544.59 8,229.26 2,142,390.15 3,575,664.85 472,083.75 9,247,574.16 
Q2 2017 501,088.16 11,417.18 2,216,749.95 3,528,162.53 466,086.89 8,987,006.01 
Q3 2017 491,496.69 11,761.54 2,267,425.12 3,542,289.06 459,248.46 9,053,078.04 
Source: Author’s Compilation from National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
Note: ‘Services’ in Bank credit to the private sector as categorised by the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics (NBS) comprises 
construction, trade/general commerce, government services, real estate, finance, insurance and capital market, 
education services, oil and gas, power and energy services, information and communication, transportation and storage, 







































Agriculture 3.49 3.61 3.61 3.43 3.68 3.09 3.04 3.26 3.48 3.19 3.11 
Mining & 
Quarrying 1.66 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.07 
Manufacturing 14.06 14.21 15.05 13.27 14.1 13.25 13.16 13.75 13.39 14.11 14.33 
Oil & Gas 24.16 23.86 26.53 26.2 24.76 28.98 29.95 30.13 30.44 29.4 29.59 
Power & 
Energy 3.35 3.83 4.06 3.84 4 4.41 4.51 4.5 4.86 4.89 4.78 
Construction 4.38 4.77 4.26 4.06 3.93 3.91 3.9 3.92 3.86 4.01 4.13 
Trade/General 
Commerce 9.36 7.88 7.91 7.53 7.2 6.56 6.01 6.11 5.96 6.11 6.03 
Government 5.74 5.19 4.75 7.05 9.32 8.91 8.44 8.45 8.56 8.7 8.66 
Finance, 
Insurance & 
Real Estate 10.28 10.12 10.97 11.34 10.81 10.12 10.47 10.73 10.77 10.85 10.84 
Education 0.5 0.48 0.61 0.57 0.63 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.48 0.49 
General 11.02 13.85 9.9 10.63 9.81 8.53 8.59 8.16 7.99 8.16 8.13 
Information & 
Communication 5.78 6.32 6.34 6.24 6.28 6.08 5.92 5.25 5.13 5 5.2 
Transport & 
Storage 3.43 3.08 3.23 3.21 2.95 2.94 2.84 2.8 2.7 2.57 2.36 
Others 2.69 2.65 2.66 2.54 2.46 2.53 2.46 2.28 2.28 2.45 2.28 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 





Appendix 5: Bank Credit to the Private Sector (N' Million) Q1 2015 - Q3 2017 
Quarter-
Year\Sector Q1 2015 Q2 2015 Q3 2015 Q4 2015 Q1 2016 Q2 2016 Q3 2016 Q4 2016 Q1 2017 Q2 2017 Q3 2017 
Agriculture 466381.34 484947.8 469924.38 449307.29 485639.22 480639.22 491282.18 525945.19 556544.59 501088.16 491496.69 
Mining & 
Quarrying 222302.53 17937.35 12142.76 11714.18 11336.49 16328.38 27282.41 21283.46 8229.26 11417.18 11761.54 
Manufacturing 1878091.98 1909491.64 1958451.18 1736192.99 1862589.07 2058036.94 2130441.3 2215741.07 2142390.15 2216749.95 2267425.12 
Oil & Gas 3226657.94 3205895.4 4453414.56 3428346.02 3270554.75 4503149.95 4847605.02 4855650.82 4871809.71 4618716.54 4683741.84 
Power & 
Energy 446625.96 515154.5 528966.83 502746.51 527560.38 685225.86 729812.18 726287.31 778059.76 768269.54 756120.25 
Construction 585520.35 641300.42 554253.16 531739.23 519036.24 607390.33 631405.26 631092 617770.14 630677.08 653606.29 
Trade/General 
Commerce 1250693.78 1058732.11 1029996.29 985693.67 950542.64 1020014.61 973006.59 984899.21 953092.55 960049.11 954231.99 
Government 766339.94 696874.19 618389.79 922888,21 1230301.35 1384963.25 1366684.41 1361853.09 1369061.27 1367342.27 1369946.93 
Finance, 
Insurance & 
Real Estate 1372598.98 1360135.63 1427942.8 1483587.91 1426987.58 1572998.98 1693576.2 1728899.54 1723526.06 1704465.56 1715239.2 
Education 79696.47 64642.82 79141.13 74158.67 83303.8 87762.11 89311.85 87221.21 86379.3 75071.55 77185.83 




Communication 771560.81 848856.41 825436.03 816381.29 829440.86 944571.11 957940.65 845936.38 820343.52 786223.69 822626.6 
Transport & 
Storage 458442.91 413138.37 420878.33 420608.7 389545.46 456889.25 459224.34 450755.69 431941.49 403147.53 373260.09 
Others 359961.18 356410.37 346076.14 332347.47 325301.94 393416.62 397437.82 367237.08 364393.95 384936.03 361538.63 
Total 13357101.71 13433425.55 13013881.07 13086204.91 13207598.46 15537453.74 16185103.23 16117285.5 16002486.76 15710570.72 15825298.91 
 
Source: Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
Note: Oil and Gas and Power and Energy comprise industry and services allocation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
